Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk*

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Abstract

This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous restrictions on the feasible set of policies for the receiver. Such restrictions, which are present in most applications, can, by limiting the punishments available to the receiver, prevent the existence of fully revealing equilibria (FRE). We focus on FRE that are i) robust to small mistakes by the senders, in that small differences between the senders’ messages result in only small punishments by the receiver, and ii) independent of the magnitudes of the senders’ bias vectors. For convex policy spaces in an arbitrary number of dimensions, we prove that if there exists a FRE satisfying property ii), then there exists one satisfying both i) and ii). Thus the requirement of robustness is, under these assumptions, not restrictive. For convex policy spaces in two dimensions, we provide a simple geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, on the directions of the senders’ biases relative to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE satisfying i) and ii). We also provide a specific policy rule, the Min Rule, for the receiver that supports a FRE satisfying i) and ii) whenever one exists. The Min Rule is the anonymous rule that punishes incompatible reports in the least severe way, subject to maintaining the senders’ incentives for truth-telling, no matter how large their biases. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion-proofness of a FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule and show that if such a FRE is not collusion-proof, then no other FRE satisfying ii) can be collusion-proof. We extend our existence results to convex policy spaces in more than two dimensions and to non-convex two-dimensional spaces. Finally, our necessary and sufficient condition, as well as our specific policy rule, can be easily adapted if the receiver is uncertain about the directions of the biases and/or if the biases vary with the state of the world.

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1 Introduction

In sender-receiver games with cheap talk, the decision-maker (receiver) has imperfect information about the consequences of a policy and elicits reports from better-informed experts (the senders), whose preferences are not perfectly aligned with those of the decision-maker (i.e. the experts are “biased”). The advice transmitted by the senders is costless but unverifiable (hence, “cheap talk”), and the receiver cannot commit himself in advance to how he will respond to the senders’ advice.\(^1\) Cheap talk games with two biased experts have been used, for example, in organizational economics to analyze the interaction between a CEO and division managers, and in political science to study the transmission of information from legislative committees to the legislature as a whole.\(^2\) In both of these contexts, as well as in most other settings to which cheap-talk models have been applied, the receiver typically faces constraints on the feasible set of policies—these may stem from limited budgets, from physical restrictions on what is possible (within a given time frame), or from legal constraints.

In this paper, we analyze a two-sender cheap-talk model in which the senders observe common information that is unavailable to the receiver and the receiver faces exogenous restrictions on the feasible set of policies. When the receiver can consult two equally informed senders, the receiver has the potential to extract all information from the senders, by comparing the senders’ messages and punishing any discrepancy between them. However, the exogenous restrictions on the feasible set of policies can, by limiting the set of possible responses by the receiver to incompatible reports by the senders, prevent the existence of fully revealing equilibria. Our objective is to provide simple geometric conditions, on the shape of the feasible set of policies relative to the directions of the senders’ bias vectors, that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibria that are not only fully revealing but have additional desirable properties.

The first such desirable property of a fully revealing equilibrium (FRE) is robustness to small mistakes by the senders. Even if the commonly informed senders attempt to report truthfully to the receiver, noise in the communication process might result in the receiver receiving incompatible messages. Yet if the discrepancy between the incompatible messages is small, it is reasonable to think that the receiver would wish to respond by choosing a policy that is close to each of the messages. We formulate a natural and analytically tractable definition of robustness of an equilibrium to small mistakes that explicitly requires that small differences between the senders’ messages should result in only small adjustments in the receiver’s response, or, phrased differently, in only small punishments by the receiver.

In our model, the receiver and the senders all have quadratic utility functions, and sender \(i\)’s ideal point differs from the receiver’s by a vector, \(b_i\), sender \(i\)’s bias vector.\(^3\) The second desirable property of the FRE’s that we seek is independence of the magnitudes of the

\(^1\) For the seminal paper in this literature see Crawford and Sobel (1982).
\(^2\) For the former application, see Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and for the latter, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) and Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b).
\(^3\) In Section 5 we sketch how our results can be extended to general quasi-concave preferences.
senders’ biases. In many settings the receiver will know the direction of the divergence in interests between himself and each of the senders but will be less certain of the intensity of each of these divergences. We seek fully revealing equilibria such that the same set of strategies remain a FRE no matter how large the magnitudes of the senders’ biases. Besides being invariant to the intensity of senders’ preferences, such equilibria are also appealing because of the relative tractability of their characterization.

We begin by focusing on convex policy spaces in an arbitrary number of dimensions. We prove in Proposition 3 that whenever there exists a fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, there also exists a robust FRE that is independent of these magnitudes. In other words, when biases can be arbitrarily large, if small deviations cannot be deterred with small punishments, then they cannot be deterred with any feasible punishments. Moreover, we show that for convex policy spaces that are two-dimensional or multidimensional and compact, it is sufficient for existence of a FRE (robust or not) that small deviations can be deterred with small punishments. These results are extremely useful, because they show that a) robustness is, perhaps surprisingly, not a restrictive requirement on a FRE that is independent of the bias magnitudes; and b) in the two-dimensional or compact multidimensional cases, we need only ensure that local deviations can be punished.

Section 3.1 then focuses on the case where the policy space is a convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^2$. Proposition 4 identifies a simple geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, on the directions of the senders’ bias vectors relative to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for all small deviations to be deterred with small punishments, and hence, given Proposition 3, for the existence of a FRE (robust or not) that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. The proposition also provides a specific policy rule for the receiver, the Min Rule, that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists. To describe this rule, observe that as the senders’ biases become arbitrarily large, their indifference curves approach hyperplanes. Using the coordinate system defined by these limiting preferences of the senders, the Min Rule specifies that, given any two reported states, the receiver chooses the component-wise minimum of these reports. The Min Rule is anonymous in that it selects the same policy in response to a pair of incompatible reports no matter which sender sent which report. This rule is the anonymous rule that punishes incompatible reports in the least severe way, subject to deterring the senders from misreporting, no matter how large their biases. If the Min Rule is feasible, it deters deviations from truthful reporting in a manner robust to small mistakes. Proposition 4 shows that the Min Rule is feasible, for all pairs of reports, if and only if the Local Deterrence Condition is satisfied, or in other words, if and only if a (robust) FRE exists.

For convex policy spaces in two dimensions, we also prove that the Local Deterrence Condition remains necessary and sufficient for existence of a FRE that is robust even when the biases have known finite sizes. This is true because, when the receiver is constrained to use small punishments, it is only the orientations, not the magnitudes, of the senders’ bias vectors that determine whether or not they have incentives to deviate from truth-telling.

Since the senders have common information and could attempt to mislead the receiver
by both making the same false report, another desirable property of a FRE is collusion-proofness. We will say that a FRE is collusion-proof if, whenever there is a feasible policy that both senders prefer to the one the receiver would choose if they were truthful, collusion on this preferred policy would not be self-enforcing, because one of the senders would find it profitable to unilaterally deviate. In Section 3.1.1 we show that the Min Rule is the best punishment rule the receiver could use in order to prevent collusion. Specifically, we show that if a FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule is not collusion-proof, then no other FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases can be collusion-proof. The intuition for this result is that the Min Rule prescribes the least severe punishment subject to maintaining the senders’ incentives, and hence it makes deviations from the collusive report most attractive. We then characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion-proofness of a FRE supported by the Min Rule. We also highlight that the benefits of the Min Rule in deterring collusion, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for it to do so, extend to a setting with more than two senders; the key is to define the Min Rule and the conditions in terms of the bias vectors for the pair of senders whose preferences are least closely aligned.

To illustrate these results, suppose that the receiver is an executive who has to allocate funds from a budget to two different projects, each one overseen by a manager. The maximum amount of funds that can be allocated is exogenously fixed, and each project must receive a non-negative level of funding. The managers (senders) have common information about the returns to the two projects, and hence about which feasible allocation of funds to each project the receiver would prefer, if he had access to the senders’ information. Whatever the best allocation of funds for the receiver (whether or not it exhausts the whole budget), each sender would prefer that a strictly higher level of funding be allocated to the project he oversees. Figure 1 illustrates the receiver’s feasible set of policies (allocations of funds) and the directions of the senders’ bias vectors.

![Figure 1: Allocation of funds given a budget constraint. The shaded area represents the feasible allocations. Given a pair of reports $(\theta', \theta'')$, the Min Rule implements $y(\theta', \theta'') = (\min\{\theta'_1, \theta''_1\}, \min\{\theta'_2, \theta''_2\})$.](image)

Since the policy space is convex, Proposition 3 implies that a robust FRE independent of
the magnitudes of the biases exists whenever a FRE independent of these magnitudes does. Moreover, since the policy space is also a subset of $\mathbb{R}^2$, to prove existence it is enough to check whether all small deviations can be deterred with small punishments. This is precisely what the Local Deterrence Condition establishes. Since the frontier of the policy space here has only three distinct orientations, it is easy to confirm that this condition is satisfied in this setting. Proposition 4 provides a way to construct a robust FRE that is independent of the biases’ magnitudes: the receiver uses the Min Rule to respond to any pair of incompatible reports. For the orthogonal bias directions shown, the Min Rule specifies that the receiver chooses the component-wise minimum of the senders’ reports with respect to the Euclidean coordinates. It is clear from Figure 1 that the allocation specified by the Min Rule is feasible in this setting for all pairs of reported allocations, and this rule implements a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Furthermore, in this setting, Proposition 7 implies that the robust FRE supported by the Min Rule is, whatever the magnitudes of the biases, collusion-proof: Given any plan by the senders to make a common false report overstating the amount of funding the receiver should allocate to both projects, the divergence in bias directions between the two senders means that each of them could gain by unilaterally deviating from the collusive plan.

