The Puzzle of Populist Right Success in Western Europe.

Abstract:
In the current debate about the causes of the populist right's success in several multiparty democracies in Western Europe, too few explanations have focused on the contradictions in the coalitions voting for these parties. One reason for this neglect is lack of easily available appropriate survey data. By analyzing and comparing national election studies, this article is able to overcome some of those problems. Another reason for the neglect is that those who have analyzed the populist right's success in Western Europe have tended to over-emphasize the importance of new alignments in the electorates. This article, by contrast, shows that the coalition voting for the populist right is deeply divided over central issues on the socio-economic dimension of politics, such as the desirable size of the public sector and the extent to which the state should regulate the economy. To solve the puzzle of the populist right's simultaneous success among an unusual and uneasy coalition of voters, then, we need to pay closer attention to party competition dynamics.

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Introduction

The social structure of the electorates of the contemporary populist right is remarkably similar across a number of countries in Western Europe. Although support is widespread, two social groups are overrepresented. On the one hand, we find owners of small businesses (shopkeepers, artisans, and independents), who normally vote for parties on the center-right of the political spectrum. On the other hand, we find blue collar workers, who normally vote for parties on the left of the political spectrum. The coming together of this seemingly uneasy coalition of voters has so far not been sufficiently accounted for. Why did social groups who very seldom have found common cause in European politics all of a sudden start doing so?

Empirical evidence of the uneasy marriage of owners of small businesses and blue collar workers is not lacking. Concluding an influential comparative study of the populist right in Western Europe, Kitschelt argues that successful populist right parties use a political formula attracting "an electoral coalition in which small independent businesspeople (shopkeepers, farmers, etc.) as well as blue collar workers are overrepresented" (1995: 275). Overrepresentation of both blue collar workers and owners of small businesses is also found in another large quantitative comparative study (Mudde 2001: 214-215).

In an analysis of *Front National's* voters in six elections from 1986 to 1997, Mayer found that the party's "most solid support has come from two occupational groups—small shopkeepers and blue-collar workers" (1998: 18). Those studying the Danish and Norwegian cases (the Progress Parties and the Danish People's Party), found that although the parties received a large proportion of tax-protest votes from owners of small businesses ('petty bourgeois support', in their terms) in the 1970s, they have received an increasing number of votes from blue collar workers since then (Svåsand 1998; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000). Overrepresentation of blue collar workers and owners of small businesses is also found in a study of the Swiss (SVP) and Austrian (FPÖ) cases (McGann and Kitschelt 2002: 13). The same pattern is reported in the case of *Lega Nord* in Northern Italy. Betz argues that, "it was particularly these small commercial and artisanal entrepreneurs and blue-collar workers in the

Northern periphery which accounted for much of the Lega's resurgence in 1996" (Betz 1998: 52).

Vlaams Blok is the only case among the parties normally considered as the populist right (Ignazi 1992) for which a different occupational profile has been reported. In this case, no overrepresentation of independent businesspeople is found. Only blue collar workers or what is described as 'lower classes' are overrepresented (Billiet and De Witte 1995; Swyngedouw, 1998: 70-71). With the exception of the Flemish case, then, the evidence suggesting that the support for the contemporary populist right rests on a coalition that disproportionately includes owners of small businesses and blue collar workers is overwhelming.

Accounting for the Puzzle

Those who study the populist right have tended to assume that political competition is fixed by voters' attitudes, and that these attitudes are rooted in socio-economic experiences. The underlying model is one of demand for policies that create opportunities or dilemmas for political parties. This perspective has directed the attention of those studying the social composition of the populist vote towards asking what the voters' common grievances are and attempting to define new alignments and classes. In the following, I suggest that we should consider a competing way of analysing party competition that focuses on how political parties manipulate the premises of political competition. This model asks us to pay much more attention to how political parties can gain support without there being any new class or alignment to which they address their appeal.

The 'demand model' of political competition is one way of filling what we can think of as the void in spatial voting theory as articulated by Anthony Downs (1957). The void arises because Down's spatial model has no answer to the question of how the dimension(s) of political space are defined, let alone changed. Demand models fill the void by suggesting that the dimensions dividing political space are given by the structure of demands from groups sharing socio-economic experiences and hence sharing certain bundles of attitudes.

According to such models, parties either emerge as and remain representations of dominant social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), or they constantly compete to attract support for as large a coalition of social groups with similar socio-economic preferences as possible (Kitschelt 1994).

Because this demand perspective makes us see party choice as fundamentally grounded in common socio-economic experiences, the apparent contradictions in the coalition supporting the populist right becomes a problem. The problem has been solved in different ways, by scholars explicitly or implicitly adopting a demand perspective on voting. All these solutions, I argue, are unsatisfactory due to inherent limitations of the demand perspective. At the root of the problem is a failure to acknowledge the real contradictions in the coalition voting for the populist right. This article shows that these contradictions cannot be overlooked when we seek to understand the recent successes of the populist right in Western Europe, and points out a model that, unlike the demand model, can account for them.

Those who study the populist right often refer to the anti-tax or anti-'nanny state' component of the populist right's appeal (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2000). This observation then has to be squared with the overwhelming empirical evidence showing that the successful populist right attracts a proportion of workers' votes that is second only to the main party of the left, and sometimes not even second to this party. The question that needs answering is, how come blue collar workers are supporting a political agenda that supposedly runs against their interests in substantial redistribution and public provision of welfare? Indeed, why are they daring to do so in this particularly perilous time when economies in Europe are opening up to international pressures and going through the massive changes associated with deindustrialization?[1]

One strand of demand theories answers that *some* workers, namely those in the private sector, have changed their political allegiances as a result of grand socio-economic changes (Esping-Andersen 1999; 1992; Kitschelt 1994). I will call this the public/private

[1] See Iversen (2000) for an argument about why we should expect workers to become more, not less, pro-welfare in the current period of de-industrialization and internationalization.

split hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the private sector segment of blue collar workers realize that their interests diverge from the interests of those employed in the public sector, who have strong ties with the main parties of the left. While workers in the public sector can afford to keep campaigning for a large state sector and generous welfare benefits, those in the increasingly competitive private sector see that their businesses cannot compete if state intervention is kept at the present level.

According to another strand of demand theories, the coalition of blue collar workers and owners of small businesses does not emerge because of a public/private sector split among the workers, but because workers *in general* have become disillusioned with the left and its programs. I will call this the disillusioned workers hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the recent success of the populist right is mainly a result of these parties' strategy to address, not those who are tired of state protection, but those who feel this protection is waning and who have lost faith in the left's desire or ability to restore it (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Goul Andersen 1992).

The challenge for this hypothesis is explaining why there is a strong element of tax resentment and public sector bashing in the rhetoric of most parties of the populist right. One answer has been that these disillusioned workers have turned against the state because they do not feel that they benefit from it. As one scholar expressed it, "they feel robbed of the fruits of their hard labor, believe that they pay high taxes only to see their money being wasted on the undeserving, make good products while their foreign competitors swamp the market, and fear downsizing while their firms report record profits" (Immerfall 1998: 257).

Yet another answer to the challenge confronting the demand perspective has been to step back and reevaluate the apparent neo-liberalism of the populist parties. I will call this the leap to the left hypothesis. Studying the Danish case, Goul Andersen argues that the populist right stands for a 'neo-liberalism of the lower strata' when he claims that, "apart from the lack of solidarity with the poorest strata, some of the redistributive aspects of the policies of the Progress Party bear more resemblance to Social Democratic policies than to mainstream neo-liberalism" (1992, p. 197). About the French case, Mudde argues that the "the FN [*Front*

National]…has increasingly thrown off its neo-liberal rhetoric and now openly admits to its 'economic protectionist' program" (1999, p. 189). This hypothesis, however, cannot explain why owners of small businesses vote for the populists, too.

