

The Populist Centre-Authoritarian Challenge: A Revised Account of the Radical Right's Success in Western Europe.

Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Nuffield College.

Abstract.

This article brings new evidence to the debate about the causes of populist right parties' success in contemporary democracies in Western Europe. It does so by criticizing and revising the most influential account of it—*The New Radical Right in Western Europe* (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). In three cases where we according to the influential study should expect a right-authoritarian winning strategy—France, Belgium, and Denmark—this study shows that a populist centre-authoritarian strategy was more successful. A number of criticisms of Kitschelt and McGann's explanation are thus supported on new empirical grounds. The revised account presented here draws attention to aspects of the populist right's success that have not been sufficiently studied. The 'underdog' image of the populist parties matters more than previously thought, and the electoral returns to these parties' chauvinist positions are higher than earlier believed.¹

Comments Welcome

elisabeth.ivarsflaten@nuf.ox.ac.uk

Introduction.

The success of the populist right in Western Europe during the last decade was remarkable. Le Pen reached the second round in the French Presidential Election in April 2002. In the Netherlands, List Pim Fortuyn entered the governing coalition after the party's success in the parliamentary election in May 2002. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) won 52 of 183 parliamentary seats in 1999 and entered the governing coalition. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) became the largest party in the national election of 1999 gaining 22.5 percent of the vote. The Danish People's Party (DF) was prominent in the victorious anti-Euro campaign in Denmark in 2000. The Flemish Blok (VB) was the most popular party in the last two municipal elections in Antwerp in the Flemish region of Belgium. The Progress Party (FrP) was the most popular party in Norway in opinion polls in the summer of 2002.

This article brings new evidence to the debate about what kind of challenge populist right parties pose to contemporary democracies in Western Europe. It does so by criticizing and revising the most influential account of the populist right's success to date. One is hard pressed to find any recent publication on the populist or radical right in Western Europe that does *not* somehow respond to Kitschelt and McGann's thesis (1995). Most responses have been critical of the conclusions in *The New Radical Right in Western Europe*. This article contains empirical evidence and analysis addressing this controversy.

Two aspects Kitschelt and McGann's explanation of the populist right's success are refuted. First, it is shown that the appeal to voters who are dissatisfied with politics is an important part of the winning formula of the populist right across the board, not as Kitschelt and McGann suggested only in countries governed by grand coalitions, like Austria, or countries with widespread corruption, like Italy.

Second, in no case can the populist right voters be described as radical on issues related to state involvement in the economy.

This article, therefore, calls for nothing less than a major revision of our explanation for the success of the populist right in Western Europe. The right-authoritarian strategy is not the most successful one available to them. The populist centre-authoritarian strategy is more successful, and explains the surge in electoral support for the populist right better.

The first section of this article revisits the controversy generated by Kitschelt and McGann's work. The second section introduces my case selection and my method of analysis. The third section presents analyses of three elections, which were specifically selected to put Kitschelt and McGann's hypothesis about the right-authoritarian winning formula to a fair, but difficult test. Using national election surveys, instead of the world value survey, this article is able to test the hypotheses of Kitschelt and McGann not only on new data, but also on data that includes more cases of populist voters and asks a larger variety of attitudinal questions. I conclude by reformulating the winning formula of the populist right and pointing out important implications of this reformulation.

The Controversy over the Populist Right's Appeal


Kitschelt's general theory of party competition can be summarized in three points. First, the distribution of preferences in the electorate depends on the available types of life experiences at any given time. Second, specific aggregate changes in the types and combinations of life experiences available in advanced industrialized democracies since the 1970s have caused a rotation of the main axis of political competition. The poles of the new axis of competition are left-libertarian and right-authoritarian. Third,

whether parties succeed or fail in the altered electoral space depends on the strategic choices parties make in competition with other parties over electoral support or office.

One problem with this general framework is connected to Kitschelt's adoption of Downs's assumption that parties compete mainly along one ideological axis (Downs 1957). This problem to some extent overshadows the analytical leverage gained from thinking about political space as containing both an economic and a socio-cultural dimension. It seems plausible that people have roughly consistent attitudes about state involvement in the economy, on the one hand, and the desirability of socio-cultural restrictions, on the other. These dimensions may not stand up against strict empirical tests of attitude consistencies based on surveys, but they make up a useful analytical model, which appears to be a more accurate depiction of contemporary electoral space than left-right, materialist-postmaterialist, or simply chaotic models (see for example, Heath *et al.* 2001).

The additional idea, introduced by Kitschelt, that people's attitudes on the two dimensions are consistent in such a way that people holding neo-liberal economic views are most likely to be for restrictions in the socio-cultural sphere is less convincing (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). What about all those highly educated professionals who favour a more entrepreneurial economy, support immigration, because they see it as good for the market, and are true cosmopolitans—unbothered by alternative life-styles? Would not they be right-libertarian? What about all the unskilled workers in the private service sector with low education and little job security, who think that immigration threatens their jobs or will lower their wages, but depend on redistribution and state regulations for adequate health-care and wages? Would not they be left-authoritarian?

Figure 1. The left/libertarian-right/authoritarian axis of competition.



It is quite likely that the libertarian-authoritarian dimension in politics is more divisive for the electorates of the traditional right and the traditional left than Kitschelt's framework would lead us to believe. By consequence, contemporary party competition may not be best described as taking place along a neatly rotated competitive axis, but rather as continuous fighting over the types of issues allowed to dominate the political agenda and attract people's vote. I do not dispute that grand changes have led to alterations in the types of life-experiences available to people, but I argue that these experiences are not connected to political competition in the way Kitschelt suggests. The authoritarian pole goes less easily with the right pole and the libertarian pole goes less easily with the left pole both for voters and for parties.

Most of the criticism of Kitschelt and McGann's explanation of the success of the populist right in Western Europe is implicitly or explicitly directed towards this particular aspect of his general theory. Schain argues that the French *Front National*,

which Kitschelt and McGann launched as a master-example of the new radical right, was not pro-capitalist. “Recent surveys,” Schain claims, “imply exactly the opposite: relatively low support for business, strong support for state intervention, and weak support for competitiveness...Because the National Front is a master case, I am left with serious reservations about the more general theory” (Schain 1997, p. 378). In another review, Steinmetz also criticizes Kitschelt and McGann for their concept of the pro-capitalist pole. “Clearly,” he argues, “the ‘anti-capitalist’ positions of the new white-collar class differ from the ‘anti-capitalism’ of industrial proletarians. Indeed, the increased emphasis on white-collar interests within many social democratic parties may better explain workers’ shift to the right than any transhistorical model of authoritarianism” (Steinmetz, 1997, p. 1176).

Hans-Georg Betz goes a step further than the previous two reviewers. He argues, by way of example, that the increased number of blue collar workers that the Austrian FPÖ and the Italian *Lega Nord* attracted in the 1990s shows that the “distinction between radical right-wing parties and populist anti-statist parties is less useful than he [Kitschelt] claims.” Instead, Betz suggests, the radical right is more flexible than Kitschelt and McGann’s study make us believe. As a consequence of this flexibility, Betz continues, “it might well be...that the radical right will in the future abandon market liberalism in favour of a return to Keynesianism and some form of protectionism should the ideological tide turn in Western Europe and elsewhere” (Betz 1996, p. 717).

A number of comparative studies support the initial reactions of the reviewers. Studying the ideology of what he terms ‘extreme right parties’ (ERPs), Cas Mudde found very little support for Kitschelt and McGann’s emphasis on the free-market position of the new radical right. This emphasis, Mudde argued, “is peculiar for two

reasons: (1) for ERPs, economy is at best a secondary issue and (2) they have a *welfare chauvinist* economic program” (Mudde 1999, p. 189). Arguing that nationalism is at the core of the ideology even of those parties that Kitschelt and McGann label the new radical right, Mudde insists that the “‘prototype NRR’ [new radical right], the FN, has increasingly thrown off its neo-liberal rhetoric and now openly admits to its ‘economic protectionist’ program” (Mudde 1999, p. 189). When the radical right parties argued for tax cuts or privatisation in the late 1990s, Mudde claimed, they targeted very specific areas such as bureaucratic waste or spending on immigrants. Protectionism, support for welfare (pensions and job creation), and state subsidies were all anti-freemarket proposals that Mudde found promoted by the new radical right in Western Europe.

Analyzing the electorate of the populist right in a quantitative comparative study, Lubbers also came down against Kitschelt and McGann’s right-authoritarian winning formula. He found that in France and Flanders, those manual workers who supported free markets were a little more likely to vote for the radical right than the mainstream party of the left. Kitschelt and McGann’s hypothesis would predict such a divide among workers. However, Lubbers insists that the workers may have been more attracted by the welfare chauvinist appeals of the radical right. “The *Vlaams Blok* and *Front National* programs,” Lubbers argued, “do call for some protective measures against international competition.” Therefore, he concluded, “the interpretation that extreme-right manual workers have dissociated themselves from social democratic redistributive measures to deprive out-groups of welfare benefits seems more applicable and is not refuted by the findings” (Lubbers, 2001, p. 233).