In Section 3.2, we extend our results to convex policy spaces of any dimension larger than two. The key observation here is that the only directions of conflict between the senders and the receiver are the ones in the (two-dimensional) plane spanned by the senders’ bias vectors. Proposition 8 shows that, for existence of a FRE (robust or not) that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, it is necessary and sufficient to look at the projection of the policy space onto the subspace of conflict of interest and see whether a FRE can be constructed there. The reason is that, when the magnitudes of the biases can be arbitrarily large, no given shift of the receiver’s action in a direction orthogonal to the plane of the biases can be certain to serve as a punishment for a deviating sender. Therefore, in response to incompatible reports, the receiver must choose as a punishment an action whose projection onto the plane of the biases is worse for both senders. Such an action exists if and only if the projection of the policy space onto the plane of the biases satisfies the Local Deterrence Condition identified in Proposition 4 for the two-dimensional case.

Since increasing returns or indivisibilities may cause the set of feasible policies for the receiver to be non-convex, it is important to examine when a robust FRE exists for non-convex policy spaces. This we do in Section 4. We identify an additional geometric condition, the Global Deterrence Condition, on the directions of the senders’ biases relative to the frontier of the convex hull of the policy space, that together with the Local Deterrence Condition identified in Proposition 4 is necessary and sufficient for existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. The Local Deterrence Condition is necessary and sufficient for small deviations to be deterrable with small punishments, but for non-convex policy spaces, this is not sufficient for existence of a robust FRE: large
deviations might not be deterrable even if small ones are. The Global Deterrence Condition is necessary and sufficient for existence of a (not necessarily robust) FRE. When the policy space is convex, the Local and the Global Deterrence Conditions coincide.

In Section 5, we relax the assumptions that the directions of the senders’ biases are (i) common knowledge and (ii) independent of the realization of the state. We prove that when the receiver does not know the actual biases but knows only the minimal closed cone in which they are certain to lie, and this minimal cone is the same for all states, then the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the bias magnitudes is the same Local Deterrence Condition identified in Proposition 4 in Section 3.1, except that the known biases \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) there are replaced by the least aligned possible realizations of the biases. Furthermore, whenever a robust FRE exists, it is supported by the receiver using the same punishment rule, the Min Rule, defined previously, except that now the punishment is computed using the least aligned possible bias realizations.

1.1 Related Literature

The closest papers to ours are Battaglini (2002) and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), both of which analyze the existence of fully revealing equilibria when the receiver can consult two equally informed senders.

Battaglini (2002) assumes that the policy space is the whole of \( \mathbb{R}^p \). He observes that each sender’s preferences are aligned with those of the receiver in the subspace orthogonal to the sender’s bias vector, and therefore the receiver can extract truthful information when the sender’s influence is restricted to those dimensions. As long as the two senders’ biases are linearly independent, the receiver can combine the two truthful reports to extract all the information. This construction supports a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases and also robust to small mistakes. However, Battaglini’s construction breaks down when there are restrictions on the receiver’s feasible set of policies, since there are pairs of reports for which the receiver’s response rule in this construction is infeasible.

Our construction of a FRE supported by the Min Rule relies on the same coordinate system defined by the normal vectors to the senders’ biases. Yet there are crucial differences between our construction and Battaglini’s. First, the Min Rule is an anonymous rule, whereas the receiver’s strategy in Battaglini’s construction critically depends on which sender made which report; consequently, even when \( Y = \mathbb{R}^2 \), the two strategies do not always coincide. Second, as we show in Section 5, our construction of a robust FRE using the Min Rule can be extended to a setting where the receiver does not know the actual directions of the biases but knows only the minimal closed cone in which they are certain to lie. Such an extension is not possible with Battaglini’s construction, since the receiver’s uncertainty about the directions of the biases prevents him from identifying the subspaces in which each sender’s preferences are aligned with his. Most importantly, while Battaglini’s construction is infeasible for restricted policy spaces even when a FRE exists, we show that whatever the form of the policy space, the feasibility of the Min Rule is both necessary as well as sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE.
Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) consider the case of compact and convex policy spaces. They show that there exists a FRE for any magnitudes of the biases if and only if, as the biases become large, the senders have a common least-preferred policy. While this characterization result is elegant, their equilibrium construction involves the receiver punishing any discrepancies between the senders’ reports by choosing their common least-preferred policy. As they themselves acknowledge, the use of extreme punishments after even small deviations is unappealing, since such deviations could in practice arise from small mistakes by the senders. In response to this criticism they introduce a robustness concept called continuity on the diagonal that can be shown to be equivalent to our robustness definition. However, they present only negative findings concerning the existence of robust fully revealing equilibria.

Their negative findings contrast strikingly with our main result, Proposition 3, which states that once we have secured the existence of a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, then robustness comes for free. The reason for this striking contrast is that their examples of nonexistence of a robust FRE are all ones in which a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases does not exist. Our Proposition 5 shows that if there does not exist a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, then no robust FRE exists, even for small magnitudes of the biases.

Finally, Ambrus and Lu (2014) and Rubanov (2015) construct equilibria in a unidimensional policy space that are arbitrarily close to full revelation. Both papers show that their equilibria survive the introduction of a small probability of the senders observing a random state which is independent of the true state. The equilibria in the two papers involve constructing complex partitions of the policy space (different for different senders) and having each sender report the element of his partition in which his observation lies. Asymptotically, incentives for truthful reporting follow because any change in a sender’s message (holding fixed the messages of the others) results in a sufficiently large change in the receiver’s action. Importantly, the equilibria in these two papers do not satisfy our robustness concept: The senders might observe states that are arbitrarily close to each other, yet the receiver’s action in response to the equilibrium messages might be far away from the senders’ observations. Our notion of robustness differs from theirs in that we do not explicitly model the occurrence of mistakes, or in other words, the players in our model are unaware of the possibility of mistakes. Yet crucially, our equilibrium concept requires

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6 In contrast to Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), we seek existence of a fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. In general, this is a stronger requirement than Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)’s requirement that a FRE exist for any magnitudes of the biases, since we, unlike them, require the same equilibrium strategies to remain an equilibrium no matter how large the bias magnitudes. Footnote 19 discusses in more detail the contrast between our equilibrium concept and results and those of Ambrus and Takahashi (2008).

7 For small biases, even in states where this policy is not the least preferred policy for both senders, it is nevertheless always worse for both of them than the policy the receiver would choose if he had full information.

8 See Lemma 2 in the Appendix.

9 There is a small recent experimental literature on multi-sender cheap talk. Lai et al. (2015), in particular, discuss robustness, but because their state and policy space is discrete, our concept of robustness cannot be applied in their setting.

10 Ambrus and Lu (2014) require the policy space to be larger, the closer their equilibrium is to be to full revelation, whereas Rubanov (2015) requires the number of senders to grow for his asymptotic result.
that the response of the receiver be close to the senders’ reports whenever these reports are themselves close: this ensures that small mistakes by the senders do not lead to large responses/punishments by the receiver. Our motivation for imposing continuity on the receiver’s out-of-equilibrium actions is shared by Friedman and Samuelson (1990, 1994), who impose a similar restriction on strategies in repeated games. They argue (1994, p.56), "In many circumstances strategies associating severe penalties with arbitrarily small deviations are implausible."

2 The Model

We analyze a game of cheap talk between two senders, $S_1$, $S_2$, and a receiver, $R$. Both senders perfectly observe $\theta \in \Theta$, the realization of a random variable $\hat{\theta}$. We will refer to the realization $\theta$ as the state, and to $\Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p$ as the state space, which has dimension $p \geq 1$. The prior distribution of $\hat{\theta}$ is given by $F$ and is commonly known. After observing $\theta$, each sender $S_i$ sends a costless and unverifiable message $m_i \in M_i$ to the receiver, who then chooses a policy $y$ from a closed set $Y$ of feasible policies. Both $M_i$ and $Y$ are independent of the realization of the state $\theta$. We refer to $Y$ as the policy space and without loss of generality we assume that $Y \subseteq \Theta$. An interpretation of this assumption is that $\Theta$ is the set of ideal policies for the receiver, but only those in $Y \subseteq \Theta$ are feasible. Clearly in the case $\Theta \subset Y$, we can without loss of generality ignore all those policies in $Y$ that are not in $\Theta$. The pair $(\Theta, Y)$ is called the environment of the game.

Given the state $\theta$ and the chosen policy $y$, the receiver’s utility is $u^R(y, \theta) = -|y - \theta|^2$ and each sender $i$’s utility is $u^{\delta_i}(y, \theta) = -|y - \theta - b_i|^2$, where $|\cdot|$ denotes the Euclidean norm in $\mathbb{R}^p$. The vector $b_i \in \mathbb{R}^p$ is referred to as the bias vector of sender $S_i$. Unless otherwise specified, the direction of $b_i$ is assumed to be independent of the state $\theta$ and common knowledge among the players. Both of these assumptions are relaxed in Section 5.