In contrast to these various demand models of voting, the supply model does not take the dimensions of political competition as given exclusively by voters attitudes or the underlying social structures. It focuses instead on how issues that emerge in politics are linked by arguments of political entrepreneurs, and from time to time are manipulated by what Riker calls 'heresthetics' (Riker 1986; 1990; McLean 2002). This supply model can be viewed as arising from a controversy over the common assumption in Downsean models that electoral competition would be compressed to only one dimension (Downs 1957). It was shown formally that when the number of parties and/or dimensions increase, there is not necessarily an equilibrium outcome, and that politics therefore should be more unstable than Downs' model suggested (Riker 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Shepsle 1990; 1991). One explanation to why political competition is relatively stable in spite of theoretical expectations to the contrary, then, is that dominating mainstream parties even in a multi-party system tend to be relatively successful in appropriating new issues and making them part of the competitive struggle in between themselves (Hug 2001; Meguid 2001).

The supply perspective should be considered in our studies of the success of the populist right in Western Europe, because it allows for the possibility that those who vote for this kind of party do not share interests on the socio-economic dimension. It is indeed possible, within the framework of the supply model, that the populist right has managed to become successful, because either (1) the populist right has been clever at manipulating the premises of political competition or (2) the mainstream parties have had an ineffective strategy for competing against the populist right, or, perhaps even more likely, a combination of the two. Either way, the result would be that, for a number of voters, socio-economic divisions became less salient for their party choice than socio-cultural divisions or a general sense of dissatisfaction with politics. As a result, if we only view party competition from the

demand perspective, we may be looking for commonalities in the coalition voting for the populist right that need not exist.

Study Design

The arguments above have not yet been studied using multivariate analysis of a selected set of national election studies. I will present such an analysis here, and show that such a comparative study can be illuminating, although we without doubt sacrifice some comparative rigor when we use studies collected by different research groups. The advantages of juxtaposing data for different countries that has been standardized as far as possible,[2] outweigh the disadvantages when we study the populist right vote. By using national election studies, we firstly have more respondents who voted for the populist right, because the average sample of each country in these studies is larger than that of the international surveys. Secondly, variables that are crucial for the debate at hand, such as public versus private sector employment, are included in most national election studies, but not in most international surveys.

The hypotheses to be tested are derived from the arguments discussed above. The supply model holds that there might well be a serious split in the populist right's electorate with regards to socio-economic grievances. The demand model holds that the voters of the populist right are aligned along the socio-economic dimension. Three different hypotheses of such alignments were presented. According to the public/private sector split hypothesis, an alignment between owners of small businesses and blue collar workers was thought to occur, because compared to blue collar workers in the public sector, those in the private sector are less prone to support a large amount of state involvement in the economy. Alternatively, according to the disillusioned worker hypothesis, an alignment between owners of small businesses and blue collar workers was thought to occur because in the current economy, workers on the whole are less keen to support a large public sector. Finally, according to the

[2] I am thankful to EREPS, the Extreme Right Electoral and Party Success network, funded by the British Academy that shared their pooled dataset using standardized socio-demographic categories and hence enabled me to conduct a more rigorous comparative study than has previously been possible.

populist leap to the left hypothesis, the voters of the populist right are not particularly against a large state sector at all. They, in fact, long for the state protection previously experienced. This third hypothesis implies that either the owners of small businesses have become more prone to support state protection, or, perhaps more likely, that they stop voting for the populists.

The cases I study have been selected to put the dominant demand hypotheses to a fair, but difficult, test. First, I have made conditions as favorable as possible for the public/private sector split hypothesis. Since Kitschelt argued that the public/private sector split would be most evident where the populist right is the most successful, I have chosen to investigate successful populist right parties. Moreover, Kitschelt (1995) suggested that the French case is the one that fits his predictions best, so I have included it. Esping-Andersen, by contrast, argued that the Scandinavian cases are where we will see the strongest public/private split, because the public sector is so encompassing there (1999). I have therefore included Denmark; one of the two Scandinavian cases that has a successful populist right. Norway is the other case, but Denmark was finally chosen to minimize the possibilities for noise arising from peculiar aspects of the Norwegian economy—a gigantic government surplus and outsider status in the EU.

Second, to make conditions favorable for the disillusioned workers and leap to the left hypotheses, I have included cases where large support from blue collar workers has been reported. Since previous studies have suggested that Flanders might be a deviant case, because of the VB's lack of votes from owners of small businesses, this case has been included. Previous studies suggested that the Scandinavian cases, and particularly the Danish one, have gone through a period of change from mainly petty bourgeois votes to mainly blue collar worker votes. Denmark has therefore been interpreted as a case where either workers as a whole have turned against the nanny state or where the populists have become more left-leaning, so the inclusion of the Danish case is important also for this reason.

Figure 1 shows the electoral results of the parties to be considered over time, and it shows that all three parties have been receiving an increasing part of the vote since the 1990s.

The parliamentary election in France in June 2002 was an exception to this trend. More specifically, figure 1 shows the percentage of the vote at national parliamentary elections for *Fremskridtspartiet* (FrP) and *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF) in Denmark, *Vlaams Blok* (VB) in the Flemish region of Belgium and *Front National* (FN) in France (first round). For each party, the graphs start in the first election when it received more than 1 percent of the national vote. Results from all parliamentary elections from the start of the graph are included, and each year of an election is marked with a symbol. In the case of VB, I report the vote share from Flanders only since VB neither gets nor seeks support outside of the Flemish region.

Figure 1. Percent of the vote received in national parliamentary elections by the populist right in Flanders, France and Denmark.



Source: Caramani (1999), CD-ROM. Additional updates from the French, Belgian and Danish government websites for the 2002, 2001 and 1999 elections.

The Coalition of Support in Denmark.

The Progress Party (FrP) in Denmark had its national electoral breakthrough in 1973 when it received 15.9 percent of the vote in the parliamentary election. The tax-lawyer Mogens Glistrup had launched FrP in 1972 as part of a major anti-tax campaign. The campaign was kick-started by an infamous television appearance where Glistrup glorified tax evaders by likening them to railway saboteurs during the German occupation in the Second World War. After substantial electoral success in the 1970s, Glistrup had to go to jail for tax evasion

between 1983 and 1985. After his release, he fought bitterly against his parliamentary substitute, Pia Kjærsgaard, before he formed another party that he named the Party of Well-Being. It was a political flop. The Danish People's Party (DF) was created when the then leader of FrP, Pia Kjærsgaard, left to form her own party in 1995. DF is now the leading populist right party in Denmark. It received 12 percent of the vote in the national parliamentary election in November 2001 (Andersen and Bjørklund 2000; Carlsen 2000; Svåsand 1998; Andersen 1992; Andersen and Bjørklund 1990).

The combined vote for the Danish Progress Party and the Danish People's Party (DF) in the 1998 parliamentary election that will be studied here was 9.8 percent. The DF, whose electorate I will analyse, earned 7.4 percent alone and received 13 seats in parliament. The combined result of the populist right in 1998 was the best in Denmark since 1979.

The first hypothesis that we will consider suggests that the populist right voters in Denmark were particularly right-leaning on the socio-economic dimension (taxes, welfare, and more generally state involvement in the economy). Recall that within the demand perspectives there was debate about where to place the populist right on this dimension. On one hand, the extent to which the populist parties are unfavourable towards a large public sector was emphasized, while on the other it was suggested that the populist right had become more favorable towards the public sector. One way to bring evidence to bear on this argument is to compare the attitudes of the populist right voters to the attitudes of voters of the dominant mainstream parties.

The final results of such a comparison is shown in figure 2. This figure is the interpretation of the results of a multinomial logistic regression model of attitudes shown to influence the decision to *Vote for the populist right (DF)* instead of *Voting for the mainstream left (SD),* or *Voting for the mainstream center-right (V),* or *Voting for the mainstream right (K).* The results of the regression model as well as the results of the principal component analysis used when creating the attitudinal scales are in the appendix.