Numerous other authors who consider single cases, explicitly or implicitly argue against the importance of neo-liberalism as a defining feature of the successful

radical right. About the supporters of the Scandinavian parties, Andersen and Bjørklund argued that they are “more xenophobic, more authoritarian and less green than the supporters of any other party. The original issues of taxation and welfarism play a minor role” (2000, p. 215). In comprehensive studies of *Front National* in France, Nona Mayer and Pascal Perrineau argued that the support for Le Pen derived from a diverse set of constituencies, who were not united by a particular combination of authoritarian and neo-liberal attitudes (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999). About the success of *Vlaams Blok* in Antwerp, Swyngedouw argued that “the anti-immigrant slogans, populist anti-(party) political message, combined with a well-organized party apparatus...are the threads from which the VB has woven its success” (Swyngedouw 2000, p. 141).

In spite of the widespread criticism of Kitschelt and McGann’s right-authoritarian winning formula, the two authors find further support for their thesis in a recent analysis of the success of the Swiss renewed radical right, SVP. Unlike the FPÖ, which is a populist, anti-statist party, they argue that the SVP “capitalized on favorable opportunities to appeal to a broader new radical rightist anti-EU, market-liberal and socio-culturally authoritarian-traditionalist electorate” (Kitschelt and McGann 2002, p. 18). They thus insist on the usefulness of a winning formula that contains a market-liberal element.

Method of Evaluation

To contribute to the seeming standstill in the debate between Kitschelt and McGann and a number of other scholars who study the contemporary populist right, I will analyze the electoral support of three populist right parties. Kitschelt and McGann characterized all three of them as new radical right parties in 1995. The two authors


could not consider the three elections I will examine, because they had not yet taken place at the time when the *New Radical Right in Western Europe* was written. My contribution differs from other recent studies since it is explicitly designed to evaluate the key points of contention following Kitschelt and McGann's account.

The parties I will analyze are *Front National* (FN) in France, *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF) in Denmark, and *Vlaams Blok* (VB) in Flanders. Besides the FPÖ, *Lega Nord*, *Alleanza Nazionale*, the Swiss SVP, and the Norwegian FrP, these parties were the most successful among those normally considered under the broad banner of the populist, radical, or new extreme right in the 1990s. I study successful parties to make the conditions where the winning formula should be present as favourable as possible. I do not select the Italian and Austrian parties, since Kitschelt and McGann argued that these are special cases where they do not find or expect to find that the right-authoritarian winning formula works. I do not select the Norwegian party, since I do not expect that an analysis of its electorate would reveal much additional information given that I examine the Danish case. I added *Vlaams Blok* since most existing studies of it suggests that it should be considered among the new radical right parties (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 2000). The reason why it was excluded from Kitschelt and McGann's work was lack of data rather than lack of reasons to include it. In addition, examining the success of *Vlaams Blok* gives me an opportunity to check the extent to which Kitschelt and McGann's theory works for a party that they could have, but did not, consider.

Figure 2 shows the electoral results of the parties to be considered over time, and it shows that all three parties received an increasing part of the vote in the 1990s. More specifically, figure 2 shows the percentage of the vote at national parliamentary elections for *Fremskridtspartiet* (FrP) and *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF) in Denmark,

Vlaams Blok (VB) in the Flemish region of Belgium and *Front National* (FN) in France (first round). For each party, the graphs start in the first election when it received more than 1 percent of the national vote. Results from all parliamentary elections from the start of the graph are included, and each year of an election is marked with a symbol. In the case of VB, I report the vote share from Flanders only, since VB neither gets nor seeks support outside of the Flemish region.

Figure 2. Percent of the vote received in national parliamentary elections by the populist right in Flanders, France and Denmark.



Source: Caramani (1999), CD-ROM. Additional updates from the Belgian and Danish government websites for the 2001 and 1999 elections.

The elections I examine in the next sections are the 1995 national parliamentary election in Belgium, the 1997 national parliamentary election in France, and the 1998 national parliamentary election in Denmark. For *Vlaams Blok*, the parliamentary election on May 21, 1995, was its best national election by then. The party received 12.5 percent of the votes in the Flemish region, and 7.8 percent overall. This result secured 11 seats in parliament for the party (Deruette 1996; Downs 1996). *Vlaams Blok* did even better in the following election in 1999, when it received 15.5 percent of the Flemish vote. I analyze the 1995 election, because the survey data needed for the 1999 election was not yet available.

The parliamentary election in France, between May 25 and June 1, 1997, saw electoral support for FN soar to 15.1 percent of the vote in the first round. Judging from the results in the second ballot, 1997 was not the FN's best election. In the 1986 parliamentary election, which was fought under a PR system, the FN received as much as 10.1 percent of the vote in the decisive ballot. In the 1993 parliamentary election which used the same electoral rules as the 1997 election, the FN received a slightly higher percentage of the vote in the decisive ballot than it did in 1997 (6.3 versus 5.7 percent). Following common practice when analyzing voting for the FN in France, however, I consider the results of the first round to be the more reliable indicator of the support for the party (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999; Schain 2000; Boy and Mayer 2000). The 1997 election can therefore be considered the best parliamentary election of FN to date, and the conditions should be very favorable for Kitschelt and McGann's theory.

The combined vote for the Danish Progress Party and the Danish People's Party (DF) in the 1998 parliamentary election was 9.8 percent. The DF, which I will analyze in chapter two, earned 7.4 percent alone and received 13 seats in parliament (Nielsen, 1999; Elklit 1999). The combined result of the populist right in 1998 was the best in Denmark since 1979. The best election for the populist right that could reasonably be expected to be in accordance with Kitschelt and McGann's winning formula was, therefore, the 1998 parliamentary election. The Danish People's Party performed even better in the parliamentary election in November 2001, when it received 12 percent of the vote. Survey data from that election is however not yet available for secondary analysis.

In all three cases, I analyse data from national election surveys conducted by different teams of researchers in connection with these three elections. The advantage

of using national election studies instead of a large international survey is that the former contain more of the information that is needed to evaluate Kitschelt and McGann's hypotheses. Especially important in our case, the national election studies have more respondents that voted for the populist right than any available international survey, and we can therefore do better analysis and be more certain about the results concerning the populist right electorate when using national election studies. The disadvantage of not using an international survey is that the national surveys do not ask exactly the same questions, and that they are not conducted in exactly the same ways. The data for the three elections can therefore not be directly compared. In my view, the advantages of using the national election studies outweigh the disadvantages, particularly since they allow us to bring new data to bear on Kitschelt and McGann's controversial hypotheses.

Since the data about the three cases are not strictly comparable, I present my analysis of the elections in separate sections. The presentation of the three cases follows a similar pattern. I first develop indices for measuring attitudes thought to influence the decision to vote for the populist right. Using multinomial logit models, I show that dissatisfaction with politics has an independent effect on the probability of voting for the populist right rather than any of the other mainstream parties. Second, I examine the extent to which the populist right voters can indeed be viewed as 'resolutely neo-liberal' by interpreting the results using conditional effects plots.

The Danish Parliamentary Election of 1998.

Two aspects distinguish the Danish populist right of 1998, which I study, from the Danish populist right of 1991, which Kitschelt and McGann studied. First, by 1998, the internal struggles between the old party leader, Mogens Glistrup, and the new

party leader, Pia Kjøersgaard, had settled. It had done so after Kjøersgaard left the Glistrup-camp and established the DF. Since the new DF was much more successful than the old FrP in the 1998 election, I study the voters of that party. The more recent parliamentary election of 2001 was a further indication that the DF is the dominant populist right party in Denmark. The results from the 1998 election already showed that most of the voters who had previously voted for the Progress Party led by Kjøersgaard went on to vote for the Danish People's Party (Elklit 1999). Second, the party we study in 1998 (DF) was electorally more successful than the party Kitschelt and McGann studied in 1991 (FrP).

The changes within the populist right fraction of Danish politics could be thought to make the Danish populist right more like its southern cousins. After all, Glistrup was in the 1970s an anti-tax and culturally libertarian voice in Danish politics, while Kjøersgaard puts more emphasis on nationalist and exclusionist issues, such as anti-immigration and Euro-scepticism. My analysis in this chapter shows that the Danish populist right of 1998 was very much like its cousin parties in France and Flanders. It was, however, not more of a right-authoritarian party in 1998, but more of a populist centre-authoritarian party—combining exclusionism and anti-politics populism with chauvinist, centre-right, rather than resolutely neo-liberal appeals. Rather than being an awkward member of the European radical right family, the DF in 1998 is a prime example of the winning populist right in Western Europe in the 1990s. Its party history with the decline of the Glistrup camp in favour of the Kjøersgaard fraction exemplifies the victory of the populist centre-authoritarian formula over other formulas.