Given these utilities, the ideal policy for the receiver is to match the state; however since $Y$ might be a strict subset of $\Theta$, such a policy might not be feasible. We denote by $y^*(\theta) = \arg \max_{y \in Y} u^R(y, \theta)$ an optimal feasible policy for the receiver when the state is $\theta$. Clearly, in the particular case in which $Y = \Theta$, $y^*(\theta) = \theta$.

A pure strategy for sender $S_i$ is denoted by $s_i : \Theta \rightarrow M_i$, and a pure strategy for the receiver is denoted by $y^R : M_1 \times M_2 \rightarrow Y$. Given messages $m_1, m_2, \mu(m_1, m_2)$ denotes the receiver’s belief about $y^R(\hat{\theta})$ after receiving messages $m_1, m_2$.

The equilibrium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 

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11 The shape of the policy space $Y$ plays a key role in the analysis. As we will see in Proposition 2 for a fixed $Y$, it makes no difference to our results whether $Y = \Theta$ or $Y \subset \Theta$.

12 In Section 5 we discuss the extension to general quasi-concave utility functions.

13 When the policy space $Y$ is a strict subspace of $\Theta$ and $Y$ is non-convex, the set $\arg \max_{y \in Y} (y - \theta)^2$ might not be a singleton. In such a case, we will focus on one particular optimal feasible policy and label this $y^*(\theta)$. As we argue in Footnote 15, such a restriction is without loss of generality for the characterization of existence of fully revealing equilibria.

14 Since the senders’ payoffs depend on the receiver’s choice of policy, it is more convenient to work directly with the receiver’s beliefs over the optimal feasible policy $y^*(\hat{\theta})$ than with his beliefs over $\hat{\theta}$. 

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**Definition 1.** The strategies \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) constitute a pure *Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium* if there exists a belief function \(\mu\) such that:

(i) \(s_i\) is optimal given \(s_{-i}\) and \(y^R\) for \(i \in \{1, 2\}\).

(ii) \(y^R(m_1, m_2)\) is optimal given \(\mu(m_1, m_2)\) for each \((m_1, m_2) \in \mathcal{M}_1 \times \mathcal{M}_2\).

(iii) \(s_1, s_2\) are measurable and if \(s_1^{-1}(m_1) \cap s_2^{-1}(m_2) \neq \emptyset\), \(\mu(m_1, m_2)\) puts probability one on \(y^*(s_1^{-1}(m_1) \cap s_2^{-1}(m_2))\). Moreover, if \(s_1^{-1}(m_1) \cap s_2^{-1}(m_2)\) has positive probability with respect to \(F\), \(\mu(m_1, m_2)\) is derived from Bayes’ rule.

Whenever the policy space \(Y\) is convex, the set of optimal policies for the receiver, given a belief \(\mu\), is a singleton, and hence the receiver always uses a pure strategy. This is not necessarily the case if \(Y\) is not convex. In Section 4 we explicitly analyze non-convex policy spaces, and we take into account the possibility of mixing by the receiver.

We will focus on a particular type of equilibrium in which the receiver perfectly learns an optimal feasible policy from the messages of the senders. We will say that the strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) are *fully revealing* if for any \(\theta \in \Theta\), the receiver’s belief given messages \(s_1(\theta)\) and \(s_2(\theta)\) puts mass one on \(y^*(\theta)\).\(^{15}\) An equilibrium with fully revealing strategies is called a *fully revealing equilibrium* (FRE).

Our goal in this paper is to characterize the conditions under which there exist equilibria that are not only fully revealing but that also satisfy two additional desirable properties: i) robustness to small mistakes by the senders and ii) independence of the magnitudes of the senders’ biases.\(^{16}\) The next two subsections formally define each of these properties of a FRE.

### 2.1 Robustness

Our first desirable property is motivated by the possibility that the senders might have made small mistakes, either because they might not have perceived the state perfectly accurately, or because they might have “trembled” when sending their messages. In those situations, it is natural to require the receiver’s response to be close to the response that would have resulted in the absence of such mistakes.

We now formulate a definition of robustness of an equilibrium that explicitly captures this reasoning. Given \(x \in \mathbb{R}^P\), \(r > 0\), denote by \(B(x, r) = \{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^P \mid ||\theta - x|| < r\}\) the open ball with centre \(x\) and radius \(r\).

**Definition 2.** Given some fully revealing strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) for the senders, the receiver’s strategy \(y^R\) is *robust* if for any \(\theta \in \Theta\) and any \(\epsilon > 0\), there exists a \(\delta > 0\) such that, if: (i)

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\(^{15}\)In general, one could say that \((s_1, s_2)\) are fully revealing strategies if the support of the receiver’s belief is contained in \(Y^*(\theta) \equiv \arg\max_{y \in Y} u^R(y, \theta)\). However, even if \(Y^*(\theta)\) is not a singleton, there cannot exist a FRE in which the receiver mixes on the equilibrium path. The reason is that such mixing would create an incentive to deviate for at least one sender. Therefore, without loss of generality we can restrict to situations in which for any \(\theta\), the receiver implements a deterministic optimal feasible policy that we will denote \(y^*(\theta)\).

\(^{16}\)For clarity of exposition, the senders are restricted to using pure strategies throughout the paper. It can in fact be shown that, when the policy space is convex, allowing the senders to use mixed strategies would not alter the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of fully revealing equilibria (or of robust fully revealing equilibria) that are required to be independent of the magnitudes of the biases.
\( \theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap \Theta \), and (ii) \( y^*(\theta'), y^*(\theta'') \in B(y^*(\theta), \delta) \cap Y \), then
\[
y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in B(y^*(\theta), \epsilon) \cap Y
\]

A fully revealing equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) in which \(y^R\) is robust is called a robust fully revealing equilibrium\(^{17}\).

Definition 2 imposes conditions both on and off the equilibrium path.

On the equilibrium path, the definition imposes a continuity requirement on the senders’ fully revealing strategies. Specifically, when the senders’ small mistakes result in a pair of messages that could have been observed jointly on the equilibrium path, and hence that cause the receiver’s belief to attach mass one to a particular policy, we require that policy to be close to the policy that would have resulted in the absence of mistakes.

More importantly, robustness imposes a restriction on the receiver’s response off the equilibrium path. Consider two incompatible reports, \(m_1, m_2\) (i.e. reports such that \(s_1^{-1}(m_1) \cap s_2^{-1}(m_2) = \emptyset\)) that are close in the following sense: given the fully revealing strategies \(s_1, s_2\), there are two states \(\theta', \theta''\) that could have generated those messages (i.e. \(s_1(\theta') = m_1\) and \(s_2(\theta'') = m_2\) and that, in addition, are (i) close to each other and (ii) lead to optimal feasible policies that are also close to each other. The robustness restriction requires that, given incompatible reports that are close in this sense, the receiver’s optimal response must be close to the optimal feasible policies corresponding to the states \(\theta'\) and \(\theta''\). Note that if \(Y\) is convex or \(\Theta = Y\), then condition (ii) is superfluous: in either case, whenever \(\theta'\) and \(\theta''\) are close, \(y^*(\theta')\) and \(y^*(\theta'')\) are also close. Condition (ii) is relevant when \(Y\) is non-convex and \(Y \subsetneq \Theta\), because in this case, small changes in \(\theta\) for \(\theta \not\in Y\) could result in large changes in the receiver’s optimal feasible policy \(y^*(\theta)\): our robustness requirement does not apply when \(y^*(\theta')\) and \(y^*(\theta'')\) are not close.

As mentioned above, our robustness requirement is motivated by the possibility of small mistakes by the senders, either in observing or in communicating the state. Formally, our analysis assumes that, ex ante, the senders and the receiver are unaware that these mistakes might happen. Definition 2 ensures that as the size of the mistakes goes to zero, the equilibrium outcome in the presence of mistakes approaches the outcome when mistakes never occur.

An additional motivation for focusing on robust fully revealing equilibria is provided by the analysis, in Section 3.1.1, of the possibility of collusion by the senders. We show there that our robustness requirement makes the receiver’s strategy more effective in deterring collusion.

As will become clear later, it is useful to define when a strategy deters local deviations with local punishments, even if it might not deter larger deviations.

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\(^{17}\)Strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) can together be fully revealing even if each sender’s report by itself does not fully reveal the optimal feasible policy. Battaglini’s (2002) construction of a fully revealing equilibrium for an unrestricted multidimensional state space is an example of this possibility. We have stated Definition 2 in a way that allows for this possibility.

\(^{18}\)In the Appendix we show that this concept of robustness extends the concept of diagonal continuity introduced by Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) to cases in which \(Y \subseteq \Theta\) and is not convex.
Definition 3. Given some fully revealing strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) for the senders, the receiver’s strategy \(y^R\) is said to deter local deviations with local punishments, if it is robust and there exists a \(\delta > 0\) such that for any \(\theta', \theta'' \in \Theta\) with \(|\theta' - \theta''| < \delta\),

\[
\begin{align*}
    u^{S_1}(y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')), \theta') &\leq u^{S_1}(y^*(\theta''), \theta'') \\
u^{S_2}(y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')), \theta') &\leq u^{S_2}(y^*(\theta'), \theta')
\end{align*}
\]

The two displayed inequalities ensure that neither of the senders has an incentive to deviate by pretending to have observed a nearby state, given that the receiver’s strategy \(y^R\) is required to be robust. In particular, the first (second) condition says that when the true state is \(\theta''(\theta')\), \(y^R\) is such that there is no nearby state \(\theta'(\theta'')\) that sender \(S_1 (S_2)\) would want to pretend to have observed.