The figure shows how the probability of voting for the Social Democrats rather than for the Danish People's Party varies as attitudes towards *Redistribution* become more hostile

and other attitudes found to make a difference are held at their mean. It shows a similar comparison for the mainstream parties of the right. The results portray the populist right voters as centre-left—neither particularly favorable nor particularly hostile towards redistribution. As attitudes towards redistribution become more hostile (as they approach value "5"), voters are more likely to choose the mainstream right parties than the populist right. As attitudes towards redistribution become more favorable (as they approach value "1"), voters are increasingly likely to vote for the Social Democrats rather than the populist right.

Figure 2. Conditional effects of attitudes towards redistribution on the predicted probability of voting for DF in Denmark, 1998.



Source: Danish Election Study 1998.

The attitudinal model does not alone answer the question of why blue collar workers and owners of small enterprises have joined forces in voting for the populist right. Instead it narrows down the initial question, by showing that we need not to explain neither a rightist nor a leftist position along the socio-economic dimension, but rather a centrist one. This centrist position could be due either to a coalition of voters with opposing preferences along the socio-economic dimension or to a coalition of relatively right-leaning blue collar workers and relatively left-leaning owners of small businesses.

To pursue these hypotheses further, table 1 shows the social structure of the populist right's electorate compared to the social structure of the large mainstream parties' electorates. In this multinomial model, we are primarily concerned with the effects of types of *Occupation* and the effect of *Sector of employment* on the decision to vote for the Danish People's Party. Control variables for *Employment status*, *Education*, *Gender*, and *Age* (life-cycle) have been included, because previous studies suggest that these variables form part of the explanation for the populist right vote (Lubbers 2001; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999). If we fail to control for these variables, we might not test the effects of occupation and sector of employment that interest us. For example, given that a large majority of public sector workers in Denmark are women, we could not be sure that we test for the effects of sector of employment unless we control for the effects of gender. This example illustrates the necessity of using multivariate analysis when disentangling the relationship between social structures and vote.

[Table 1 about here]

The results in table 1 show that owners of small businesses were more likely to vote for the populist right than for the social democrats when compared to skilled blue collar workers. Compared to white collar workers, owners of small businesses, and farmers, blue collar workers are more likely to vote for the populist right than for the mainstream parties of the right even when we control for education and sector of employment. Previous findings with regards to the social structure of the populist right vote are therefore confirmed in the Danish case. Moreover, it is important to note that the overrepresentation of both owners of small businesses and blue collar workers is found as late as in 1998, so it is not the case that the Danish populist right has lost its appeal to owners of small businesses. In the Danish case, we therefore still have to explain why the populists attract both these groups disproportionately, and not only the blue collar workers.

The results in table 1 do not completely rule out the hypothesis that those employed in the public sector are less likely to vote for the populists than those in the private sector. When looking at the comparison between the voters of the populist right and the voters of the

Social Democrats, where we might expect this split to be most pronounced, we can distinguish a small independent effect showing that being employed in the public sector on average makes voters a little more likely to vote social democrat than populist. Given that Denmark is one of the countries where among others Esping-Andersen has predicted that the effect of the public/private split would be most dramatic, the results shown in table 1 are weak. However, they suggest that the explanatory value of the public/private sector split hypothesis cannot be completely disregarded in the Danish case.

Table 1 cannot answer the question of whether blue collar workers and owners of small businesses have contradictory preferences along the socio-economic dimension. To investigate this aspect of the hypotheses, I examined the social structures underlying attitudes towards redistribution in Denmark using ordinary least squares analysis with the attitude index as the dependent variable. For the sake of comparison, I also included results from similar analyses of two attitudes that had more predictive power on the vote of the populists than attitudes towards redistribution. These attitudes are *Exclusionism* (a 1 to 5 index measuring hostility towards immigration and support for strict punishment of crimes) and *Dissatisfaction with politics* (a 1 to 5 index measuring general dissatisfaction with current politics and politicians).[3]

The results in table 2 show that even when we control for public sector employment, blue collar workers are significantly more likely to favour redistribution than the owners of small businesses. Note that whereas the mean blue collar worker is diametrically opposed to the mean owner of a small business when it comes to redistribution, the two groups agree on dissatisfaction with politics and exclusionism. The reason the populist right attracts both blue collar workers and owners of small businesses disproportionately in Denmark, is therefore not that these two groups agree along the socio-economic dimension of politics. The coalition is instead forged in spite of a deep divide—in fact, the deepest divide in the electorate—over the desirability of redistribution. The disillusioned worker hypothesis suggesting that there has

[3] See the appendix for the multinomial logistic model showing the effects of exclusionism and dissatisfaction on the voters' choices and the principal component analysis used to make the attitudinal indices.

been a change of mind among the working class as a whole, so that they on average have become hostile towards state involvement in the economy can therefore be refuted.

[Table 2 about here].

Further, table 2 shows that both Esping-Andersen and Kitschelt are correct when they argue that those who do not work in the public sector are much less favorable towards redistribution than those who do. In this respect, their argument about a public/private sector split along what we may think of as the traditional left-right axis or the socio-economic dimension of politics is sound. However, the split is also evident with regards to exclusionism and dissatisfaction, so this division in the Danish electorate cannot be confined to the socio-economic dimension. And we do not know whether the weak public sector bias against voting for the populist right is due to their stance on redistribution or exclusionism, or both.

This analysis of the Danish parliamentary election of 1998, as a whole, sheds light on the strategic challenges confronting the populist right in Denmark. If they wish to make inroads into the blue collar electorate without losing their votes from owners of small businesses, they may appeal to dissatisfaction with politics and exclusionism, but not much to redistributionary issues. This dilemma may explain why so many of the observers accuse the Danish People's Party of promoting redistributionary and economic policies that are confusing at best and unviable at worst (Carlsen, 2000). Moreover, it suggests that the strong focus on the party's anti-immigrant stance and the sharp distancing from the DF that the leaders of the mainstream parties and the greens engage in are largely counter-productive. Since the appeal of the anti-immigration issue cuts across occupational groups, focus on it benefits the populist right. The more political conflicts center on issues other than strictly socio-economic ones, the more likely it is that the Danish populist right will be able to make inroads into the blue-collar electorate while keeping its small business support.

The Coalition in France.

The national electoral breakthrough of *Front National* (FN) did not happen until 1986 when the party received 10 percent of the national vote in the parliamentary election. By then, *Front National* had existed for 14 years since its creation in 1972 as a national party springing from the key militant far-right alliance, *Ordre Nouveau.* The latter was formed in 1969 after the student uprisings and strikes of May 1968. The FN leader, Jean Marie Le Pen, was already an experienced politician by 1972. He had been a parliamentary deputy representing the *Poujadists* in the1950s and a campaign manager for Jean Louis Tixier Vignancour, a former Vichy minister, who ran for President against de Gaulle in 1965 (Hainsworth 2000a; 1992a; Mayer 1998).

In the 1970s, FN's electoral performance was so poor that it only once, in 1978, received more than 1 percent of the national vote. The majoritarian electoral system in France contributed to ensure that the FN did not get any parliamentary seats. Not until the first national election after the socialists formed government did FN make its parliamentary break-through. In 1986, FN received 35 seats in the national assembly under the temporary proportional electoral law passed by the socialist government. Le Pen is still the leader of Front National, but in early 1999 Bruno Mégret founded *Front National-Mouvement National* as a competitor to FN after leadership disputes with Le Pen. The 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections showed that Le Pen's party survived the split (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999).

The parliamentary election in France, between May 25 and June 1, 1997, saw electoral support for FN soar to an unprecedented 15.1 percent of the vote in the first round. Due to the majoritarian electoral system in France, however, this first-round success only led to one National Front candidate in parliament. Judging from the results in the second ballot, 1997 was not the FN's best election. In the 1986 parliamentary election, which was fought under a PR system, the FN received as much as 10.1 percent of the vote in the decisive ballot. In the 1993 parliamentary election which used the same electoral rules as the 1997 election, the FN received a slightly higher percentage of the vote in the decisive ballot than it did in 1997 (6.3 versus 5.7 percent). Following common practice when analyzing voting for the FN

in France, however, I consider the results of the first round to be the more reliable indicator of the popularity of the party (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999; Schain 2000; Boy and Mayer 2000). The 1997 election can therefore be considered the best parliamentary election of FN to date.