The Populist Appeal


As outlined above, Kitschelt and McGann emphasized that the radical right electorate would be composed of people holding a combination of neo-liberal and socio-culturally authoritarian attitudes. Recent developments in Danish politics, most notably the campaign against the Euro before the referendum in 2000, suggest that the EU issue should be included in the winning formula of the Danish People's Party. Kitschelt and McGann do not include attitudes towards the EU in their Danish model. However, Euro-scepticism at least conceptually maps onto their socio-cultural axis as long as it is seen to represent nationalism, fear of change, or socio-cultural protectionism. Attitudes towards the EU can, however, also be viewed as a separate political dimension altogether, so I do not assume that the EU issue is part of the socio-cultural set of attitudes (Hix 1999; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2001). In addition, I hypothesised that dissatisfaction with politics is an important component of the winning formula of populist right parties across Europe, not only in Italy and Austria. This section presents a test of the extent to which these various attitudes distinguish the populist right voters from voters of the mainstream parties, green voters, and non-voters in Denmark.

To prepare the test, I analysed the Danish Election Survey of 1998 and selected 26 questions from this study that asked about attitudes towards immigration, law and order, the EU, satisfaction with politics, the environment, redistribution, and public sector size.² The questions used are reported in the appendix. Kitschelt and McGann collected questions in a similar fashion from the World Value Survey. They then, like I do, subjected the questions to a principal component analysis (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, p. 140).

Based on the results of the principal component analysis reported in the appendix, I constructed six indices measuring exclusionism, Euro-scepticism, satisfaction with politics, attitudes towards redistribution, attitudes towards environmental protection, and attitudes towards public sector size. I computed index scores by adding together the responses for all items (questions) that loaded on the same component and dividing by the number of items.³ As a result, the indices for all attitudes ranged between 1 and 5. The variables have been coded so that the lowest value (1) always denotes the most left-libertarian and least populist position— inclusionist, pro-EU, for redistribution, for a large public sector, satisfied with politics, and supportive of environmental protection. The highest value (5) always denotes the opposite, the most right-authoritarian and most populist attitudes. If we think that all the hypotheses described in the introductory paragraph of this section are true, we would expect populist right voters to score higher than other voters on our scales.

Figure 3 plots attitudes towards redistribution and exclusionism according to party. To give a portrait of the populist right voters, I have chosen to compare the Danish People's Party's (DF) voters to the voters of the largest mainstream parties (the Social Democrats (SD), the Liberals (V), and the Conservatives (K)), the voters of the Danish approximation of a left-libertarian or green party (SF), and the non-voters. I selected the two last groups because we expect that the green voters may be an interesting mirror image of the populist right and because the non-voters could be interestingly similar to the populist right voters. Those who voted for other parties have been excluded. In total, 390 respondents were excluded and 1611 respondents were kept in the model. The 390 respondents who were excluded voted for other relatively small parties or single candidates.

Figure 3. Mean scores on the redistribution and exclusionism indices by party vote, no-vote and the population mean in Denmark, 1998.



Source: *Danish Election Studies, 1998.*

Figure 3 shows that the voters of the Danish People's Party (DF) score higher than voters of the other parties, non-voters, and the population mean on the exclusionism scale. By contrast the DF voters are in the middle position on the redistribution scale. They have the green and social democratic voters and the non-voters to their left and they have the voters of the two mainstream parties of the right to their right.

I use a multinomial logit model to test the hypothesis that all the attitudes considered contribute to distinguishing the voters of the Danish People's Party from the voters of other parties and non-voters. The multinomial logit model tests the proposition that the odds (or the log odds, to be precise) of voting for the Danish People's Party rather than any of the other options considered varies according to attitudes towards immigrants and order, the EU, environmental protection, redistribution, public sector size, and satisfaction with politics. Like all statistical models, the multinomial logit model estimated here also has an error term which includes the variance in party vote not predicted by the attitudinal variables included

in the model. In our case, we are not primarily concerned with predicting voting in the best possible way, but we are interested in finding out whether all of the attitudinal variables included in the model has an independent effect on the odds that a person will vote populist rather than another party (or not vote).

[Table 1 about here]

The results are presented in table 1. The table lists the independent variables (the attitudes) in the left column. The other columns contain the statistical results of the model described above. The coefficients are given as log odds here, but we will interpret them as percentages or proportions in the sections to follow. Table 1, however, suffices for answering our initial question. Which combination of attitudes distinguished populist right voters from voters of other parties and from non-voters in Denmark in 1998? Table 1 shows that all of the attitudes considered have an independent effect on the chances that a person will vote for the populist right. Stated differently, if we drop any one of the attitudinal variables, the model fits our empirical data significantly worse.⁴

One idea launched from time to time in the media and sometimes considered by political scientists (see for example Mudde 1999) is that the vote for the populist right is only about immigration attitudes. This idea is decisively refuted by the statistical results presented in table 1. Consider for example the comparison of the voters of the Danish People's Party to the voters of the Social Democrats. All coefficients are significant on the five-percent level, so all the attitudes included in the model have an independent effect on making people more likely to vote populist than social democrat. The only concession we should make to a hypothesis about the dominance of anti-immigration attitudes is that exclusionist attitudes are the only ones in our model that distinguish the populist right voters from all the other groups

considered in the expected direction (i.e. all coefficients for exclusionist attitudes are significant and have negative signs). Populist right voters were in other words more exclusionist (against immigrants and for strict law and order measures) than voters of the mainstream left, the mainstream right, the green voters, and the non-voters in Denmark in 1998.

As I hypothesised, dissatisfaction with the political process distinguishes the populist right voters from the voters of all three mainstream parties and, in the Danish case, even from the green voters, too. The negative signs of the coefficients related to the satisfaction measure in table 1 shows that the average DF voters were more dissatisfied with politics than voters for the four other parties when the other attitudes in the model are held constant. As one may have expected, the non-voters are not more satisfied with politics than the populist right voters. Given that not voting can be interpreted as a protest act or a sign of alienation from politics, it is perhaps surprising that the non-voters are not significantly more dissatisfied than the populist right voters. The anti-politics appeal that Kitschelt and McGann reserved for the anti-statist populist parties in Austria and Italy, therefore, played a part in the winning appeal of the Danish populist right in the 1998 election.

No Resolute Neo-liberalism

Given the controversy over the degree to which populist right voters are resolutely neo-liberal we will pay particular attention to the measures of such attitudes that we have in the Danish case. Several critics of the Kitschelt and McGann winning formula interpreted the two authors as arguing that the successful new radical right would manage to attract a coalition of voters that held radical right views on the economic axis (Schain 1997; Steinmetz 1997; Betz 1996; Mudde 1996). The populist

right voters would in this interpretation be to the right of voters of all other mainstream parties on the economic axis. This view is not supported by my analysis. However, it is also possible to interpret Kitschelt and McGann's winning formula as saying that the new radical right would attract voters who are to the right of the mean in the electorate, but not necessarily to the right of the mainstream parties of the right on the economic scale. The evidence in the Danish case, casts some doubt even on this more relaxed interpretation of the neo-liberalism of the DF's electorate.


To interpret more accurately how changing attitudes with regards to public sector size affect the probability of voting for the populist right a graphical interpretation is presented in figure 4. The figure focuses on the public sector size measure rather than the redistribution one, because the public sector measure is the one most supportive of Kitschelt and McGann's hypothesis. The figure shows how the results in the multinomial model in table 1 varies if we keep all independent variables (attitudes) at their mean, except attitudes towards public sector size, which we allow to vary across its entire range.⁵ For example, the line labeled "SD-DF" shows that the predicted probability of voting Social Democrat rather than the Danish People's Party declines as attitudes towards a large public sector become more hostile. Recall that the value "5" on the horizontal axis indicates the most rightist position, i.e. a high level of hostility towards a large public sector.

If we understand the "winning formula" to mean that the further to the right voters are placed on the economic dimension, the more likely they are to vote for the populist right rather than any other party, figure 4 disproves it. Only the predicted probabilities of voting for the greens, the main party of the left, and not voting rather than voting for the populist right declines as attitudes towards the public sector become more rightist. The probabilities of voting for the mainstream parties of the

right rather than the populist right, by contrast, increase as the attitudes towards public sector size become more rightist.

The increase in the predicted probability of voting Conservative (K) is the most marked. Voters with mean positions on all other issues, who are for a large state are more likely to vote DF than Conservative—the probability of voting Conservative is about 40 percent at score “1” on the public sector size index. By contrast, voters with a mean position on all other issues, who are against a large state are much more likely to vote Conservative than DF—the probability of voting Conservative is about 75 percent at score “5” on the public sector size index. The probability of voting for the larger mainstream party of the right in Denmark, the Liberals (V), is above 75 percent regardless of attitudes towards state-size. However, compared to those who want a big state, those who want a smaller state are even more likely to vote liberal than populist.