Note that given the quadratic form of the senders’ utilities, \(u^{S_i}(y, \theta) = -|y - \theta - b_i|^2\), the set of policies that sender \(S_i\) prefers to \(y^*(\theta)\) is the ball \(B(\theta + b_i, |y^*(\theta) - \theta + b_i|)\). In the case in which \(\theta \in Y\), and hence \(y^*(\theta) = \theta\), \(S_i\)’s preferred set of policies is just \(B(\theta + b_i, |b_i|)\). Figure 2 illustrates a strategy for the receiver that deters local deviations with local punishments.

![Figure 2: Robust punishment of a local deviation](image)

In a fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), the receiver perfectly learns an optimal feasible policy from the pair of messages, and neither sender has an incentive to try to mislead the receiver by sending a different message. Using a similar argument to the Revelation Principle we can, without loss of generality, concentrate on fully revealing equilibria in which each sender truthfully reports \(y^*(\theta)\). The strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) are truthful if \(M_1 = M_2 = Y\) and for all \(\theta \in \Theta\), \(s_1(\theta) = s_2(\theta) = y^*(\theta)\). An equilibrium with truthful strategies is called a truthful equilibrium.

Lemma 1 is an extension of Lemma 1 in Battaglini (2002) that incorporates our notion of robustness. It considerably simplifies our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1. For any (robust) fully revealing equilibrium there exists a (robust) truthful equilibrium that is outcome-equivalent to it.

Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix.

2.2 Independence of the Magnitudes of the Biases

Given a bias vector $b \in \mathbb{R}^p$, we define the magnitude of the bias as the Euclidean norm of the vector, $|b|$. We focus our analysis on fully revealing equilibria in which strategies are independent of the magnitudes of the biases:

Definition 4. Given biases $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p$ and a (robust) FRE $(s_1, s_2, y^R)$, the equilibrium is independent of the magnitudes of the biases if it remains a (robust) FRE for all biases $t_1b_1, t_2b_2$, with $t_1, t_2 \in (0, +\infty)$.

Definition 4 requires the same strategies to remain a FRE no matter the intensity of the senders’ preferences. In many cases, even though it is clear that an expert is biased in a certain direction, it is more difficult to assess the exact magnitude of that bias. In the example in the introduction of an executive choosing an allocation of funds to two managers, it might be clear to the executive that each manager would like more funds allocated to his own project than would be optimal, but it might be harder to determine the intensity of those biases, which might depend on traits unobservable to the executive. Definition 4 rules out equilibria whose existence depends on sharp conditions on the magnitudes of the biases.

Note that a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases would remain a FRE even if the receiver were uncertain about the magnitudes of the biases. In Section 5 we extend our characterization to cases in which the receiver is also, to some degree, uncertain about the directions of the senders’ biases.

To understand the implications of Definition 4, consider $\theta \in Y$, an therefore $y^*(\theta) = \theta$. Note that if there exists a FRE for bias vectors $(b_1, b_2)$, then for any biases $(t_1b_1, t_2b_2)$, where $0 < t_1, t_2 \leq 1$, the same strategies constitute a FRE. The reason is that, for $0 < t \leq 1$, the set of policies that, in state $\theta$, a sender with bias $b$ prefers to $y^*(\theta)$ contains the set of policies preferred to $y^*(\theta)$ by a sender with bias $tb$: formally, $B(\theta + tb, |tb|) \subseteq B(\theta + b, |b|)$. Hence the same punishment that deters deviations by a sender with bias $b$ will deter deviations by one with smaller bias $tb$. (See Figure 3a) Requiring the FRE to be independent of the magnitudes of the biases is thus equivalent to requiring the same strategies to remain a FRE even as the magnitudes of the biases become arbitrarily large. As observed by Levy and Razin (2007), the indifference curves of a sender with a very large bias are very close to hyperplanes orthogonal to the bias vector, and such a sender’s ranking of policies is approximately independent of the true state of the world. This observation provides a very simple characterization of the set of policy choices for the receiver that would deter the sender, independently of the magnitude of his bias, from misreporting the state.

Figure 3b illustrates this characterization. Given a (bias) vector $b \in \mathbb{R}^p$ and a scalar $k \in \mathbb{R}$, we define $H(b, k) \equiv \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^p \mid bx > k \}$ and $h(b, k) \equiv \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^p \mid bx = k \}$. In words, $H(b, k)$
The ball \( B(\theta + b, |b|) \) represents the set of policies preferred to \( \theta \in Y \) by a sender with bias \( b \). Scaling down the bias to \( tb \) with \( 0 < t \leq 1 \) implies that \( B(\theta + tb, |tb|) \subseteq B(\theta + b, |b|) \). Hence any policy that deters deviations from a sender with bias \( b \) also deters deviations from a sender with smaller bias \( tb \).

**Figure 3:** Independence of the magnitudes of the biases.

(b) As the magnitude of the bias increases, the indifference curve passing through \( \theta \) converges to the hyperplane orthogonal to \( b \) and passing through \( \theta \), denoted \( h(b, \theta) \). The shaded half space represents the set of policies that are never preferred to \( \theta \) independently of the magnitude of the bias.

is the half-space composed of all the points in \( \mathbb{R}^p \) whose inner product with \( b \) is greater than \( k \), and \( h(b, k) \) is the boundary of \( H(b, k) \). As Figure 3b shows, for any point \( y \in H(b, b \theta) \), we have \( by > b \theta \), and there exists a scalar \( t > 0 \) large enough so that \( y \in B(\theta + tb, t|b|) \), i.e. so that in state \( \theta \), the policy \( y \) is preferred to \( \theta \) by a sender with bias \( tb \). Therefore, in order for a given policy choice of the receiver to deter misreporting independently of the magnitude of the sender’s bias, the receiver’s choice must lie in \( \mathbb{R}^2 \setminus H(b, b \theta) \), which corresponds to the shaded half-space in Figure 3b.

Requiring the equilibrium to be independent of the magnitudes of the biases might be seen as a strong requirement. However, we will show in Proposition 5 that when the policy space is two-dimensional and robustness is required, the existence of a FRE becomes no more likely even if we drop the requirement of independence of the magnitudes of the biases.

### 2.3 Preliminary Results

Propositions 1 and 2 below allow us to abstract from specifying particular belief functions when proving the existence or nonexistence of pure robust fully revealing equilibria that are independent of the magnitudes of the senders’ biases. Proposition 1 deals with the case in which the policy space coincides with the state space, and Proposition 2 extends the result to the more general case in which the policy space is a subset of the state space.

The first part of Proposition 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{19}\)This condition coincides with the condition that Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) show in their Proposition 7 to be equivalent, for the case of compact \( Y \), to the existence of a FRE for arbitrarily large biases. Note, however, that our requirement that there exist a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases is in general stronger than Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)’s requirement that there exists a FRE for arbitrarily large biases: we require the
The second part of Proposition 1 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strategy that deters local deviations with local punishments and is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. Finally, we show that the two conditions together are not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

**Proposition 1.** Suppose \( Y = \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p \). Given \( b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p \),

(i) There exists a pure fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases if and only if

\[
\text{for any } \theta', \theta'' \in Y, \quad Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')
\]

(ii) There exist some pure fully revealing strategies for the senders and a strategy for the receiver that deters local deviations with local punishments and is independent of the magnitudes of the biases if and only if

\[
\text{for any } \theta \in Y \text{ and any } \epsilon > 0, \text{ there exists } \delta > 0 \text{ such that for any } \theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y, \quad B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')
\]

(iii) Conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure robust fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

When condition (i) holds, the receiver’s policy rule \( y_R(\theta', \theta'') \) in a truthful equilibrium will satisfy \( y_R(\theta', \theta'') = \theta' \) if \( \theta' = \theta'' \) and \( y_R(\theta', \theta'') \in Y \setminus H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \) if \( \theta' \neq \theta'' \). Such a rule is feasible and ensures that sender 1 (resp., 2) has no incentive to deviate to a report of \( \theta' \) (resp., \( \theta'' \)) when the true state is \( \theta'' \) (resp., \( \theta' \)), even for arbitrarily large magnitudes of the biases. Condition (ii) implies that a feasible punishment can be found arbitrarily close to the reports when these converge to each other. Henceforth we will refer to \( \mathbb{R}^p \setminus H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \) as the “punishment region” for the deviation \( (\theta', \theta'') \) and to \( Y \setminus H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \) as the “feasible punishment region”. See Figure 4.

Proposition 2 states that there exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium for \( Y \subseteq \Theta \), if and only if there exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium when the space state is reduced to coincide with the policy space. In other words, when determining whether or not a (robust) FRE exists, we can ignore those states that cannot be implemented as a policy. Given a state space \( \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p \) and a policy space \( Y \subset \Theta \), denote by \( S^Y \) the minimal subspace

same equilibrium strategies to remain an equilibrium no matter how large the magnitudes of the biases, whereas they require only that for any magnitude of the biases there exists a FRE (which might depend on the magnitudes). For instance, when the policy space is not compact, there always exists a FRE for arbitrarily large biases, so Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)’s Proposition 7 does not hold in this case; in contrast, when \( Y \) is not compact, there might not exist a FRE that is independent of the bias magnitudes. Our Proposition 1 is valid whether or not \( Y \) is compact.