Similar to studies of the success of the populist right in Denmark, those who studied the French case have remarked upon the growth of support for *Front National* among blue collar workers in the 1990s (Mayer 1999; Boy and Mayer 2000; Schain 2000; Lubbers 2001). However, the party has been portrayed as more rightist than its Scandinavian counterpart (Kitschelt 1995). To bring evidence to the debate about where the populist voters stand on issues of public sector size and state involvement in the economy, an analysis replicating the one shown in the Danish case has been conducted. An illustrative interpretation of the results are shown in figure 2 below.[4]

Figure 2. Conditional effects of attitudes towards public sector size on the predicted probability of voting for FN in France, 1997.



Source: French election study 1997.

Figure 2 portrays the mean voter of the populist right as much less favorable to extensive *State size and involvement in the economy* than the mean voter of the main party of the left (PS). It shows that they are closer to the voters of the main parties of the right (UDF

[4] The analysis leading to this figure is shown in the appendix.

and RPR), but that they are still a little less hostile to a large public sector than these voters. As in the Danish case, all results hold other attitudes that were found to have an impact on the decision to vote for the populists at their mean. In the French case, therefore, the populist voters as a whole can be described as center-right regarding their views on the desirability of a large public sector. As in the Danish case, this position of the populist voters could be due either to an uneasy coalition of left-leaning blue collar workers and right-leaning owners of small businesses or a uniform coalition of right-leaning blue collar workers and centrist owners of small businesses.

Table 3 shows the results of a multinomial model similar to that seen in the Danish case. It is a comparison of the social structure of the populist right's electorate and the electorates of the three large mainstream parties. The results confirm the findings of previous scholars, and shows that an explanation of the populist right's success in France has to account for why both blue collar workers and owners of small businesses found the party appealing. Compared to the PS voters, the FN's electorate overrepresents owners of small businesses. Compared to the parties of the right, they overrepresent unskilled blue collar workers and underrepresent farmers.

The public/private sector split plays no significant role in the explanation of why people voted for the FN rather than any of the mainstream parties. Those in the public sector are, in the French case, not significantly more likely to vote for the PS than for the National Front. As in the Danish analysis, these results are found when controlling for other socio-demographic variables that are thought to account for the choice to vote for the populist right in previous studies (Lubbers 2001; Mayer 1999).[5]

[Table 3 about here].

The results of the analysis of the social base of the populist right vote in France are very similar to those seen in the Danish case. However, we cannot take for granted that the conclusion to be reached about the socio-economic divisions in the coalition supporting the

[5] Unlike the Danish case, the French case includes a control variable for *Religion*. This variable could not be included in the Danish case because the Danish Election Study did not include this variable in the questionnaire.

populist right will be the same. Perhaps when we control for public sector employment, the attitudes of blue collar workers in France are more like those of their coalition partners? Indeed, this is what studies launching France as the master case of right-wing populism have argued (Kitschelt 1995).

The results in table 4 decisively refute the notion that the coalition underlying the populist right's success in France is coherent along the socio-economic dimension. Blue collar workers are significantly more favorably inclined towards and extensive state size and involvement in the economy than owners of small businesses are, even when we control for public sector employment. As in the Danish case, the division between the blue collar workers and the owners of small businesses on the issue of state involvement in the economy is the deepest one in the electorate. With regards to *Exclusionism* and *Dissatisfaction with politics*, however, there are no significant divisions between blue collar workers and owners of small businesses.

[Table 4 about here].

As in the Danish case, table 4 shows a deep division between public sector workers and private sector workers when it comes to the socio-economic dimension of politics. Public sector workers are much more favorably inclined to a large amount of state involvement in the economy. However, as table 3 showed, this division—like the division between blue collar workers and owners of small businesses—is not an important part of the explanation for the success of populist right. In addition, table 3 interestingly shows that, in France, the public/private sector divide on issues of exclusionism and dissatisfaction is much smaller than was the case in Denmark. This could be why the public/private sector divide does not matter at all for the choice to vote populist in France, while there was a weak effect of this split in Denmark regarding the choice between the Social Democrats and the populist right. Overall, the Danish and French cases have provided important evidence to suggest that we need to explain why the populist right is doing well in spite of the socio-economic divisions within their electorate instead of because of new alignments.

Why no owners of small businesses among Vlaams Blok's voters?

Vlaams Blok (VB) was formed in 1978 as an electoral alliance between *Vlaams-Nationale Partij* and *Vlaamse Volkspartij*. Both these parties were founded in 1977 after the agreement on reorganization of the Belgian state had been signed by the Flemish nationalist party, *Volksunie*. Anchored in the biggest port city of Flanders, Antwerp, *Vlaams Blok* activists set out with the political goal of separating Flanders from Belgium. The founder of VB, Karel Dillen, had been a member of *Volksunie*, which was formed in 1954, but he left that party in 1970-71. In the first election after its formation, VB received only 1.4 percent of the votes in Flanders. The party did not have its definite national-level breakthrough until 1991 when it received 10.3 percent of the vote in Flanders. The VB's share of the vote in that election amounted to 6.6 percent of the overall national vote. Dillen resigned from VB in 1996 and personally appointed Frank Vanhecke to succeed him. Beside, if not in front of Vanhecke, looms the charismatic Filip Dewinter, who is a prominent figure within the party. He is leading the party's faction in its central arena, the Antwerp City Council (Swyngedouw 2000; 1998; Lubbers 2001; Husbands 1992).

For *Vlaams Blok*, the parliamentary election on May 21, 1995, was its best national election until then. The party received 12.5 percent of the votes in the Flemish region, and 7.8 percent overall. This result secured 11 seats in parliament for the party. *Vlaams Blok* did even better in the following election in 1999, when it received 15.5 percent of the Flemish vote. I analyze the 1995 election, because the survey data needed for the 1999 election was under embargo when I started this analysis.

Compared to the Danish and French populist right, previous work has found that *Vlaams Blok* has been less successful in attracting owners of small businesses. This section finds support for that argument. However, I find that the social structures underlying attitudes along the socio-economic dimension of politics in Flanders is very similar to those found in the Danish and French cases. The reason why VB attracts blue collar workers, but not the owners of small businesses, looks to be on the level of party strategy and party competition, as the supply model leads us to expect.

Figure 4. Conditional effects of attitudes towards public sector size on the predicted probability of voting for VB in Flanders, 1995.



Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.

Figure 4 shows that attitudes to *Redistribution* matters for the decision to vote for the main party of the left (SP) rather than VB. The more hostile to redistribution Flemish voters become, the less likely they are to vote for the SP instead of *Vlaams Blok*. The opposite trend is found with regards to the mainstream party of the right (VLD). The more hostile to redistribution the voters become in this comparison, the more likely they are to vote for the VLD rather than for the VB. There is virtually no difference between the voters of the centrist CVP and the voters of VB in this respect. So, figure 4 tells us more decisively than the preceding figures for the Danish and French cases that the populist's electorate is neither right nor left. The figure holds other relevant attitudes at their mean.

Although they show that the VB voters are more favorably inclined to redistribution than the VLD voters, the results in figure 4 are somewhat surprising, because the VB electorate is clearly to the right of the SP electorate. If *Vlaams Blok* disproportionately represents blue collar workers, should not the electorate as a whole have had a more left-wing profile? Two competing explanations could account for the pattern in figure 4. Either *Vlaams Blok* does not overrepresent blue collar workers to any notable extent, or blue collar

workers in Flanders are less favorable towards state involvement than the blue collar workers in France and Denmark.