Figure 4. Conditional effects of attitudes towards public sector size on the predicted probability of voting for DF in Denmark, 1998.



Source: Danish Election Study 1998.

The decline in the predicted probability of voting Social Democrat rather than DF in Denmark as attitudes become hostile towards a large public sector is quite

dramatic. Those who support a large public sector and have mean attitudes on all other variables in the model have a predicted probability of voting Social Democrat rather than DF of close to 1. They are in other words close to 100 percent certain to prefer the left to the DF. Those who are very hostile to a large public sector and have mean attitudes on the other variables are, by contrast, only about 60 percent more likely to vote Social Democrat than DF. The drop in the probability of choosing the green party over DF as attitudes towards the public sector become more hostile is the sharpest. While more than 90 percent of voters who support a large public sector (value “1”) would choose the greens over the populists, only 20 percent would do the same if they opposed a large public sector (value “5”).

Based on this evidence from the Danish election in 1998 we can conclude that the populist right is not the preferred choice for those who are extreme, or even moderate, neo-liberal voters. As attitudes towards the public sector become more hostile, the mainstream parties of the right become a more attractive choice than the populist right. However, the predicted probability of voting for any of the parties of the left or not voting decreases as attitudes towards the size of the public sector become more hostile. It is therefore wrong to consider the populist right voters in Denmark as extremely neo-liberal, but it is correct to view them as being more neo-liberal than those who support the parties of the left (the Social Democrats and the Greens). This evidence suggests that the winning formula for the populist right in Denmark might be its ability to appeal to voters of the left and of the right by adopting a middle of the road, or simply a chauvinist, position on issues relating to the state’s involvement in the economy.

The French Parliamentary Election of 1997.

In the study of the Danish People's Party we found that dissatisfaction with politics was more widespread among DF voters than among voters of the mainstream parties. This finding was robust also when we controlled for other attitudes thought to distinguish the populist right voters from voters of other parties. Comparative and single case studies of *Front National* give us no reason to suspect that the issues dividing the populist right voters and voters for other parties are different in France and Denmark (Andersen and Evans 2001; Lubbers 2001; Boy and Mayer 2000; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). As in the Danish case, there are good reasons to include attitudes to the EU into our analysis. Le Pen is a fervent nationalist and Euro-skeptic, so it is likely that an anti-EU position is part of the party's winning appeal. In addition, I hypothesize that like the Danish case, the French case will show that the anti-politics appeal of the French populist right is an important part of the party's winning formula.


The French Election Survey of 1997 was less comprehensive than the Danish Election Survey of 1998. As a result, it had fewer questions relevant to the attitudes we wish to study. Most importantly, there were no questions about attitudes towards environmental protection. Fortunately, questions about all other attitudes examined in the previous chapter were available. Since attitudes towards the environment are not crucial to my study, the lacking variable should not alter our conclusions significantly. In the end, I selected the 16 questions reported in the appendix. As in the Danish case, I grouped the attitudes under headings that represent attitudes towards different issues—the EU, state size and involvement in the economy, immigration, order and satisfaction with politics.

Similar to the results shown in the Danish case, the principal component analysis shown in the appendix extracted one less component than the number of headings suggested. In the French case, too, the two attitudes that load on the same component concern order and immigration. This result is not very robust since I only had one question that measured attitudes towards law and order. This question, however, very clearly loads on the same component as attitudes towards immigration. Consistent with my analysis of the Danish electorate, I label the combination of anti-immigrant and tough-on-crime attitudes 'exclusionist'. Unlike the Danish case, all questions about attitudes towards state size and involvement in the economy load on the same component. This is perhaps because none of the questions in the French study ask concretely about redistribution. For the Danish case, we found that the two sets of attitudes related to the economic axis yielded predicted probabilities of voting populist that were different only in degree, but not in kind. Both measures portrayed the populist right in Denmark as having a center-authoritarian, and not a right-authoritarian, appeal along the economic axis. It is therefore not a considerable disadvantage that we only have one index of neo-liberal attitudes in the French case.

Figure 5 shows exclusionist and neo-liberal attitudes according to party. Voters of *Front National* (FN) are compared to voters of the mainstream parties of the left (PS) and right (RPR and UDF), the greens (*Verts*), and non-voters. The image that appears is strikingly similar to the one we saw in the Danish case. The populist right voters are higher on the exclusionist measure than voters of any of the other parties. With regards to attitudes along the economic axis, the FN voters are to the left of the UDF and RPR voters. The results of the multinomial model in table 2 below does, however, not confirm the impression given by figure 5. When we control for the other relevant attitudes, the results in table 2 show that the difference between

the neo-liberal attitudes of FN, UDF, and RPR voters is not significantly different from zero.

Figure 5. Mean scores on the neo-liberalism and exclusionism indices by party vote, no-vote and the population mean in France, 1997.



Source: *French Election Study 1997*.

As in the Danish case, a multinomial logit model was estimated to test the hypothesis that all the attitudes considered contribute to distinguishing the populist right voters from voters of the other parties and non-voters. Because there are two mainstream parties on the right and only one mainstream party on the left, the dependent variable has 6 categories also in the French case. As in the Danish analysis, respondents who voted for other parties than those studied were excluded. In total, 753 of 3010 respondents were excluded.⁶ The number of respondents included in the model in table 2 is therefore 2257.

[Table 2 about here]

The results of the multinomial logit model are presented in table 2. As in the Danish case, we can conclude from the results that all the attitudes included in the model have an independent effect on the odds that a person will vote for the FN rather

than any of the other options considered. Additional tests of the fit of more parsimonious models corroborate the impression given by table 2, since all the more parsimonious models fit the data significantly worse at the 1 percent level. Voting for the populist-right can therefore clearly not be explained by exclusionist attitudes alone.


Moreover, in France, both exclusionism and Euro-scepticism distinguish the populist right voters from voters of all the other parties considered and from the non-voters. The FN voters are, in other words, not only on average more exclusionist than nearly everybody else, but they are also more often Euro-sceptic. This difference between the Danish and the French results is due to the difference between the positions of the green parties in the two countries on the EU-issue. While the Danish SF has a Euro-sceptic profile, the French green party is pro-EU. A glance at the Danish model presented above reveals that the anti-EU attitudes distinguished the Danish populist voters from the voters of all the mainstream parties and the non-voters, but not from the greens (SF).

As I hypothesised, dissatisfaction with the political process distinguished FN voters from the voters of the three mainstream parties—PS, RPR and UDF. The populist right voters were, as I expected, more dissatisfied with politics (the coefficients are all positive). There is no significant difference between the populist voters, the green voters and the non-voters in this respect. The analysis presented here shows that even the party that Kitschelt and McGann viewed as their master case benefits from an anti-politics or populist appeal. The analysis of the French case is thus further evidence that it may not make sense to view the FPÖ as a different type of party than the Danish People's Party and the National Front. The FPÖ's type of

winning appeal, at least as far as populism goes, is certainly evident in the French and Danish cases, too.

To get a clearer picture of the effect of changing attitudes towards the state's involvement in the economy on the decision to vote for the populist right, a graphic interpretation of the multinomial logit model is presented in figure 6. The graph shows how the predicted probability of voting for another option rather than *Front National* varies as neo-liberal attitudes are allowed to vary. All the other attitudes (independent variables) in the model are kept at their mean. Similar to the Danish case, figure 6 disproves the hypothesis that the more rightist people become on the economic axis, the more likely they are to vote for *Front National*. Only the predicted probabilities of voting for the main party of the left, the greens, and not voting rather than voting for FN decrease as hostility towards state involvement in the economy increases.

Figure 6. Conditional effects of attitudes towards state involvement in the economy on the predicted probability of voting for FN in France, 1997.



Source: French Election Study 1997.

The predicted probabilities of voting for the main parties of the right grow slightly as hostile attitudes towards state involvement in the economy increase. The predicted probability of preferring the RPR over *Front National* increases by approximately 10 percentage point from about 65 to about 75 percent. The increase in the case of the UDF is smaller—from about 65 to about 70 percent. The decline in the predicted probability of voting for PS is, by contrast, very steep. Preferring a large state that is heavily involved in the economy and having mean attitudes on all other measures quite effectively prevents voters from choosing *Front National* over PS. Figure 6 depicts this by showing that the predicted probability of voting PS rather than FN is close to 100 percent at the extreme end of the neo-liberalism index (value “1”). By comparison, those who are against heavy state involvement in the economy (value “4”) are more likely to vote FN than PS if all other attitudes are at their mean. The predicted probability of voting PS over FN, in this case, is only about 30 percent.