Note that condition (2) is always satisfied for interior points, and hence only imposes a restriction on those points in the frontier of \( Y \).
Figure 4: The shaded area represents the feasible punishment region given the incompatible pair of reports \((\theta', \theta'')\). The intersection of the shaded area with the ball \(B(\theta, \epsilon)\) represents the local punishment region.

Given a vector \(b \in \mathbb{R}^p\), we denote by \(b^Y\) the projection of \(b\) onto \(S^Y\).

Proposition 2. Given \(\Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p\), \(Y \subseteq \Theta\), \(b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p\) and their projections \(b^Y_1, b^Y_2 \in S^Y\), the following two statements are equivalent:

(i) For the environment \((\Theta, Y)\) and biases \((b_1, b_2)\), there exists a pure (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

(ii) For the environment \((Y, Y)\) and biases \((b^Y_1, b^Y_2)\), there exists a pure (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Given Proposition 2, the shape of the state space \(\Theta\) is irrelevant (as long as \(Y \subseteq \Theta\)), and all that matters for the existence of a pure (robust) FRE is the shape of the policy space, relative to the projections of the senders’ bias vectors onto the minimal subspace, \(S^Y\), containing the policy space. Therefore, when proving existence results for pure (robust) FRE’s, we can without loss of generality focus on the case in which \(\Theta = Y\), and hence \(y^*(\theta) = \theta\). Proposition 1, which is stated for the case \(\Theta = Y\), will be our primary tool. For the sake of simplicity, and with some abuse of language and notation, for the rest of the paper we will refer to the projections of the biases onto the subspace \(S^Y\) as the biases and denote them directly by \(b_1, b_2\).

Finally, we discuss two special cases where, for any number of dimensions and any shape of \(Y\), it is straightforward to draw conclusions about the existence of a robust fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. First, if the senders’ bias vectors are in exactly the same direction (i.e. \(b_1 = tb_2\) for some strictly positive scalar \(t\)), then there always exists a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. In it, the receiver responds to any discrepancy between the messages by choosing whichever of the two reported states leads to a smaller inner product with (each of) the bias vectors. In other words, the receiver’s chosen policy coincides with whichever of the reported states would be less preferred by both senders, if both biases were sufficiently

\[21\text{In particular, } Y \text{ could be of a lower dimension than } \Theta.\]
large. Such a strategy for the receiver ensures that neither sender can strictly gain by deviating from truthful reporting, no matter how large his bias. Furthermore, since the receiver’s chosen policy always coincides with one of the senders’ messages, this FRE satisfies our definition of robustness. (See Figure 5a.)

Second, if the biases are exactly opposite (i.e. $b_1 = tb_2$ for some strictly negative scalar $t$), then it follows from part (i) of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 that there exists a FRE that is independent of the magnitude of the biases “if and only if $Y$ is included in a lower dimensional hyperspace that is orthogonal to the direction of the biases” (Ambrus and Takahashi (2008, p.13)). In addition, it follows from part (ii) Proposition 1 that when a FRE exists in this case, a robust FRE exists as well: a (truthful) robust FRE is supported by a response function for the receiver such that $y(\theta', \theta'') = \lambda \theta' + (1 - \lambda) \theta''$, for $\lambda \in [0, 1]$. (See Figure 5b.)

For the remainder of the paper, we will exclude these two special cases and assume that $b_1$ and $b_2$ are linearly independent.

3 Convex Policy Spaces

We begin by focusing on convex policy spaces in an arbitrary number of dimensions. Proposition 3 below shows that, when focusing on strategies that are independent of the magnitudes of the biases, whenever there exists a fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), there also exists a robust FRE. In fact, if small deviations cannot be deterred with small punishments, then they cannot be deterred with any feasible punishments. Moreover, we show that for convex state spaces that are two-dimensional or multidimensional and compact, it is sufficient for existence of a FRE that is independent of the magnitude of the biases (robust or not) that small deviations can be deterred (with small punishments). These preliminary results are extremely useful, because they show that a) robustness is, perhaps surprisingly, not a restrictive requirement on a FRE when it is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

\[\text{Figure 5: Special Cases: aligned biases and opposite biases.}\]

For convex policy spaces, the receiver optimal policy is always degenerate, and hence the use of pure strategies by the receiver is without loss of generality. In particular, the non-existence of pure (robust) FRE implies the non-existence of FRE.
and the policy space is convex; and b) in the two-dimensional or compact multidimensional cases, we need only ensure that local deviations can be punished.

**Proposition 3.** Given $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p$ convex and $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p$ linearly independent, the following statements are equivalent:

(i) There exists a fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

(ii) There exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

When we further assume that a) $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ or that b) $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p$ and $Y$ is compact, then the following statement is also equivalent to the previous two:

(iii) Local deviations can be deterred with local punishments that are independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

![Figure 6: $Y$ convex: A local punishment exists whenever a punishment exists. The grey area represents the feasible punishment region given $(\theta', \theta'')$.](image)

The intuition behind the first equivalence in Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 6. Given an incompatible pair of reports $(\theta', \theta'')$, consider the feasible punishment region $Y \setminus (H(b_1, b_1\theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2\theta'))$ (shaded area). If there exists a FRE, then the feasible punishment region has to be non-empty. Denote by $y$ a feasible punishment. Given that $Y$ is convex, and $\theta', \theta''$ and $y$ are all feasible policies, the triangle of convex combinations of these three policies is also feasible. As $\theta'$ and $\theta''$ converge to $\theta$, there are policies, such as $y'$, that belong to that triangle and that lie in the intersection of the feasible punishment region and the ball $B(\theta, \epsilon)$, so are feasible local punishments.

Figure 7 illustrates the intuition for why, when $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$, local deterrence of local deviations is sufficient for existence of a FRE. Suppose there were a (large) deviation, such as $(\theta', \theta'')$, that could not be deterred, i.e., the punishment region (dark grey area) does not intersect the policy space. Then it would be possible to construct a local deviation $(\bar{\theta}', \bar{\theta}'')$, by choosing $\bar{\theta}''$ along the segment $[\theta', \theta'']$ and close to $\theta'$, and by the convexity of $Y$, the whole of the punishment region for that deviation would still be infeasible.
The result of Proposition 3 might be surprising in the light of Ambrus and Takahashi’s (2008; Section 4.2)’s negative findings regarding the existence of robust fully revealing equilibria. They provided examples in which a robust FRE did not exist even though for sufficiently small magnitudes of the biases it was possible to construct a FRE. However, in all of these examples, a FRE did not exist for sufficiently large biases.

In Proposition 5 in Section 3.1, we show that for two-dimensional spaces, once the equilibrium is required to be robust, the magnitudes of the biases do not play any role. Intuitively, even a small bias can be regarded as extremely large when we consider local punishments after very small disagreements among senders. And hence, if there does not exist a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, then no robust FRE exists, even for small magnitudes of the biases.

In the next subsection, we provide a local necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a robust FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases that is constructive in the sense that it provides a policy rule that implements a robust FRE whenever one exists. Given Proposition 3 when stating this and subsequent results, we will write “There exists a (robust) FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases” to refer to both of the statements (i) and (ii) that Proposition 3 proves are equivalent.

### 3.1 Policy Space a Subset of $\mathbb{R}^2$

In this section, we focus on the case where the policy space is two-dimensional. We start by defining a particular policy rule for the receiver that, if feasible, implements a robust FRE.

**Definition 5.** Given $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2$ linearly independent, the Min Rule is the function from $\mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R}^2$ to $\mathbb{R}^2$ that, for every pair of reports $\theta', \theta'' \in \mathbb{R}^2$, implements the point $\theta' \wedge_{\{b_1, b_2\}} \theta''$ in $\mathbb{R}^2$ defined by:

$$b_1(\theta' \wedge_{\{b_1, b_2\}} \theta'') = \min\{b_1 \theta', b_1 \theta''\}$$
$$b_2(\theta' \wedge_{\{b_1, b_2\}} \theta'') = \min\{b_2 \theta', b_2 \theta''\}.$$ 

In words, the Min Rule selects the policy which is the coordinate-wise minimum of the
senders’ reports, using the coordinate system formed by the normal vectors to the biases. Note that $\theta' \wedge_{\{b_1,b_2\}} \theta''$ depends only on the direction and not on the magnitudes of the biases.

If the two reports coincide, the Min Rule selects the common report. If the reports differ, the inner product of the policy selected by the Min Rule with each bias vector is, by definition, weakly smaller than the inner product of each of the reports with that bias. Hence the chosen policy $\theta' \wedge_{\{b_1,b_2\}} \theta''$ is, regardless of the magnitudes of the biases, weakly worse for both senders than both of the reports provided, so can act as a punishment for the deviation $\theta' \neq \theta''$. Figure 8 illustrates the Min Rule for two different scenarios. Note that the policy selected by the Min Rule can coincide with one of the reports, as in Figure 8a, or can implement a completely distinct point, as in Figure 8b.