Table 5 sheds light on this question. It shows that, compared to the centrist CVP voters, the VB overrepresents blue collar workers (when the latter groups is compared to professionals or farmers). Compared to the VLD, the VB underrepresents owners of small businesses, and compared to the SP, *Vlaams Blok's* electorate looks very similar. These results show that the coalition voting for the VB is wide. However, it might be less divided than the coalitions seen in the Danish and French cases, because in Flanders owners of small businesses are voting for the mainstream right rather than the populist right. The absence of this segment of the populist electorate accounts for the more strictly centrist attitudes displayed by the VB voters.

The lack of a clear leftist profile among the VB voters could be explained by a public-private sector split, where the public sector workers voted for the main party of the left, while the unemployed and those working in private businesses voted for the populist right. However, table 5 shows that also in the Flemish case, the public/private sector split hypothesis performs badly. When controlling for other socio-economic characteristics found to be relevant in earlier studies (Swyngedouw 1998; Lubbers 2001), those who are employed in the public sector are not significantly more likely to vote for the SP than for the VB. It seems that the importance of the public/private sector divide hypothesis has been clearly challenged even when the underlying social structure of the populist right vote varies.

[Insert table 5 about here].

The hypothesis of disillusioned workers turning against the public sector can however not be refuted on the evidence in table 5. It suggests that the VB voters are not particularly clearly defined by social groups, but it shows an underrepresentation of white collar workers, the self-employed, and farmers. Moreover, figure 4 showed that the VB voters were clearly less keen on state involvement in the economy than SP voters To pursue the disillusioned workers' hypothesis, then, we must look at the social structure underlying the attitudes towards redistribution.

[Table 6 about here]

Table 6 shows a comparison of attitudes towards redistribution, *Exclusionism*, and *Dissatisfaction with politics* that is intended to be as similar as possible to the tables shown in the French and Danish cases. It shows that there is indeed a gap between the attitudes of the blue collar workers and the owners of small businesses in Flanders, as in France and Denmark. As in these two previous cases, the public sector employees are more in favor of redistribution than the rest of the Flemish population. There is little evidence in the Flemish case, too, that the success of the populist right has been caused by a shift in the attitudes of the 'lower classes' to the right on the socio-economic dimension. Instead, it seems indeed that the populist right in Flanders chose a strategy that has failed to attract owners of small businesses, and instead attracted a wide segment of voters. Alternatively, the VLD's strategy for keeping the owners of small businesses in their electorate is more effective than the strategy chosen by mainstream parties of the right in France and Denmark.

Rather than showing the development of a new alignment, then, the structure of the Flemish vote suggests that no magic formula is required to attract blue collar workers. They have not turned rightist along the socio-economic axis, so the issues that draws them away from the left is mainly exclusionism and disillusionment with politics. Moreover, the analysis presented here shows that *Vlaams Blok* is not winning votes because of any kind of neo-liberalism, but rather in spite of it. Its electorate may have less possibility of growing than its Danish and French counterparts, because it has little appeal to the owners of small businesses. However, its coalition is more cohesive, so the party may have more of a chance of keeping its voters in the event that they assume a government position.

Conclusion

This article has shown that a simultaneous appeal to both blue collar workers and owners of small businesses is not easily achieved in contemporary politics in Western Europe. These two groups of voters are deeply divided on the socio-economic dimension of politics, and they are, therefore, not a readily available coalition. The Flemish case is an example of how

populist parties may easily fail to appeal to both these groups, while the French and Danish cases are examples where this difficult balancing act has been successfully pursued by the populist right.

The poor performance of the public/private sector split hypothesis tested here does not suggest that there is no difference between the preferences of public sector and private sector employees along the socio-economic dimension of politics. To the contrary, this article found, as expected, that public sector workers are significantly more keen to support a large and active state than are private sector workers. However, this relatively deep division (albeit not as deep as that between blue collar workers and owners of small businesses) is only very weakly and only in one of the cases studied here reflected in the likelihood of voting for the populist right. The analysis presented here showed that public sector employees were generally not much less likely to vote for the populist right than those employed in the private sector.

The demand perspectives described here have no explanation for why the populist right in Denmark and France manages to appeal to an electorate that is deeply divided on the socio-economic dimension of politics. Neither is it particularly good at explaining why the Flemish populist right fails to attract this coalition. Only the supply perspective that allows for the possibility that the premises of political competition can be altered, so that socio-economic divisions for a while appear insignificant can properly account for the populist right's success among this uneasy coalition of voters.

Above all, this study has highlighted the importance for the populist right in most Western European countries of keeping a stance that is malleable along the socio-economic axis. Welfare chauvinism, understood either as the ability to subordinate redistributionary issues to socio-cultural ones or as selectively supporting some popular redistributionary schemes while arguing against unpopular bureaucratic waste, is a necessary electoral strategy for the populist opposition parties that seek to appeal to their disparate electorates.

Instead of disregarding the populist right because their policy-suggestions along the economic axis are perceived as inconsistent or chauvinist, this study suggests that their

populist and chauvinist strategy should be recognized as a clever way of maximizing their support. This interpretation of their strategy implies, however, that it would be difficult for the populist right to hold together their coalition of support if they ever appear as something other than opposition parties. The recent dissolution of the FPÖ in Austria is a first-rate example of the trouble a populist party that attracted an essentially divided coalition might run into if they take on government responsibility.

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Table 1. Multinomial model of the socio-demographic composition of the electorate of the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and the Conservatives compared to the DF electorate in Denmark, 1998.

	Social Democrats (SD)		Liberals (V)		Conservatives (K)	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=209)						
White collar, professionals/managers (n=271)	0.402	0.447	1.06*	0.452	1.71**	0.550
White collar, routine non-manual (n=410)	0.339	0.341	0.433	0.361	1.15*	0.475
Owner of small businesses (n=97)	-1.44***	0.556	0.169	0.464	1.57**	0.549
Farmers (n=44)	-31.300	coll.	1.73**	0.670	0.049	1.227
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=262)	0.942*	0.380	0.551	0.405	0.207	0.604
No occupation (n=708)	0.234	0.322	0.295	0.339	1.09*	0.456
Sector of employment						
Employed in private sector or not employed (n=1487)						
Employed in public sector (n=514)	0.597*	0.286	-0.032	0.299	-0.401	0.347
Employment status						
Not job-seeking (n=1893)						
Unemployed (108)	0.811	0.551	0.183	0.590	0.160	0.678
Education						
No education/primary education (n=410)						
Mid-school (n=322)	-0.207	0.309	0.057	0.321	0.582	0.415
Secondary school (n=667)	-0.341	0.283	0.023	0.292	1.05**	0.365
University (593)	0.630	0.405	1.20**	0.410	2.15***	0.470
Gender						
Female (n=921)						
Male (n=1080)	-0.205	0.215	-0.174	0.221	-0.310	0.251
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1108)						
36 years and below (n=613)	-0.343	0.255	0.065	0.258	-0.087	0.294
67 years and above (n=280)	0.162	0.334	0.719*	0.337	0.694	0.384
Intercept	1.33***	0.376	0.577	0.396	-1.47**	0.538
Number of cases	1361					
Pseudo R^2	0.0763					
LR chi2	255.78***	(42df)				

Sources: Danish Election Study 1998; EREPS pooled sociodemographic dataset. ***p-value<.001; **p-value<0.01; *p-value<0.05.

Table 2. The socio-demographic structure underlying attitudes towards redistribution, exclusionism, and dissatisfaction with politics in Denmark, 1998. Three OLS models.