The evidence from the French election of 1997 shows that, like in Denmark, *Front National* is not the dominant choice of those who are at the extreme right on the economic scale. As attitudes towards state size and involvement become more hostile, the mainstream parties of the right is a bit more attractive than the populist right also in France. As in the Danish case, therefore, the populist voters are correctly viewed not as being to the right of all other voters on the economic axis, but as being to the right of the voters of the left, the green voters, and the non-voters. Although the FN voters in France are more similar to the parties of the right than their Danish counterparts, the average voters of the populist right in France, too, have a non-extremist, center-right stance.

The 1995 Parliamentary Election in Belgium

Writing in 1995, Kitschelt and McGann argued that, “the parties with right-authoritarian appeal include the French National Front, the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties (with a somewhat more restrained authoritarianism), and also most likely the Swiss extreme-rightist parties (Automobilists and National Action/Swiss Democrats) and the Belgian Vlaams Blok, parties we cannot examine here for want of comparable data” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, p. 90). In this section, I conduct an analysis of the Flemish part of the Belgian Parliamentary election of 1995 to evaluate the hypothesis that *Vlaams Blok* is a new radical right party. The method of investigation is the same as is in the two preceding case-studies, and the conclusions reached are on the whole strikingly similar. The evidence in this section supports grouping VB together with the Danish People’s Party and the French National Front. The analysis shows that a populist anti-politics stance contributes to the appeal of *Vlaams Blok*. Moreover, the anti-immigration position is an important part of the winning formula of VB, but the entire winning formula consists of a combination of appeals very similar to those found in Denmark and France. With regards to the economic axis, *Vlaams Blok’s* voters are more clearly in a middle position than the Danish and French voters. The success of VB in Flanders is thus further evidence that populist right success does not hinge upon a resolutely neo-liberal position.

One major difference between the Flemish party and its Danish and French counterparts is the regional character of *Vlaams Blok* and its support-base. Advocating Flemish independence from Belgium as part of its program, *Vlaams Blok* neither seeks nor gets support outside of the Flemish region. The analysis I will conduct in this section is therefore restricted to voters in the Flemish region of Belgium. Since the party-system in Belgium is regionally divided, choosing to look

at only the Flemish section of the electorate is relatively unproblematic. There are mainstream Flemish parties of the left and of the right and there is a Flemish green party. So although the election in question was national, party competition and support was mostly regional.

Like the Danish and French populist right, the Flemish populists had also increased in popularity after the publication of Kitschelt and McGann's book. In the 1995 publication, the two authors classified Belgium as a country with "some extreme right" rather than as a country with a "significant extreme right" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, p. 54). Had they known about the electoral success of *Vlaams Blok* in Flanders that was to come, they would most certainly have classified Flanders as a region of Belgium with a significant extreme right. The relatively high level of success of *Vlaams Blok* in Flanders in the latter half of the 1990s suggests that the party managed to find a winning formula that appeals to a large portion of the Flemish electorate. Was this formula right-authoritarian or populist center-authoritarian?

Regionalist Populism

As noted above an expected significant difference in the appeal of the Flemish populist right when compared to the Danish and French parties is the issue of regional independence or regional empowerment. *Vlaams Blok* does not, however, have a Euro-sceptic profile, so we would not expect EU-issues to matter much in distinguishing the VB voters from voters of other parties. If *Vlaams Blok* otherwise is like the other two parties we studied, we should expect its supporters to be more exclusionist than other parties' supporters. In addition, they should be more dissatisfied with politics than voters of the mainstream parties. Finally, based on the previous two case studies, we might expect the voters of *Vlaams Blok* to be more neo-

liberal than the voters of the mainstream left, but to be less neo-liberal than the voters of the mainstream right.


From the Belgian Election Study of 1995, I selected 20 questions that were relevant to the attitudes I wished to measure. Unfortunately, there were no questions about Euro-scepticism, so this measure had to be left out. As explained above, however, I did not expect attitudes towards the EU to matter very much in the Flemish context, so the loss is not very great. The questions were grouped under the six headings shown in the appendix. Note that there were no questions about law and order attitudes. As a substitute, measures of authoritarian attitudes were used (belief in a strong leader and respect for authority).

The principal component analysis extracted exactly as many components as there are headings. Authoritarian and anti-immigrant attitudes did not load on the same component in the way that order and immigrant attitudes did in the Danish and French cases. This difference could be caused by survey design and measurement error, but it could also mean that the libertarian-authoritarian scale is not really about authoritarian attitudes as socio-psychologists traditionally understand this concept (Adorno et al. 1950). The authoritarian pole should rather be seen to represent various exclusionary and reactionary attitudes.

The means plot in figure 7 gives an impression of how VB voters differ from voters of the other parties and the population mean with regards to attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. It shows that the VB voters are in the middle of the political landscape with regards to redistribution attitudes. The dependent variable in the Flemish study has only five categories and not six as in the Danish and French cases. This is so because voting is compulsory in Belgium, so there is no category for non-voters in the model. In the Flemish case, then, *Vlaams Blok* voters are compared

to voters of the mainstream left (SP) and right (CVP and VLD) and to the green (Agalev) voters.

Figure 7. Mean scores on the redistribution and anti-immigrant indices by party vote and the population mean in Flanders, 1995.



Source: *Belgian Election Study 1995*.

I use a multinomial model to test the extent to which the electoral appeal of the populist right in Flanders depends on a similar combination of attitudes as that seen with very little variation in the French and Danish cases. Particularly, I am interested to find out if *Vlaams Blok* also benefits from a populist appeal. The Flemish respondents voting for other parties are excluded from the model. The total number of excluded cases are 465 of 2099, so 1634 cases are left in the analysis.⁷

[Table 3 about here]

The results of the multinomial logit model are presented in table 3. The results indicate that all the attitudes in the model contribute independently to distinguishing populist right voters from voters of the other parties considered. Separate tests of the fit of more parsimonious models confirm the impression given by the results in table 3. Note, however, that authoritarian attitudes and attitudes towards


the environment only serve to distinguish the VB voters from the green (Agalev) voters. Anti-immigrant attitudes and regionalism distinguish the VB voters from voters of all the other four parties. As I hypothesized, dissatisfaction with politics distinguish the VB voters from the voters of all the other mainstream parties. *Vlaams Blok* voters are more dissatisfied with politics than the voters of the mainstream parties in Flanders.

Relative to the voters of the other parties in Flanders, the voters of *Vlaams Blok* certainly do not have more radically right attitudes along the economic axis than do the Danish or French populist right voters relative to the other voters in their respective countries. Table 3 above showed that attitudes towards redistribution place VLD voters significantly to the right of VB voters (the coefficient is positive and significant on the 1 percent level). VB voters were not distinct from the centre-right CVP voters with regards to redistribution (the coefficient is not significant). However, the VB voters were, as expected both from Kitschelt and McGann's theory and our two previous case studies, to the right of the voters of the mainstream party of the left (SP).

The more detailed analysis of the predicted probability of voting for the other parties rather than the VB as neo-liberal attitudes vary is presented in the, by now familiar, conditional effects plot in figure 8. As in the two previous analyses, the trends for voting for the main party of the left is quite rapidly declining. The trend for voting for the main parties of the right are either upwards sloping as in the case of the VLD or relatively flat as in the case of the CVP. The predicted probability of voting for the SP rather than the VB declines from around 85 to around 40 percent as attitudes become more hostile towards redistribution. The predicted probability of

voting VLD rather than VB increases from about 65 percent to about 85 percent as attitudes towards redistribution become less favorable.

Figure 8. Conditional effects of attitudes towards redistribution on the predicted probability of voting for VB in Flanders, 1995.



Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to bring new evidence to the debate about the causes of the success of the populist right in Western Europe. To do so, I studied why people voted for the populist right parties in Denmark, France, and Flanders. These cases were selected because they allowed us to test the most influential, but controversial, contemporary theory about the success of the populist right. Contrary to previous criticisms, this study showed that a number of Kitschelt and McGann's insights into the success of the populist right are valid. It should indeed be seen as the result of a winning formula, rather than a result of the anti-immigration or protest appeal alone. One of the components in the winning formula is, as the two authors suggest, authoritarian, if by authoritarian is understood reactionary and exclusionist attitudes

such as an anti-immigration position, toughness on crime, nationalism, and little concern for the environment.

Key points in Kitschelt and McGann's account of the success of the new radical right is, however, refuted by the evidence presented here. Firstly, the populist appeal to those dissatisfied with politics is an important part of the winning formula of the Danish People's Party, the French National Front, and The Flemish Blok. This evidence is not in agreement with Kitschelt and McGann's analysis, which suggested that the populist appeal was reserved for the populist anti-statist parties in countries governed by grand coalitions, like Austria, or countries with widespread corruption, like Italy. By contrast, I showed that the populist appeal is a common characteristic of *all* successful new radical right parties in Western Europe. I insist, therefore, on labelling the parties analyzed here the 'populist right' rather than the 'radical right'.