Figure 8: Min Rule for the receiver

The Min Rule is anonymous in that it selects the same policy in response to $(\theta', \theta'')$ and $(\theta'', \theta')$. Among all anonymous rules, the Min Rule prescribes the punishment that is least severe for each of the senders, subject to deterring both of them from deliberately misreporting, no matter how large their biases. In particular, as the two reports converge to each other, the policy selected by the Min Rule also converges to the same point, and hence if the punishment is feasible, it constitutes a robust punishment that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

It remains to determine when it is feasible for the receiver to respond to a deviation according to the Min Rule. Proposition 4 below provides a simple geometric condition, which we term the Local Deterrence Condition, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE. The proposition also shows that the Min Rule is a feasible policy if and only if the Local Deterrence Condition is satisfied. In other words, the feasibility of punishing deviations according to the Min Rule is necessary as well as sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Before stating the characterization, we need to introduce some additional notation. Given $S \subset \mathbb{R}^2$ closed and convex, we denote the frontier of $S$ by $Fr(S)$. We say that a

\[ y = \theta' \wedge_{\{b_1,b_2\}} \theta'' \]

so $b_iy \leq b_i\theta$ for $i = 1, 2$. Then $(\theta + b_i - y)^2 = b_i^2 + (\theta - y)^2 + 2b_i(\theta - y) > b_i^2 = (\theta + b_i - \theta)^2$. In other words, for both senders, $y$ is farther from $\theta + b_i$ than $\theta$ is, and hence neither sender has an incentive to deviate from truthfully reporting $\theta$.\[ To see this, denote by $y = \theta' \wedge_{\{b_1,b_2\}} \theta''$ so $b_iy \leq b_i\theta$ for $i = 1, 2$. Then $(\theta + b_i - y)^2 = b_i^2 + (\theta - y)^2 + 2b_i(\theta - y) > b_i^2 = (\theta + b_i - \theta)^2$. In other words, for both senders, $y$ is farther from $\theta + b_i$ than $\theta$ is, and hence neither sender has an incentive to deviate from truthfully reporting $\theta$.\]
point \( s \in Fr(S) \) is smooth if there exists a unique tangent hyperplane to \( Fr(S) \) at \( s \). Any point in \( Fr(S) \) that is not smooth will be called a kink. The set of smooth points in the frontier is denoted by \( \widetilde{Fr}(S) \). For any \( s \in \widetilde{Fr}(S) \), we denote by \( n^B_Y(s) \) the unit normal vector to \( Fr(S) \) at \( s \) in the inward direction to \( S \): \( n^B_Y(s) \) is the unique vector that satisfies \( n^B_Y(s)(s' - s) \geq 0 \) for all \( s' \in S \).

Given \( b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2 \), define \( C(b_1, b_2) \equiv \{ b \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid b = \alpha b_1 + \beta b_2 \mid \alpha, \beta > 0 \} \), the open convex cone spanned by the vectors \( b_1, b_2 \). Similarly, adopting notation used for intervals in \( \mathbb{R} \), define \( C[b_1, b_2] \equiv \{ b \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid b = \alpha b_1 + \beta b_2 \mid \alpha, \beta \geq 0 \} \), the closed convex cone spanned by the vectors \( b_1, b_2 \) and \( C(b_1, b_2) \equiv \{ b \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid b = \alpha b_1 + \beta b_2 \} \), with \( \alpha \geq 0, \beta > 0 \), the convex cone that includes the extreme direction \( b_2 \) but not \( b_1 \).

**Proposition 4.** Given \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) convex and \( b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) linearly independent, the following statements are equivalent:

(i) There exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

(ii) For every \( \theta \in \widetilde{Fr}(Y) \), \( n^Y_Y(\theta) \notin C(b_1, b_2) \). (Local Deterrence Condition)

(iii) For every \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y \), \( \theta' \wedge_{[b_1, b_2]} \theta'' \in Y \). (Feasibility of Min Rule)

Condition (iii) says that responding to any deviation according to the Min Rule is a feasible strategy for the receiver, and hence by using the Min Rule, the receiver can deter deviations in a robust way. Whenever the reports \( (\theta', \theta'') \) of the senders do not agree, the receiver’s action is rationalized by a belief that allocates mass one to \( \theta' \wedge_{[b_1, b_2]} \theta'' \in Y \).

The Local Deterrence Condition (condition (ii)) is a condition on the directions of the senders’ bias vectors relative to the frontier of the policy space. For a given smooth point on the frontier, \( \theta \in \widetilde{Fr}(Y) \), the condition \( n^Y_Y(\theta) \notin C(b_1, b_2) \) is satisfied if and only if, in state \( \theta \), there exists, close to \( \theta \), a feasible policy for the receiver that, no matter how large the magnitudes of the biases, is worse for both senders than the policy \( y = \theta \).

To understand the intuition behind the proposition, note that by Proposition 3 to prove the existence of a robust FRE it is enough to check whether local deviations can be punished locally. Whether this is the case is exactly what the Local Deterrence Condition establishes. Clearly, if a pair of incompatible reports converge to a point in the interior of the policy space, punishing locally is never problematic, since the punishment region always intersects the policy space in a neighbourhood of the point. However, if a pair of incompatible reports converge to a point \( \theta \) on the frontier of the policy space, then punishing locally requires that, close to \( \theta \), there exist a feasible policy that, for any bias magnitudes, would make both senders worse off than the policy \( y = \theta \).

In what follows we illustrate the results of Proposition 4 through a couple of examples. Consider the funding allocation game introduced in the Introduction and depicted in Figure 9a. The receiver has to allocate funds from a budget to two different projects, each one overseen by one of the senders. The maximum amount of funds that can be allocated is exogenously fixed, and each project must receive a non-negative level of funding. The optimal allocation of funding depends on some information known to the senders but not to
the receiver. Relative to the receiver, each sender is biased towards the project he oversees. Since the inward normal vector to smooth points on the frontier of the policy space has only three distinct orientations in this example, it is particularly easy to confirm that the Local Deterrence Condition is satisfied in this setting, as illustrated in Figure 9a. It follows that all local deviations can be punished locally.

The Min Rule for the receiver explicitly identifies a feasible local punishment in response to any local deviation. For the orthogonal biases shown, the Min Rule chooses the component-wise minimum of the senders’ reports with respect to the Euclidean coordinates: \( \theta' \wedge \{b_1, b_2\} \theta'' = (\min(\theta'_1, \theta''_1), \min(\theta'_2, \theta''_2)) \). It is also easy to confirm directly from Figure 9a that in this setting the punishment specified by the Min Rule is always feasible.

Note that big deviations are also deterred by the receiver using the Min Rule. For example, if each sender claims the whole budget for his own project, the Min Rule prescribes that the receiver allocate zero funds to each of them. But by Proposition 3, we do not need to explicitly check whether big deviations can be deterred: as long as local deviations are deterrable, big deviations will also be deterrable.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Theta &\equiv Y \\
\text{Funds allocated to project 1} &\quad \text{Funds allocated to project 2}
\end{align*}
\]

(a) Allocation of funds given a budget constraint. The shaded area represents the feasible allocations.

\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{\theta}' \wedge \{b_1, b_2\} \bar{\theta}'' &\quad \bar{\theta}' \wedge \{b_1, b_2\} \theta''
\end{align*}
\]

(b) Allocation of funds across departments given a maximum total budget cut. The shaded area corresponds to the feasible allocations.

Figure 9: Illustration of robust FRE in the case of allocation of funds/cuts.

Figure 9b illustrates why the Local Deterrence Condition is necessary for existence of a robust FRE. In Figure 9b, the receiver, a local government, needs to determine the allocation of funding for two departments; depending on the state of the world, the optimal allocation might involve some budget cuts up to a maximum total level of cuts. As can be seen in the figure, the Local Deterrence Condition is violated at \( \theta \), a smooth point on the segment of the frontier representing the maximum total level of cuts. The implication of this violation is that incompatible reports along the frontier, such as \((\theta', \theta'')\), cannot be deterred, since doing so in a manner independent of the magnitudes of the biases would require imposing as a punishment deeper total cuts than the maximum level allowed.

One might argue that violations of the senders’ incentives for truthtelling along the
frontier are a minor problem if, for instance, the probability of those states arising is close to zero.\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} However, the fact that local deviations along the frontier are not deterrable implies that more general and bigger deviations are not deterrable either. Consider, in Figure\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} the pair of reports $(\tilde{\theta}', \tilde{\theta}''')$, which correspond to each sender arguing that some cuts are needed but not in his own department. There is no feasible punishment that would deter such a deviation independently of the magnitudes of the biases.

To introduce the final result of this subsection recall that, as Proposition\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} showed, requiring of a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases that it also be robust does not restrict the circumstances under which it exists. We now show, in Proposition\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} below, that existence of a robust FRE becomes no more likely even if we drop the requirement that it be independent of the magnitudes of the biases. The reason is that when the receiver is constrained to use small punishments, then whether the senders have incentives to deviate from truth-telling depends only on the orientations, not the magnitudes, of their bias vectors.

**Proposition 5.** Given $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ convex and $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2$ linearly independent, the following statements are equivalent:

(i) There exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium.

(ii) There exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Proposition\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} together with Proposition\footnote{As argued above, local deviations from a point in the interior of the policy space are always deterrable regardless of the shape of the policy space.} implies that the Local Deterrence Condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a robust FRE for given biases $b_1, b_2$.

### 3.1.1 Collusion Proofness

Since the senders have common information and could potentially attempt to mislead the receiver by both making the same false report, another desirable property of a fully revealing equilibrium is collusion-proofness. We will say that a FRE is collusion-proof if, whenever there is a feasible policy $\hat{\theta}$ that is at least weakly preferred by both senders to the true state $\theta$, colluding by both reporting $\hat{\theta}$ would not be self-enforcing for the senders, because at least one of them would have a profitable unilateral deviation.