	Redistribution		Exclusiomism		Dissatisfaction	
	Coef.	s.e	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=209)						
White collar, professionals/managers (n=271)	0.365***	0.105	-0.075	0.085	-0.164*	0.076
White collar, routine non-manual (n=410)	0.162	0.095	-0.083	0.077	-0.146*	0.068
Owner of small businesses (n=97)	0.779***	0.135	-0.025	0.109	0.017	0.098
Farmers (n=44)	0.453*	0.182	0.034	0.147	0.013	0.131
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=262)	-0.309**	0.101	-0.080	0.081	0.082	0.072
No occupation (n=708)	0.048	0.093	-0.191*	0.075	-0.146*	0.067
Sector of employment						
Employed in private sector or not employed (n=1487)						
Employed in public sector (n=514)	-0.275***	0.064	-0.261***	0.051	-0.106*	0.046
Employment status						
Not job-seeking (n=1893)						
Unemployed (108)	-0.281**	0.109	0.018	0.088	0.095	0.079
Education						
No education/primary education (n=410)						
Mid-school (n=322)	0.303***	0.084	0.025	0.068	0.066	0.061
Secondary school (n=667)	0.448**	0.074	-0.178**	0.060	-0.108*	0.054
University (593)	0.678***	0.084	-0.713***	0.068	-0.334***	0.060
Gender						
Female (n=921)						
Male (n=1080)	0.122*	0.051	0.034	0.041	-0.071	0.037
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1108)						
36 years and below (n=613)	0.224***	0.061	0.157***	0.049	-0.120**	0.044
67 years and above (n=280)	0.042	0.084	0.267***	0.067	0.146*	0.060
Intercept	2.59***	0.105	3.624***	0.085	3.565***	0.076
Number of cases	1992		1992		1992	
R^2	0.1237		0.147		0.085	
F	19.94***		24.35***		13.05***	

Sources: Danish Election Study 1998; EREPS pooled sociodemographic dataset.

Table 3. Multinomial model of the socio-demographic composition of the electorate of the PS, the RPR, and the UDF compared to Front National's electorate in France, 1997.

	PS		RPR		UDF	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=594)						
White collar, professionals/managers (n=716)	-0.373	0.280	0.065	0.312	0.187	0.325
White collar, routine non-manual (n=721)	-0.074	0.280	-0.229	0.323	0.103	0.331
Owner of small businesses (n=260)	-1.01**	0.347	0.107	0.354	0.040	0.377
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=594)	-0.504	0.328	-0.618	0.396	-0.477	0.409
Farmers (113)	2.019	1.045	2.766**	1.046	2.87**	1.052
No occupation (n=393)	-0.201	0.337	-0.182	0.378	0.397	0.376
Sector of employment						
Employed in private sector or not employed (n=2142)						
Employed in public sector (n=868)	0.274	0.203	-0.362	0.234	-0.352	0.239
Employment status						
Not job-seeking (n=2839)						
Unemployed (171)	0.346	0.379	-0.521	0.518	0.127	0.462
Education						
No education/primary education (n=952)						
Mid-school (n=983)	-0.012	0.210	0.114	0.235	0.002	0.242
Secondary school (n=457)	0.962**	0.332	1.23***	0.363	1.06**	0.370
University (618)	0.797**	0.302	1.13***	0.328	1.14***	0.332
Religion						
Other religion or no religion (n=749)						
Catholic or Protestant (n=2261)	-0.380	0.203	0.886***	0.257	1.41***	0.290
Gender						
Female (n=1577)						
Male (n=1433)	-0.434*	0.190	-0.716***	0.208	-0.489*	0.212
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1447)						
36 years and below (n=1072)	-0.389	0.210	-0.637**	0.244	-0.377	0.246
67 years and above (n=491)	0.048	0.254	0.469	0.260	0.467	0.267
Intercept	1.63***	0.330	0.024	0.391	-0.888*	0.423
Number of cases	1435					
Pseudo R^2	0.0685					
LR chi2	257.06***					

Source: French election study, 1997; EREPS pooled sociodemographic dataset.

Table 4. The socio-demographic structure underlying attitudes towards State involvement in the economy, Exclusionism, and Dissatisfaction with politics in France, 1997. Three OLS models

	State involvement		Exclusionism		Dissatisfaction	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=594)						
White collar, professionals/managers (n=716)	0.288***	0.040	-0.166***	0.042	-0.114***	0.034
White collar, routine non-manual (n=721)	0.094*	0.039	-0.085*	0.041	-0.010	0.033
Owner of small businesses (n=260)	0.477***	0.049	-0.026	0.052	-0.074	0.042
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=594)	0.042	0.052	0.059	0.055	0.050	0.045
Farmers (113)	0.413***	0.067	-0.049	0.071	-0.132*	0.058
No occupation (n=393)	0.030	0.045	-0.205***	0.048	-0.163***	0.039
Sector of employment						
Employed in private sector or not employed (n=2142)						
Employed in public sector (n=868)	-0.347*	0.029	-0.063*	0.030	-0.025	0.025
Employment status						
Not job-seeking (n=2839)						
Unemployed (171)	-0.070	0.051	-0.016	0.054	0.103*	0.044
Education						
No education/primary education (n=952)						
Mid-school (n=983)	0.116***	0.031	-0.079*	0.033	-0.054*	0.027
Secondary school (n=457)	0.163***	0.040	-0.417***	0.043	-0.186***	0.035
University (618)	0.323***	0.039	-0.535***	0.042	-0.243***	0.034
Religion						
Other religion or no religion (n=749)						
Catholic or Protestant (n=2261)	0.294***	0.028	0.339***	0.029	-0.076**	0.024
Gender						
Female (n=1577)						
Male (n=1433)	0.147***	0.026	-0.016	0.027	-0.100***	0.022
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1447)						
36 years and below (n=1072)	-0.127***	0.029	-0.062*	0.030	0.095***	0.025
67 years and above (n=491)	0.112***	0.034	0.002	0.036	-0.154***	0.030
Intercept	1.77***	0.045	2.41***	0.048	2.96***	0.039
Number of cases	3010		3010		3010	
R^2	0.1848		0.1925		0.0745	
F	45.23***		47.57***		16.07***	

Source: French election study, 1997; EREPS pooled sociodemographic dataset.

Table 5. Multinomial model of the socio-demographic composition of the electorates of the SP, VLD, and CVP compared to Vlaams Blok's electorate in Flanders, 1995.

	SP		VLD		CVP	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=195)						
White collar, professional/manager (n=426)	0.554	0.468	0.899	0.487	1.27**	0.469
White collar, routine non-manual (n=433)	-0.199	0.359	0.411	0.382	0.312	0.366
Owners of small businesses (n=195)	-0.489	0.478	1.51***	0.445	0.324	0.454
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=598)	-0.064	0.321	-0.111	0.357	-0.018	0.336
Farmers (n=33)	-30.752	coll.	2.067	1.092	2.55*	1.066
No occupation (n=219)	-0.165	0.448	0.589	0.456	0.602	0.441
Sector of employment						
Employed in the private sector or not employed (n=1788)						
Employed in the public sector (n=302)	0.049	0.297	-0.658*	0.330	-0.316	0.303
Employment status						
Respondent not job-seeking (n=1972)						
Unemployed (n=127)	-0.351	0.350	-0.611	0.381	-0.514	0.358
Education						
No education/primary (n=413)						
Mid-school (n=486)	-0.221	0.292	-0.348	0.313	0.036	0.294
Secondary school (n=646)	-0.210	0.324	-0.019	0.335	0.283	0.322
University (n=514)	0.055	0.435	0.649	0.434	0.695	0.428
Religion						
Other religion or no religion (n=1188)						
Catholic or Protestant (n=911)	-0.195	0.207	0.587**	0.211	1.64***	0.208
Gender						
Female (n=1004)						
Male (n=1095)	-0.458*	0.212	-0.395	0.217	-0.708***	0.211
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1148)						
36 years and below (n=750)	-0.590**	0.230	-0.354	0.235	-0.798***	0.231
67 years and above (n=201)	-0.887*	0.361	-0.803*	0.360	-0.427	0.327
Intercept	1.79***	0.410	0.697	0.443	0.503	0.427
Nuber of cases	1495					
Pseudo R^2	0.1137					
LR chi2	440.85***					

Source: Belgian Election Study 1995; EREPS pooled sociodemographics dataset.

Table 6. The socio-demographic structure underlying attitudes towards redistribution, exclusionism, and dissatisfaction with politics in Flanders, 1995. Three OLS models.