Another disagreement between the evidence in this study and the theory presented by Kitschelt and McGann concerns the interpretation of the role that a resolutely neo-liberal appeal plays in attracting voters to the populist right. This study shows that the average voter of the Danish People's Party, *Front National*, and *Vlaams Blok* is not more neo-liberal than the average voter of mainstream parties of the right. In some cases, they are indistinct from the mainstream right voters on this index, and in other cases they are significantly less neo-liberal than the mainstream right voters. In no case, can the populist right voters be described as radical on issues related to the economic axis. With regards to the socio-cultural axis, by contrast, their attitudes are radical.

There are two important implications of this revision of Kitschelt and McGann's account. First, managing to establish a populist 'us-against-them' position has been an important part of the populist right's achievement across Western Europe.

This theme has captured the attention of those dissatisfied with the mainstream left and those dissatisfied with the mainstream right. Ironically, the ‘us-against-them’ image has been facilitated by the fashion in which most mainstream party-leaders have responded to the populist right, namely by distancing themselves. The strategy of marking distance from the populist right may succeed if a link between fascist legacies and the new populist party is convincingly made. However, if this link is not successfully established, the strategy of marking distance back-fires as it has done in Denmark, France, and Flanders. Here, attempts at marking the populist right parties as fascist have not succeeded and have instead helped the populists establish themselves as “underdogs”—a crucial image, which this study shows is attractive to their supporters.

The second important implication is that the populist right is less confined to the right-authoritarian sector of the political space than Kitschelt and McGann thought. The populist right’s appeal is resolutely reactionary (or what Kitschelt and McGann call authoritarian), but it is malleable along the economic axis. Welfare chauvinism, understood either as the ability to subordinate redistributionary issues to socio-cultural ones or as selectively supporting some popular redistributionary schemes while arguing against unpopular bureaucratic waste, is a more successful electoral strategy for the populist opposition parties than a resolutely neo-liberal position. Instead of disregarding the populist right because their policy-suggestions along the economic axis are perceived as inconsistent or chauvinist, this study suggests that their populist and chauvinist strategy should be recognized as a clever way of maximizing their support.

Endnotes.

¹ I would like to thank Robert Andersen, Hans Georg-Betz, Andreas Busch, Geoffrey Evans, Steve Fischer, Anthony Heath, Natalia Letki, Arendt Lijphart, Marcel Lubbers, Herbert Kitschelt, David Mayhew, Kenneth Shepsle, Chris Wlezien, and the data collectors in Belgium, Denmark, and France. All have contributed to this article either directly by commenting or providing data or indirectly by kindly sharing their unpublished work.

² Initially, I grouped redistribution and public sector size questions together under the heading ‘state involvement in the economy’, but I separated the two groups because of the low correlations between the two sets of questions. This low correlation explains why the questions clearly load on two separate components in the principal component analysis.

³ Cronbach’s alpha and the correlation between the indices are reported in the appendix.

⁴ Separate tests were conducted to compare the fit of the full model to more parsimonious models. All the more parsimonious models fit the data significantly worse.

⁵ For a good description of the method and software I used for creating the conditional effects plots, see Long and Freese (2001).

⁶ The number of respondents excluded is a higher proportion of the respondents than the actual proportion who voted for other parties. This is partly because a number of respondents who replied that they voted in the first round of the election also said that they could not remember which party they had voted for. Probably some of the respondents really could not remember who they had voted for, but others possibly lied about having voted in the first place. In any case, the respondents who said they could not remember who they had voted for were excluded from the analysis.

⁷ Those who conducted the survey coded 50 cases not as ‘don’t know’ but as missing on the attitudes-questions I use. Those 50 cases were also excluded.

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Table 1. Comparing attitudes of DF voters to attitudes of Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Green and non-voters in Denmark, 1998.
Multinomial logit model.

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Social Democrat voters compared to DF voters</i>		<i>Liberal voters compared to DF voters</i>		<i>Conservative Voters compared to DF Voters</i>		<i>SF (green) voters compared to DF voters</i>		<i>Non voters compared to DF voters</i>	
	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	15.707***	1.091	7.420***	1.034	5.567***	1.157	15.804***	1.248	10.45***	1.337
Exclusionism	-1.173***	0.182	-1.003***	0.183	-1.083***	0.203	-1.989***	0.221	-1.057***	0.229
European integration	-0.399**	0.132	-0.753***	0.130	-0.734***	0.150	0.149	0.170	-0.423*	0.179
Redistribution	-0.444***	0.101	0.208*	0.098	0.546***	0.118	-0.463***	0.131	-0.242	0.137
Environment	-0.318*	0.143	0.477***	0.146	0.501**	0.169	-1.029***	0.192	-0.302	0.193
Public Sector Size	-1.058***	0.162	0.193	0.164	0.195	0.189	-1.160***	0.208	-0.985***	0.213
Satisfaction with political process	-0.776***	0.174	-0.797***	0.174	-0.838***	0.195	-0.435*	0.210	-0.120	0.226
Number of cases	1611									
Pseudo R ²	0.2341									
LR chi2	1184.17 (30 df)									

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Source: Danish Election Study 1998.

Table 2. Comparing attitudes of FN voters to attitudes of PS, RPR, UDF, green, and non voters in France, 1997.
Multinomial logit model.

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>PS voters compared to FN voters</i>		<i>RPR voters compared to FN voters</i>		<i>UDF Voters compared to FN voters</i>		<i>Green voters compared to FN voters</i>		<i>Non voters compared to FN Voters</i>	
	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	12.63***	0.757	7.91***	0.765	7.756***	0.776	10.350***	0.962	8.039***	0.705
Exclusionism	-1.857***	0.161	-0.719***	0.164	-0.644***	0.166	-2.222***	0.220	-1.401***	0.152
State size and involvement	-1.682***	0.149	0.190	0.144	0.093	0.146	-1.533***	0.219	-0.785***	0.131
European integration	-0.680***	0.139	-0.734***	0.143	-0.827***	0.147	-0.944***	0.211	-0.489***	0.127
Satisfaction with politics	-0.500**	0.185	-1.515***	0.194	-1.394***	0.197	0.060	0.258	0.051	0.172
Number of cases	2257									
Pseudo R ²	0.1521									
LR chi ²	1117*** (20 df)									

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Source: French Election Study 1997.

Table 3. Comparing attitudes of VB voters to attitudes of SP, VLD, CVP, and green voters in Flanders, 1995.

Multinomial logit model

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>SP voters compared to VB voters</i>		<i>VLD voters compared to VB voters</i>		<i>CVP voters compared to VB Voters</i>		<i>Green (Agalev) voters compared to VB voters</i>	
	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	12.051***	1.105	6.188***	1.058	11.455***	1.050	10.142***	1.320
Anti-immigrant	-1.515***	0.171	-1.103***	0.165	-1.454***	0.162	-1.903***	0.211
Authoritarian	-0.260	0.154	-0.023	0.150	0.226	0.147	-0.698***	0.185
Redistribution	-0.854***	0.153	0.421**	0.137	-0.046	0.137	-0.368	0.194
Environment	0.142	0.116	0.039	0.112	0.144	0.109	-0.900***	0.173
Regionalization	-0.543***	0.116	-0.295**	0.112	-0.291***	0.109	-0.434**	0.149
Satisfaction with the political process	-0.949***	0.181	-0.424*	0.175	-1.097***	0.171	-0.339	0.224
Number of cases	1634							
Pseudo R ²	0.1272							
LR chi ²	614.34 (24 df)							

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Source: *Belgian Election Study 1995*.

Appendix.

A1. Questions used to create indices in the Danish case (my translation).

Immigration Issues

(v120) “I will now mention some arguments from the current debate about politics that one may or may not agree with. Here is a card with five possible responses—completely agree, mostly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mostly disagree, completely disagree—I would like to ask you to choose one of them...Immigration is a serious threat to our uniqueness as a nation.”

(v129) “[Same introduction as v120]...Refugees and immigrants, including those who are not Danish citizens, should have the same right to welfare benefits as the Danes.”

(v195) “Among other things, political parties disagree on how many refugees we can receive. Some think that we receive too many. Others say we may well receive more refugees. Here is a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that we should receive a lot less refugees than we currently do, 2 means somewhat less refugees, 3 means as many as now, 4 means somewhat more refugees and 5 means that we should receive many more refugees than we currently do...Where would you place yourself on this scale?”

(v271) “It is sometimes discussed how refugees, who receive permission to stay in our country, should be treated. If 1 means that refugees nearly always should be sent home as soon as possible, and 5 means that refugees who have permission to stay here should be integrated into Danish society, where would you place your opinion?”