**Definition 6.** Given bias vectors $b_1, b_2$ and given a FRE $(s_1, s_2, y^R)$, we say that the equilibrium is **collusion-proof**, if for all $\theta \in Y$ and all $\hat{\theta} \in Y$ such that

$$u^{S_1}(\hat{\theta}, \theta) \geq u^{S_1}(\theta, \theta) \quad \text{and} \quad u^{S_2}(\hat{\theta}, \theta) \geq u^{S_2}(\theta, \theta)$$

there exists $\tilde{\theta} \in Y$ such that either:

$$u^{S_1}(y^R(\tilde{\theta}, \hat{\theta}), \theta) > u^{S_1}(\hat{\theta}, \theta) \quad \text{or} \quad u^{S_2}(y^R(\tilde{\theta}, \hat{\theta}), \theta) > u^{S_2}(\hat{\theta}, \theta)$$
Given a FRE, the specific beliefs held by the receiver following incompatible reports will affect whether or not the FRE is collusion-proof, since these beliefs will determine the receiver's response if one of the senders were to deviate from the collusive plan. Intuitively, the more severely the receiver punishes incompatible reports, the less incentive either sender will have to deviate from the collusive plan, and hence the less likely a FRE is to be collusion-proof. To illustrate, consider the same funding allocation game depicted in Figure 9a which is reproduced in Figure 10a. For this game, there exists a non-robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, in which the receiver responds to any incompatible reports by choosing policy $y$: policy $y$ is such that, for any true state $\theta \neq y$, it is strictly worse for both senders than $\theta$. It follows that whenever the true state $\theta$ is such that there exists a policy $\hat{\theta}$ that is preferred by both senders to $\theta$, colluding by both reporting $\hat{\theta}$ would be self-enforcing. So a FRE supported by such a harsh punishment strategy by the receiver is not collusion-proof.

Now, in the same funding allocation game, consider the robust FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule. Figure 10b illustrates the argument. Suppose that the true state is $\theta$, and consider whether collusion on the report $\hat{\theta}$, which is preferred by both senders, would be self-enforcing. For either sender, if he expected the other sender to report $\hat{\theta}$ and the receiver to respond using the Min Rule, then the set of policies which he could induce the receiver to choose is indicated by the shaded region in the figure. (Recall that the Min Rule is an anonymous rule.) Sender 1 could increase his payoff by deviating from the collusive report of $\hat{\theta}$ to the report $y_1$, thereby inducing the policy $y_1$. Similarly, Sender 2 could gain by deviating from $\hat{\theta}$ to $y_2$, thereby inducing the receiver to choose $y_2$. In fact, in the environment depicted in Figure 10b, whenever there is a feasible policy $\hat{\theta}$ that is weakly preferred by both senders (and at least strictly preferred by one of them) to the true state $\theta$, a plan to collude by both reporting $\hat{\theta}$ would give both senders an incentive to unilaterally deviate. So the FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule is collusion-proof.

As we noted when we defined the Min Rule in Definition 5, this is the anonymous.
rule that, given incompatible reports, prescribes the least severe punishment for each of the senders, subject to deterring deliberate misreporting, no matter how large their biases. Intuitively, then, we would expect that the Min Rule should be the strategy for the receiver that would make deviations from the collusive report most attractive. The next proposition formalizes the benefit of the Min Rule in deterring collusion by the senders.

**Proposition 6.** Given $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ convex, if the FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule is not collusion-proof, then no other FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases can be collusion-proof.

Two things follow from Proposition 6: It is sufficient to focus on the FRE supported by the Min Rule in order to see whether a collusion-proof FRE exists, and whenever a collusion-proof FRE exists, there exists a robust FRE that is collusion-proof.

The dimension and shape of $Y$ are both important in determining whether or not a FRE supported by the Min Rule is collusion-proof. When $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, then it follows from the discussion at the end of Section 2.3 that a robust FRE exists if and only if the senders’ bias vectors point in the same direction. Yet even when a robust FRE exists with $Y$ one-dimensional, no such FRE, even one supported by the Min Rule, is collusion-proof.\(^{25}\)

On the other hand, suppose $Y$ is the whole of $\mathbb{R}^2$. Since the Min Rule is clearly always feasible, by Proposition 6 there exists a robust FRE supported by it. Here, as long as the senders’ bias vectors are linearly independent, the robust FRE supported by the Min Rule is collusion-proof. This follows from the same logic illustrated in Figure 10b. Suppose the senders planned to collude by both reporting $\hat{\theta}$ that they both preferred to the true state $\theta$. Any sender $i$ for whom $\hat{\theta}$ did not lie on the line through $\theta$ in the direction of $b_i$ would, in state $\theta$, strictly prefer the receiver to choose the projection, $y_i$, of $\hat{\theta}$ onto this line—since the policy space is the whole of $\mathbb{R}^2$ and the receiver is expected to use the Min Rule, Sender $i$ could induce the receiver to choose $y_i$ by deviating from reporting $\hat{\theta}$ to reporting $y_i$. And the fact that the senders’ bias vectors are linearly independent guarantees that the projections $y_1$ and $y_2$ are distinct policies, so at least one sender will have a strict incentive to deviate.\(^{26}\)

To characterize exactly how the shape of the set of feasible policies determines whether or not a FRE supported by the Min Rule is collusion-proof, we now introduce some further notation that will be used only in this section. Given a smooth point on the frontier $\hat{\theta} \in \tilde{\mathcal{F}}(Y)$, we denote by $n^{\text{out}}(\hat{\theta})$ the outward normal vector to $Y$ at $\hat{\theta}$, and by $T_Y(\hat{\theta})$ the set of unit tangent vectors to $Y$ at $\hat{\theta}$. For a generic $\hat{\theta}$ on the frontier of $Y$, we define the Polar Cone of $Y$ at $\hat{\theta}$ as the convex cone:

$$PC_Y(\hat{\theta}) \equiv \{ n \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid n(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \leq 0, \text{ for all } \theta \in Y \}$$

---

\(^{25}\)Given any finite biases pointing in the same direction, find a state $\theta$ and a candidate collusive report $\hat{\theta}$ sufficiently close to $\theta$ such that $\hat{\theta}$ lies, for each sender, strictly between $\theta$ and his ideal point $\theta + b_i$. Then neither sender would have an incentive to deviate from the collusive report $\hat{\theta}$, since any robust response rule for the receiver that supported a FRE would lead the receiver, in response to such a deviation, to choose a policy farther away than $\hat{\theta}$ from both senders’ ideal points.

\(^{26}\)If $b_1 = t b_2$ for some strictly positive scalar $t$, then even for $Y = \mathbb{R}^2$, there is no collusion-proof FRE. The argument parallels that for $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}$.  

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Note that if \( \hat{\theta} \) is a smooth point, then \( PC_Y(\hat{\theta}) \equiv n^{Out}_Y(\hat{\theta}) \), but if \( \hat{\theta} \) is a kink point, then \( PC_Y(\hat{\theta}) \) has a non-empty interior.

The following proposition provides conditions that, whatever the magnitudes of the biases, are necessary and sufficient for collusion-proofness of the robust FRE in which the receiver uses the Min Rule. These conditions depend only on the directions and not on the magnitudes of the biases.\(^{27}\)

**Proposition 7.** Given \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) convex, with non-empty interior, and biases \( b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) linearly independent, the robust FRE supported by the Min Rule is collusion-proof if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:

(i) There does not exist a \( \hat{\theta} \in \overline{Fr}(Y) \) and \( t_Y(\hat{\theta}) \in T_Y(\hat{\theta}) \) such that \( b_1, b_2 \in C(n^{Out}_Y(\hat{\theta}), t_Y(\hat{\theta})) \).

(ii) There does not exist a \( \hat{\theta} \in Fr(Y) \) such that \( b_1, b_2 \in \text{int}(PC_Y(\hat{\theta})) \).

![Figure 11: The necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion-proofness](image)

Proposition\(^7\) shows that, given linearly independent bias vectors, there are only two situations in which a robust FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule fails to be collusion-proof. These two situations are illustrated in the two panels of Figure 11. When condition (i) is violated at some \( \hat{\theta} \), as in Figure 11a, then whatever the magnitudes of the biases, there must exist a state \( \theta \) sufficiently close to \( \hat{\theta} \), such that collusion on \( \hat{\theta} \) would be self-enforcing in state \( \theta \): the frontier of \( Y \) renders infeasible the type of profitable unilateral deviations from \( \hat{\theta} \) that were possible in Figure 10b. Violation of condition (ii), illustrated in Figure 11b, is equivalent to existence of a policy \( \hat{\theta} \) which, for sufficiently large biases, is both senders’ preferred policy in \( Y \), regardless of the true state—it follows that in this case,  

\(^{27}\)If the conditions in Proposition\(^7\) are satisfied, the FRE supported by the Min Rule is collusion-proof whatever the magnitudes of the biases. If, however, one of the conditions fails, then our proof shows that whatever the magnitudes of the biases, there is some true state \( \theta \) and some report \( \hat{\theta} \) such that collusion on \( \hat{\theta} \) would be self-enforcing. The smaller the magnitudes of the biases, the closer to the true state the collusive report would have to be, in order to be strictly preferred by both senders to the true state. Nevertheless, whenever senders with given biases would have an incentive, in state \( \theta \), to collude on the report \( \hat{\theta} \), so would senders whose biases had larger magnitudes.
for any finite biases, there must exist a \( \theta \) sufficiently close to \( \hat{\theta} \) that collusion on \( \hat{\theta} \) would be self-enforcing in state \( \theta \), since in state \( \theta \), \( \hat{\theta} \) is the best feasible policy for both senders.