	Redistribution		Exclusionism		Dissatisfaction	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
Occupation						
Blue collar, skilled manual (n=195)						
White collar, professional/manager (n=426)	-0.043	0.072	-0.323***	0.076	-0.158*	0.062
White collar, routine non-manual (n=433)	-0.054	0.064	-0.096	0.068	-0.023	0.055
Owners of small businesses (n=195)	0.314***	0.073	0.045	0.078	-0.007	0.064
Blue collar, unskilled manual (n=598)	-0.126*	0.061	-0.016	0.064	-0.037	0.053
Farmers (n=33)	0.050	0.110	-0.065	0.117	-0.225*	0.096
No occupation (n=219)	0.024	0.073	-0.248***	0.077	-0.176**	0.064
Sector of employment						
Employed in the private sector or not employed (n=1788)						
Employed in the public sector (n=302)	-0.106*	0.048	-0.090	0.051	-0.054	0.042
Employment status						
Respondent not job-seeking (n=1972)						
Unemployed (n=127)	-0.057	0.066	0.078	0.070	0.112	0.058
Education						
No education/primary (n=413)						
Mid-school (n=486)	0.123*	0.049	-0.050	0.052	-0.038	0.043
Secondary school (n=646)	0.173***	0.052	-0.173**	0.056	-0.080	0.046
University (n=514)	0.321***	0.063	-0.364***	0.067	-0.211***	0.055
Religion						
Other religion or no religion (n=1188)						
Catholic or Protestant (n=911)	0.122***	0.033	0.112***	0.035	-0.116***	0.029
Gender						
Female (n=1004)						
Male (n=1095)	0.000	0.033	-0.101**	0.035	-0.100***	0.029
Age						
From 37 to 66 years (n=1148)						
36 years and below (n=750)	0.097**	0.037	-0.020	0.039	-0.001	0.032
67 years and above (n=201)	-0.054	0.057	0.237***	0.060	0.077	0.049
Intercept	2.12***	0.072	3.46***	0.076	3.59***	0.063
Number of cases	2047		2030		2037	
R^2	0.0738		0.1261		0.055	
F	10.79***		19.37***		7.85***	

Source: Belgian Election Study 1995; EREPS pooled sociodemographics dataset.

APPENDIX.[6]

Table A1. Comparing attitudes of DF voters to attitudes of Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Green, and non-voters in Denmark, 1998. Multinomial logit model.

	Social Democrat voters compared to DF voters		*Liberal voters compared to DF voters*		*Conservative Voters compared to DF Voters*		*SV (green) voters compared to DF voters*		*Non voters compared to DF voters*	
Attitudes	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	15.707***	1.091	7.420***	1.034	5.567***	1.157	15.804***	1.248	10.45***	1.337
Exclusionism	-1.173***	0.182	-1.003***	0.183	-1.083***	0.203	-1.989***	0.221	-1.057***	0.229
European integration	-0.399**	0.132	-0.753***	0.130	-0.734***	0.150	0.149	0.170	-0.423*	0.179
Redistribution	-0.444***	0.101	0.208*	0.098	0.546***	0.118	-0.463***	0.131	-0.242	0.137
Environment	-0.318*	0.143	0.477***	0.146	0.501**	0.169	-1.029***	0.192	-0.302	0.193
Public Sector Size	-1.058***	0.162	0.193	0.164	0.195	0.189	-1.160***	0.208	-0.985***	0.213
Satisfaction with politics	-0.776***	0.174	-0.797***	0.174	-0.838***	0.195	-0.435*	0.210	-0.120	0.226
Number of cases	1611									
Pseudo R^2	0.2341									
LR chi2	1184.17	(30 df)								

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Source: Danish Election Study 1998.

[6] For a more detailed description of the analysis reported in this appendix, see Ivarsflaten (2002).

A2. Mapping attitudes towards seven issues in Denmark, 1998. Principal component analysis.

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Immigration Issues						
Immigration a threat	**0.7215**	-0.0117	-0.2137	-0.1638	0.2433	-0.0756
Less social rights for immigrants	**0.6630**	0.0352	-0.1092	0.1985	0.1266	-0.0433
Receive fewer immigrants	**0.8309**	0.0322	-0.0691	0.0267	0.1289	-0.1266
Immigrants go home	**0.7986**	0.0469	-0.0718	0.0072	0.1279	-0.1497
Receive de facto asylum seekers	**0.6194**	0.0662	-0.0551	0.0466	0.0545	-0.0935
Law and Order Issues						
Stricter punishment for violence	**0.5690**	-0.0649	-0.1746	0.0315	0.1822	0.0117
Punishment vs. Crime prevention	0.4844	-0.1067	-0.1467	0.2207	0.2695	0.2863
Order and punishment vs. Prevention and treatment	**0.6003**	-0.0884	-0.1817	0.1721	0.3467	0.0084
EU Issues						
General attitude to the EU	0.1244	**0.5693**	-0.3156	-0.1722	-0.2816	0.1944
More power to EP	0.1477	**0.7535**	-0.1110	-0.0565	0.0677	-0.0360
More foreign policy power to the EU	-0.1224	**0.7990**	-0.0232	-0.0012	-0.0957	0.1299
Satisfaction with political process						
Politicians care too little about voters' opinions	-0.1814	-0.1165	**0.7473**	0.1254	-0.0970	0.0275
Politicians can be trusted to make right decisions	-0.0243	-0.1543	**0.6813**	-0.1801	0.0389	0.0456
No real difference between parties	-0.0669	0.0280	**0.4881**	0.2030	-0.1898	0.0733
Politicians waste citizens' money	-0.4154	0.0381	**0.5437**	-0.0350	-0.1670	0.3322
Political parties care about man on the street	-0.1737	-0.0666	**0.7255**	0.0115	-0.0117	-0.0401
Redistribution Issues						
Higher taxes on high incomes	0.0003	-0.1071	0.0495	**0.7179**	0.1020	-0.1687
Economic equality is important political goal	0.0743	-0.0282	0.0045	**0.7732**	-0.0387	-0.0793
Environment Issues						
Economic growth vs. environment	0.2396	-0.0665	-0.0564	-0.1083	**0.7175**	-0.1864
Competitiveness vs. environment	0.2402	-0.1199	-0.0037	-0.0894	**0.7045**	-0.1842
Favor green politics	0.1828	-0.0108	-0.0563	0.2223	**0.6817**	-0.1241
Higher green taxes on fuel	0.2938	0.0177	-0.1389	0.1690	**0.5917**	0.0445
Public Sector Size						
Privatization makes services better and cheaper	-0.2091	0.1436	0.1201	-0.1723	-0.2176	**0.6441**
Cannot afford welfare state in the long run	-0.2466	0.2245	0.1520	-0.0543	-0.0099	0.4552
More efficient public sector without compromising standard	-0.0535	0.0748	0.0098	-0.0783	-0.1458	**0.7190**
Cut public sector income and spending	-0.2418	0.0189	-0.0277	-0.3346	-0.3192	**0.5046**
Eigenvalues	*6.45*	*2.79*	*1.56*	*1.41*	*1.16*	*1.03*

*Varimax rotation. Values greater than .5 are in bold

Source: Danish Election Studies (1998).

A3. Mapping attitudes towards five issues in France, 1997. Principal component analysis.