(v139) “[Same introduction as v120]...De facto refugees should still be allowed to receive permission to stay in Denmark.”

Law and Order Issues

(v126) “[Same introduction as v120]...Violence should be punished much harder than it is today.”

(v127) “[Same introduction as v120]...Preventive measures and treatment are better for reducing crime than severe punishment.”

(v239) “Some parties believe in maintaining law and order using stricter punishment. Other parties propose preventive measures and gentle treatment of criminals. On this scale 1 stands for those who want to maintain law and order and 5 stands for those who propose preventive measures and more gentle treatment of criminals...Where would you place yourself?”

EU Issues

(v164) “What is your general attitude to the EU—very positive, mostly positive, neutral/neither positive nor negative, mostly negative, or very negative?”

(v158) “I now have some questions about politics and politicians more generally. Here is a card with five possible answers—completely agree, mostly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mostly disagree, completely disagree. I will read some statements for you, and for each one of them I would like you to answer based on the scale on the card...The EU-parliament should have more power in relation to the Council of Ministers and the Commission.”

(v159) [Same introduction as v158]...The EU should play a foreign policy and military role that equals the EU-countries’ economic might.”

Redistribution Issues

(v117) “[Same introduction as v120]...High incomes should be taxed more than they are today.”

(v132) [Same introduction as v120]...In politics one should strive to grant everyone equal standard of living, economically speaking, regardless of education and occupation.”

Public Sector Size Issues

(v128) “[Same introduction as v120]...Many public services could be performed both better and cheaper if they were transferred to the private sector.”

(v131) “[Same introduction as v120]...In the long term, it is not possible to maintain the welfare state as we currently know it.”

(v134) “[Same introduction as v120]...A lot of money can still be saved on making the public sector more efficient without compromising the service offered to citizens.”

(v206) “The parties disagree about how large the public sector should be. Some parties say that we should cut public income and spending, others say that we should expect higher public spending and income in the future. Here is a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that we should cut public spending and income heavily, 2 means that they should be cut a little, 3 means that public spending and income is satisfactory, 4 means that they should increase a little, and 5 means that they should be increased heavily...Where would you place yourself?”

Environment Issues

(v121) “[Same introduction as v120]...Economic growth should be secured through building out the industry, even if this conflicts with environmental interests.”

(v122) “[Same introduction as v120]...Measures to improve the environment should not be taken so far that they harm our businesses’ competitiveness abroad.”

(v217) “A green dimension in politics is being discussed. Some parties stand out by paying a lot of attention to the environment, while others say that concern for the environment is getting out of hand. On this scale 1 means the least green politics while 5 means the most green...Where would you place yourself?”

(v144) “[Same introduction as v120]...The green tax on fuel should be increased.”

Dissatisfaction with Politics

(v146) “[Same introduction as v158]...Politicians time and again show too little respect for voters’ opinions.”

(v147) “[Same introduction as v158]...In general, one can trust our politicians to make the right decisions for our country.”

(v149) “[Same introduction as v158]...Really, there is almost no difference between the positions of the big parties. The disagreement is all due to tactics.

(v153) “[Same introduction as v158]...Politicians waste tax-payers’ money.”

(v263) “Some think that the political parties in Denmark care about what ordinary citizens think. Others think that the political parties in Denmark do not care about what ordinary citizens think. If you use the scale on this card, where would you place your opinion?”

A2. Questions used to create indices in the French case (my translation).

EU Issues

(q3) “Are you for or against the fact that the European Union will have its own currency, something which means that the Franc will be replaced by the Euro? (Completely for, mostly for, mostly against, or completely against)”

(q6) “If it were to be announced tomorrow that the European Union had ended would you feel very regretful, indifferent, or very relieved?”

(q7-2) “In each of the following areas, do you think that European integration has had mostly positive effects for France, mostly negative effects or no particular effect?...Our way of life.”

(q15-2) “Here are a number of statements. For each of them, could you tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree?...Being a part of the European Union ensures that France is better protected against the risks connected to globalisation of the economy.”

State Size and Involvement

(q20-5) “For each of the words mentioned, could you please let me know if it means something very positive, quite positive, quite negative, or very negative to you...Privatisation.”

(q23-1) “During the election campaign, the following propositions were made. For each one of them could you tell me if you personally are completely for, mostly for, mostly against, or completely against? ...Reducing the number of bureaucrats.”

(q23-5) “[Same introduction as q23-1]...Creating 350,000 public-sector jobs.”

(q23-6) “[Same introduction as q23-1]...Reducing the work week to 35 hours without reducing wages.”

Immigration Issues

(q23-3) “[Same introduction as q23-1]...Upholding Pasqua-Debre’s immigration laws.”

(q15-9) “[Same introduction as q15-3]...The North Africans (“maghrebins”) who live in France will one day be as French as everyone else.”

(q15-5) “[Same introduction as q15-3]...Some races are less gifted than others.”

(q15-2) “[Same introduction as q15-3]...There are too many immigrants in France.”

Law and Order Issues

(q15-7) “[Same introduction as q15-3]...The death-penalty should be re-introduced.”

Satisfaction with Politics

(q14) “In your view, do people in political circles care about the opinions of people like you?”

(q25) “Do you think that currently democracy in France functions...very well, quite well, not very well, or not well at all?”

(q20-8) “For each of the words mentioned, could you please let me know if it means something very positive, quite positive, quite negative, or very negative to you...’the state”

A3. Questions used to create indices in the Flemish case.

Immigration Issues

(q108-4) “The following questions concern immigrants, by which we understand primarily Turks and Moroccans. Please tell me whether or not you agree with the following statements. Use Card No. 38 to answer. If you have no opinion on the matter, just say so... Guest workers are a threat to the employment of Belgians— completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, completely disagree”

(q108-6) “[Same introduction as q108-4]... Immigrants contribute to the country’s welfare”

(q108-7) “[Same introduction as q108-4]... Muslims are a threat to our culture and customs.”

(q108-10) “[Same introduction as q108-4]... We should welcome immigrants who want to come and live in Belgium.

(q108-11) “[Same introduction as q108-4]... The participation of immigrants in any political activity in Belgium should be forbidden.

Redistribution Issues

(q91-3) “Please tell me whether or not you agree with the following statements. Use Card No. 31 to answer. If you haven’t thought about it, just say so... The differences between classes ought to be smaller than they are at present.”

(q91-4) “[Same introduction as q91-3]... The differences between high and low incomes have to stay as they are.”

(q91-5) “[Same introduction as q91-3]... The government must reduce income differentials”

Environment Issues

(q128-2) “Let’s now turn to the environment. The following statements concern only what you yourself can do about it. Use Card No. 51 to answer...I am prepared to support publicly strict control on traffic.”

(q128-4) “[Same introduction as q128-2]”...I am prepared to give something up for a cleaner environment.”

(q128-5) “[Same introduction as q128-2]”... I would be prepared to pay higher prices if that would mean less industrial pollution.”

Satisfaction with Politics

(q97-4) “And what is your opinion about the following statements? You can use Card No. 31 to answer...Most of our politicians are competent people, who know what they are doing.”

(q97-5) “[Same introduction as q97-4]... In the elections, one party promises more than the other, but in the end, nothing much happens.”

(q97-6) “[Same introduction as q97-4]... People like me do have an influence on what political authorities do.”

(q97-10) “[Same introduction as q97-4]... Actually, there is no politician I would trust.”

Authoritarian Attitudes

(q95-1) “And what is your personal opinion about the following statements? You can use Card No. 31 again to answer...Obedience and respect for authority are the two most important virtues children have to learn.”

(q95-3) “[Same introduction as q95-1]... What we need most, more than laws and institutions, is a few courageous and devoted leaders in whom the people can trust.”

(q95-7) “[Same introduction as q95-1]... What we need is strong leaders who tell us what to do.”

Regional Power Issues

(64-1) “Now, I am going to read you a number of topics which were being discussed during the last general elections. Could you say, for each of these topics, if you agree completely, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree completely? If you have no opinion, you can say so. You can answer with Card No. 15...Strive for the independence of Flanders.”

(64-15) “[Same introduction as q64-1]... Split up (federalise) social security.”

A4. Correlation between Scales in the Danish Case.

	immorder	eu	redist	env	priv	sat
immorder	1					
eu	0.033	1				
redist	0.128	-0.1805	1			
env	0.5486	-0.1647	0.1395	1		
priv	0.3784	-0.2522	0.3036	0.4349	1	
sat	0.4449	0.2199	-0.0237	0.2841	0.25	1

Source: Danish Election Study, 1998.

A5. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the Danish Case.