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4
EU Issues				
For or against the EURO	**0.7764**	-0.1315	-0.1428	0.1138
Regret the disappearance of the EU	**0.7806**	-0.0885	-0.2328	0.1131
The EU has positive influence on our way of life	**0.6119**	0.0050	-0.1414	0.1734
The EU protects France against globalization	**0.7395**	0.0041	0.0074	0.1282
State Size and Involvement				
"Privatization" is a good thing	-0.1823	**0.6147**	-0.1360	-0.1501
The number of bureaucrats should be reduced	-0.0470	**0.7036**	-0.1293	0.1419
For the creation of public employment	-0.1021	**0.8002**	0.0287	-0.0244
The work week should be reduced	0.0225	**0.7260**	-0.0710	-0.1482
Immigration and xenophobia				
Support Pasqua-Debre's immigration laws	0.0394	0.3776	**-0.6319**	-0.1456
North Africans in France become like other French	0.2026	0.0245	**-0.5896**	0.1155
Some races are less gifted than others	0.0216	-0.1079	**-0.6214**	0.0940
There are too many immigrants in France	0.1603	0.1076	**-0.7870**	0.0410
Order				
The death penalty should be reintroduced	0.2153	-0.0053	**-0.6993**	0.1074
Satisfaction with Politics				
Do politicians care about people like you	0.2328	-0.0471	0.0087	**0.6785**
Democracy in France works well	0.1841	-0.1005	-0.0953	**0.6906**
"The State" is a good thing	0.1052	0.0005	-0.0716	**0.6896**
Eigenvalues	*3.54*	*2.67*	*1.35*	*1.07*

*varimax rotated. Values >0.5 are in bold.

Source: French Election Study 1997.

A4. Comparing attitudes of FN voters to attitudes of PS, RPR, UDF, green, and non voters in France, 1997.
Multinomial logit model.

	PS voters compared to FN voters		*RPR voters compared to FN voters*		*UDF Voters compared to FN voters*		*Green voters compared to FN voters*		*Non voters compared to FN Voters*	
Attitudes	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	12.63***	0.757	7.91***	0.765	7.756***	0.776	10.350***	0.962	8.039***	0.705
Exclusionism	-1.857***	0.161	-0.719***	0.164	-0.644***	0.166	-2.222***	0.220	-1.401***	0.152
State size and involvement	-1.682***	0.149	0.190	0.144	0.093	0.146	-1.533***	0.219	-0.785***	0.131
European integration	-0.680***	0.139	-0.734***	0.143	-0.827***	0.147	-0.944***	0.211	-0.489***	0.127
Satisfaction with politics	-0.500**	0.185	-1.515***	0.194	-1.394***	0.197	0.060	0.258	0.051	0.172
Number of cases	2257									
Pseudo R^2	0.1521									
LR chi2	1117***	(20 df)								

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Source: French Election Study 1997.

A5. Mapping attitudes towards six issues in Flanders, 1995. Principal component analysis.

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4	Comp 5	Comp 6
Immigration Issues						
Guest workers threaten employment	**0.6740**	-0.0208	0.2138	0.0517	-0.2068	0.1221
Immigrants contribute to country's welfare	**0.7122**	-0.0706	0.0786	0.1476	-0.0222	0.0613
Muslims are threat to culture	**0.5849**	0.0971	0.0592	0.0724	-0.3502	0.0515
We should welcome immigrants	**0.7530**	0.0204	0.1182	0.0599	0.1359	0.0700
No political activities for immigrants	**0.7314**	0.0110	0.1744	0.0553	-0.2519	0.0796
Redistribution						
Reduce class difference	0.0017	**0.7738**	0.0027	-0.0222	0.0903	-0.0066
Maintain income differentials	-0.0345	**0.7427**	-0.0244	-0.0014	0.1418	-0.0274
Government reduce income difference	0.0254	**0.7888**	-0.0091	-0.0639	-0.1082	0.0061
Environment Issues						
Support strict control of traffic	0.1073	0.1253	**0.6638**	0.0563	-0.0793	0.0433
Prepared to give up something for environment	0.1308	-0.0145	**0.8604**	0.0638	-0.0620	0.0182
Prepared to pay higher prices if less polution	0.1473	-0.0709	**0.8201**	0.0700	-0.0308	-0.0346
Satisfaction with politics						
Politicians are competent people	0.0469	0.0246	-0.0667	**0.6901**	0.1665	0.0146
Parties promise without result	0.0909	-0.1127	0.1824	**0.5836**	-0.2543	0.0284
People like me influence politics	0.0831	-0.0635	0.1403	**0.6645**	0.0368	-0.0141
No politician I trust	0.1970	-0.0332	0.1548	**0.6381**	-0.1915	0.0647
Authoritarian Attitudes						
Children must learn respect for authority	-0.2936	0.0879	-0.1650	-0.0108	**0.6071**	-0.0684
We need strong leader rather than better institutions	-0.0337	0.0895	-0.0034	-0.0848	**0.7309**	-0.0274
A strong leader should tell us what to do	-0.1107	-0.0137	-0.0785	0.0297	**0.7604**	-0.0974
Regional Power Issues						
Stop division of Belgium	0.1129	-0.0610	0.0083	-0.0188	-0.0773	**0.8265**
Federalise Social security	0.0684	0.0398	-0.0018	0.0536	-0.0370	**0.8437**
Eigenvalues	*4.12*	*1.90*	*1.71*	*1.46*	*1.26*	*1.20*

*varimax rotated. Loadings >.5 are in bold.

Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.

A6. Comparing attitudes of VB voters to attitudes of SP, VLD, CVP, and green voters in Flanders, 1995. .
Multinomial logit model

	SP voters compared to VB voters		*VLD voters compared to VB voters*		*CVP voters compared to VB Voters*		*Green (Agalev) voters compared to VB voters*	
Attitudes	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.	Log odds	s.e.
Intercept	12.051***	1.105	6.188***	1.058	11.455***	1.050	10.142***	1.320
Exclusionism	-1.515***	0.171	-1.103***	0.165	-1.454***	0.162	-1.903***	0.211
Authoritarianism	-0.260	0.154	-0.023	0.150	0.226	0.147	-0.698***	0.185
Redistribution	-0.854***	0.153	0.421**	0.137	-0.046	0.137	-0.368	0.194
Environment	0.142	0.116	0.039	0.112	0.144	0.109	-0.900***	0.173
Regionalization	-0.543***	0.116	-0.295**	0.112	-0.291***	0.109	-0.434**	0.149
Satisfaction with politics	-0.949***	0.181	-0.424*	0.175	-1.097***	0.171	-0.339	0.224
Number of cases	1634							
Pseudo R^2	0.1272							
LR chi2	614.34	(24 df)						

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.

A7. Correlation between Scales in the Danish Case.

	Exclusionism	EU	Redistribution	Environme	Public sector size	Satisfaction
Exclusionism	1					
EU	0.033	1				
Redistribution	0.128	-0.1805	1			
Environment	0.5486	-0.1647	0.1395	1		
Public sector size	0.3784	-0.2522	0.3036	0.4349	1	
Satisfaction	0.4449	0.2199	-0.0237	0.2841	0.25	1

Source: Danish Election Study, 1998.

A8. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the Danish Case.

Scales	Alpha
Exclusionism	0.8212
EU	0.6306
Satisfaction	0.7137
Redistribution	0.5129
Environment	0.7283
Public Sector Size	0.6288

Source: Danish Election Study, 1998

A9. Correlation between Scales in the French Case.

	Exclusionism	Satisfaction	State Size	EU
Exclusionism	1			
Satisfaction	0.1708	1		
State Size	0.1817	-0.1512	1	
EU	0.3485	0.407	-0.1544	1

Source: French Election Study 1997.

A10. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the French Case.

Scales	Alpha
Exclusionism	0.7234
EU	0.7507
Satisfaction	0.5407
State size	0.7080

Source: French Election Study 1997.

A11. Correlation between Scales in the Flemish Case.

	Exclusionism	Authoritarianism	Satisfaction	Regionalism	Redistribution	Environment
Exclusionism	1					
Authoritarianism	0.3837	1				
Satisfaction	0.3017	0.167	1			
Regionalism	0.2234	0.1715	0.0884	1		
Redistribution	-0.0148	-0.1175	-0.1001	-0.0278	1	
Environment	0.3544	0.2106	0.2316	0.04	-0.0128	1

Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.

A12. Cronbach's Alpha for Indices in the Flemish Case.

Scales	Alpha
Exclusionism	0.7786
Regionalism	0.5924
Satisfaction	0.5807
Redistribution	0.6686
Environment	0.7242
Authoritarian	0.6228

Source: Belgian Election Study 1995.