Scales	Alpha
Immigration and Order	0.8212
EU	0.6306
Satisfaction	0.7137
Redistribution	0.5129
Environment	0.7283
Public Sector Size	0.6288

Source: *Danish Election Study, 1998*

A6. Correlation between Scales in the French Case.

	imm	sat	priv	eu
imm	1			
sat	0.1708	1		
priv	0.1817	-0.1512	1	
eu	0.3485	0.407	-0.1544	1

Source: *French Election Study 1997.*

A7. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the French Case.

Scales	Alpha
Immigration and Order	0.7234
EU	0.7507
Satisfaction	0.5407
State	0.7080

Source: *French Election Study 1997.*

A8. Correlation between Scales in the Flemish Case.

	imm	aut	sat	reg	redist	env
imm	1					
aut	0.3837	1				
sat	0.3017	0.167	1			
reg	0.2234	0.1715	0.0884	1		
redist	-0.0148	-0.1175	-0.1001	-0.0278	1	
env	0.3544	0.2106	0.2316	0.04	-0.0128	1

Source: *Belgian Election Study 1995.*

A9. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the Flemish Case.

Scales	Alpha
Immigration	0.7786
Regionalism	0.5924
Satisfaction	0.5807
Redistribution	0.6686
Environment	0.7242
Authoritarian	0.6228

Source: *Belgian Election Study 1995.*

A10. Mapping attitudes towards seven issues in Denmark, 1998. Principal component analysis.

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Immigration Issues						
Immigration a threat	0.7215	-0.0117	-0.2137	-0.1638	0.2433	-0.0756
Less social rights for immigrants	0.6630	0.0352	-0.1092	0.1985	0.1266	-0.0433
Receive fewer immigrants	0.8309	0.0322	-0.0691	0.0267	0.1289	-0.1266
Immigrants go home	0.7986	0.0469	-0.0718	0.0072	0.1279	-0.1497
Receive de facto asylum seekers	0.6194	0.0662	-0.0551	0.0466	0.0545	-0.0935
Law and Order Issues						
Stricter punishment for violence	0.5690	-0.0649	-0.1746	0.0315	0.1822	0.0117
Punishment vs. Crime prevention	0.4844	-0.1067	-0.1467	0.2207	0.2695	0.2863
Order and punishment vs. Prevention and treatment	0.6003	-0.0884	-0.1817	0.1721	0.3467	0.0084
EU Issues						
General attitude to the EU	0.1244	0.5693	-0.3156	-0.1722	-0.2816	0.1944
More power to EP	0.1477	0.7535	-0.1110	-0.0565	0.0677	-0.0360
More foreign policy power to the EU	-0.1224	0.7990	-0.0232	-0.0012	-0.0957	0.1299
Satisfaction with political process						
Politicians care too little about voters' opinions	-0.1814	-0.1165	0.7473	0.1254	-0.0970	0.0275
Politicians can be trusted to make right decisions	-0.0243	-0.1543	0.6813	-0.1801	0.0389	0.0456
No real difference between parties	-0.0669	0.0280	0.4881	0.2030	-0.1898	0.0733
Politicians waste citizens' money	-0.4154	0.0381	0.5437	-0.0350	-0.1670	0.3322
Political parties care about man on the street	-0.1737	-0.0666	0.7255	0.0115	-0.0117	-0.0401
Redistribution Issues						
Higher taxes on high incomes	0.0003	-0.1071	0.0495	0.7179	0.1020	-0.1687
Economic equality is important political goal	0.0743	-0.0282	0.0045	0.7732	-0.0387	-0.0793
Environment Issues						
Economic growth vs. environment	0.2396	-0.0665	-0.0564	-0.1083	0.7175	-0.1864
Competitiveness vs. environment	0.2402	-0.1199	-0.0037	-0.0894	0.7045	-0.1842
Favor green politics	0.1828	-0.0108	-0.0563	0.2223	0.6817	-0.1241
Higher green taxes on fuel	0.2938	0.0177	-0.1389	0.1690	0.5917	0.0445
Public Sector Size						
Privatization makes services better and cheaper	-0.2091	0.1436	0.1201	-0.1723	-0.2176	0.6441
Cannot afford welfare state in the long run	-0.2466	0.2245	0.1520	-0.0543	-0.0099	0.4552
More efficient public sector without compromising standard	-0.0535	0.0748	0.0098	-0.0783	-0.1458	0.7190
Cut public sector income and spending	-0.2418	0.0189	-0.0277	-0.3346	-0.3192	0.5046
<i>Eigenvalues</i>	6.45	2.79	1.56	1.41	1.16	1.03

*Varimax rotation. Values greater than .5 are in bold

Source: Danish Election Studies (1998).

A11. Mapping attitudes towards five issues in France, 1997. Principal component analysis.

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4
EU Issues				
For or against the EURO	0.7764	-0.1315	-0.1428	0.1138
Regret the disappearance of the EU	0.7806	-0.0885	-0.2328	0.1131
The EU has positive influence on our way of life	0.6119	0.0050	-0.1414	0.1734
The EU protects France against globalization	0.7395	0.0041	0.0074	0.1282
State Size and Involvement				
"Privatization" is a good thing	-0.1823	0.6147	-0.1360	-0.1501
The number of bureaucrats should be reduced	-0.0470	0.7036	-0.1293	0.1419
For the creation of public employment	-0.1021	0.8002	0.0287	-0.0244
The work week should be reduced	0.0225	0.7260	-0.0710	-0.1482
Immigration				
Support Pasqua-Debre's immigration laws	0.0394	0.3776	-0.6319	-0.1456
North Africans in France become like other French	0.2026	0.0245	-0.5896	0.1155
Some races are less gifted than others	0.0216	-0.1079	-0.6214	0.0940
There are too many immigrants in France	0.1603	0.1076	-0.7870	0.0410
Order				
The death penalty should be reintroduced	0.2153	-0.0053	-0.6993	0.1074
Satisfaction with Politics				
Do politicians care about people like you	0.2328	-0.0471	0.0087	0.6785
Democracy in France works well	0.1841	-0.1005	-0.0953	0.6906
"The State" is a good thing	0.1052	0.0005	-0.0716	0.6896
<i>Eigenvalues</i>	<i>3.54</i>	<i>2.67</i>	<i>1.35</i>	<i>1.07</i>

*varimax rotated. Values >0.5 are in bold.

Source: French Election Study 1997.

A12. Mapping attitudes towards six issues in Flanders, 1995. Principal component analysis.

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4	Comp 5	Comp 6
Immigration Issues						
Guest workers threaten employment	0.6740	-0.0208	0.2138	0.0517	-0.2068	0.1221
Immigrants contribute to country's welfare	0.7122	-0.0706	0.0786	0.1476	-0.0222	0.0613
Muslims are threat to culture	0.5849	0.0971	0.0592	0.0724	-0.3502	0.0515
We should welcome immigrants	0.7530	0.0204	0.1182	0.0599	0.1359	0.0700
No political activities for immigrants	0.7314	0.0110	0.1744	0.0553	-0.2519	0.0796
Redistribution						
Reduce class difference	0.0017	0.7738	0.0027	-0.0222	0.0903	-0.0066
Maintain income differentials	-0.0345	0.7427	-0.0244	-0.0014	0.1418	-0.0274
Government reduce income difference	0.0254	0.7888	-0.0091	-0.0639	-0.1082	0.0061
Environment Issues						
Support strict control of traffic	0.1073	0.1253	0.6638	0.0563	-0.0793	0.0433
Prepared to give up something for environment	0.1308	-0.0145	0.8604	0.0638	-0.0620	0.0182
Prepared to pay higher prices if less pollution	0.1473	-0.0709	0.8201	0.0700	-0.0308	-0.0346
Satisfaction with politics						
Politicians are competent people	0.0469	0.0246	-0.0667	0.6901	0.1665	0.0146
Parties promise without result	0.0909	-0.1127	0.1824	0.5836	-0.2543	0.0284
People like me influence politics	0.0831	-0.0635	0.1403	0.6645	0.0368	-0.0141
No politician I trust	0.1970	-0.0332	0.1548	0.6381	-0.1915	0.0647
Authoritarian Attitudes						
Children must learn respect for authority	-0.2936	0.0879	-0.1650	-0.0108	0.6071	-0.0684
We need strong leader rather than better institutions	-0.0337	0.0895	-0.0034	-0.0848	0.7309	-0.0274
A strong leader should tell us what to do	-0.1107	-0.0137	-0.0785	0.0297	0.7604	-0.0974
Regional Power Issues						
Stop division of Belgium	0.1129	-0.0610	0.0083	-0.0188	-0.0773	0.8265
Federalise Social security	0.0684	0.0398	-0.0018	0.0536	-0.0370	0.8437
<i>Eigenvalues</i>	<i>4.12</i>	<i>1.90</i>	<i>1.71</i>	<i>1.46</i>	<i>1.26</i>	<i>1.20</i>

*varimax rotated. Loadings >.5 are in bold.

Source: *Belgian Election Study 1995*.