Note that given Proposition 6, conditions (i) and (ii) together with the Local Deterrence Condition are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE that is collusion-proof.

Collusion Proofness, the Min Rule, and Multiple Senders

We now briefly discuss the problem of deterring collusion in a setting with more than two senders. We highlight that, regardless of the number of senders, the Min Rule remains the most effective strategy for the receiver for deterring collusion, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for it do so retain the same form; the key is to define the Min Rule and the conditions in terms of the bias vectors for the pair of senders whose preferences are least closely aligned.

With more than two (identically informed) senders, there always exists a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, regardless of the shape of the policy space relative to the senders’ biases. Truthful revelation by the senders is supported by the receiver using a strategy which ignores any unilateral deviation. Moreover, such a strategy for the receiver can always be specified in a way that is robust. However, such a FRE is highly vulnerable to collusion by the senders: whenever there exists a candidate collusive agreement (a feasible policy \( \hat{\theta} \) that all senders weakly prefer to the true state), no sender can gain by a unilateral deviation from \( \hat{\theta} \), since such a deviation will have no effect on the receiver’s policy choice.

By contrast, consider the \( n \) senders’ incentives for truthful revelation and for collusion if the receiver is expected to use a version of the Min Rule. Specifically, suppose that the \( n \) senders’ bias vectors are not all scalar multiples of one another and that they lie in a closed convex cone, and denote the smallest such cone by \( C[\bar{b}, \bar{b}] = \{ \alpha \bar{b} + \beta \bar{b} \mid \alpha, \beta \geq 0 \} \). Thus, \( \bar{b} \) and \( \bar{b} \), the extreme rays of the convex cone, are the bias vectors of the two senders whose bias directions are least closely aligned. For \( n \) senders for whom the least aligned biases are \( \bar{b}, \bar{b} \), define the Min Rule as the strategy for the receiver that, for every set of \( n \) reports \( \theta^1, \ldots, \theta^n \), with \( \theta^i \in \mathbb{R}^2 \), implements the policy \( y_{min} \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) that is defined by

\[
\begin{align*}
by_{\min} &= \min\{b\theta^1, \ldots, b\theta^n\} \\
\bar{b}y_{\min} &= \min\{\bar{b}\theta^1, \ldots, \bar{b}\theta^n\}.
\end{align*}
\]

If the Min Rule as just defined is feasible, then it supports a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. The reason is that the robust punishment specified by the Min Rule ensures that each of the two senders with the least aligned bias vectors is deterred from deviating from truthful revelation, and this implies that the same is true for

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28Formally, robustness requires that, for any \( \theta \) and \( \epsilon > 0 \), there should be a \( \delta > 0 \) such that if \( \theta^i \in B(\theta, \delta) \) for all \( i \in [1, \ldots, n] \), then \( y(\theta^1, \ldots, \theta^n) \in B(y^{*}(\theta), \epsilon) \). The following strategy for the receiver is one that supports a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases: If all or all but one sender submit the same report, implement that common report; if the senders submit three or more distinct reports, implement the report of sender 1.
all other senders, since their bias vectors are convex combinations of $b$ and $\overline{b}$. With $n$ senders, let us define a FRE as collusion-proof if, whenever there is a feasible policy $\hat{\theta}$ that is at least weakly preferred by all senders to the true state $\theta$, collusion by all reporting $\hat{\theta}$ would not be self-enforcing for the senders, because at least one of them would have a profitable unilateral deviation.

Given these definitions of the Min Rule and collusion proofness for the case of $n$ senders, we can show that Proposition 6 continues to hold, regardless of the number of senders. That is, if the FRE supported by the receiver using the Min Rule is not collusion-proof, then no other FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases can be collusion-proof. Furthermore, we can show that Proposition 7 also holds regardless of the number of senders, with the only change being that the biases $b_1$ and $b_2$ are now replaced by the least aligned pair of bias vectors, $\underline{b}$ and $\overline{b}$.

3.2 Multidimensional Spaces

The results in Proposition 4 extend easily to higher dimensions. For $b_1, b_2$ linearly independent, the only directions of conflict between the senders and the receiver are the ones in the plane spanned by these two vectors. Thus, senders will not have incentives to deviate by misreporting dimensions of the state orthogonal to this plane. On the other hand, the receiver could potentially utilize these dimensions of no conflict to punish inconsistent messages. However, this strategy cannot be guaranteed to work for the receiver if the senders’ biases can be arbitrarily large.

Given $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p$ linearly independent, denote by $\Pi_b \subset \mathbb{R}^p$ the plane spanned by these two vectors and denote by $Y_b$ the orthogonal projection of $Y$ onto $\Pi_b$.

**Proposition 8.** Given $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p$ convex and biases $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^p$ linearly independent, the following statements are equivalent:

(i) For the environment $(Y, Y)$, there exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

(ii) For the environment $(Y_b, Y_b)$, there exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Proposition 8 says that for the existence in high-dimensional spaces of a FRE (robust or not) that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, it is necessary and sufficient to look at the projection of the policy space onto the subspace of conflict of interest and see whether a FRE can be constructed there. In particular, since the projection $Y_b$ of the policy space onto $\Pi_b$ is a two-dimensional set, it is necessary and sufficient to check whether the Local Deterrence Condition in Proposition 4 is satisfied when applied to $Y_b$.

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29 Similar logic underlies Proposition 10 in Section 5 which analyzes a two-sender setting in which the bias vectors have directions that are uncertain and/or state-dependent.

30 Note that the projection of a closed set onto a plane is not necessarily closed and hence $Y_b$ might not be closed. Nevertheless, our proof shows that for any convex two-dimensional policy space, whether open or closed, the Local Deterrence Condition in Proposition 4 remains necessary and sufficient for existence of a (robust) FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases. (This is true despite the fact that for an open two-dimensional policy
The intuition behind Proposition 8 is that when the equilibrium is required to exist
garanteed by Proposition 4, the Min Rule for the receiver is helpful in constructing a robust
FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, whenever one exists. Given a
pair of reports \((\theta', \theta'')\), let \((\theta'_b, \theta''_b)\) denote their projections onto \(\Pi_b\). Proposition 8, coupled
with Proposition 4, implies that in the multi-dimensional environment \((Y, Y)\), there exists a
(robust) FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases if and only if, for all \((\theta', \theta'')\in Y,
\theta'_b \land (b_1, b_2) \theta''_b \in Y_b\). The condition \(\theta'_b \land (b_1, b_2) \theta''_b \in Y_b\) means that there exists a feasible
policy in \(Y\) whose projection is \(\theta'_b \land (b_1, b_2) \theta''_b\), and such a policy can serve as a punishment
for when \(\theta' \neq \theta''\). Although the Min Rule applied to \(Y_b\) does not uniquely identify a policy
for the receiver in \(Y\), it does pin down the coordinates of the policy in the subspace where
the players’ interests conflict. Moreover, as \(\theta'\) and \(\theta''\) converge to each other, the convexity
of \(Y\) implies that the set of policies in \(Y\) whose projection onto \(\Pi_b\) is \(\theta'_b \land (b_1, b_2) \theta''_b\) contains
points close to \(\theta'\) and \(\theta''\), thus ensuring that a robust punishment can be found.

Note that Proposition 5 does not extend to higher dimensions. It remains true that existence
of a FRE that is independent of the magnitude of the biases is sufficient for existence
of a robust FRE when bias magnitudes have known finite upper bounds. However, it is
no longer necessary. If bias magnitudes had known finite upper bounds, then the receiver
might be able to utilize, for punishments, the dimensions of the policy space orthogonal to
the biases. For example, in this case, if the state space were unrestricted in a dimension
orthogonal to the plane of the biases, a robust FRE would always exist.

4 Non-Convex Policy Spaces

This section considers the case where the policy space is non-convex, for example because
of increasing returns to some resources or indivisibilities. We identify an additional geo-
metric condition, the Global Deterrence Condition, on the directions of the senders’ biases
relative to the frontier of the convex hull of the policy space, that together with the Local
Deterrence Condition identified in Proposition 4, is necessary and sufficient for existence
of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. The form of the Global
Deterrence Condition differs from that of the Local Deterrence Condition only in that the
frontier of the convex hull of the policy space \(Y\) replaces the frontier of \(Y\) itself.

When the policy space is non-convex, it is possible for the belief of the receiver to be
such that two or more policies are optimal. To see a simple example of this, consider a
policy space in which everything is feasible except policies that are within \(\epsilon\) of zero, i.e.
\(Y = \mathbb{R}^2 \setminus B(0, \epsilon)\). If the belief of the receiver is such that the expected state is 0, then any

space, local deviations can always be deterred with local punishments that are independent of the magnitudes of the biases.)
policy such that \(|y| = \epsilon\) is optimal. In such a case, the restriction to pure strategies from the receiver is not without loss of generality, and hence for this section we allow the receiver to use mixed strategies[^1].

Before presenting our result, we need to generalize our definition of a smooth point on the frontier as well as that of an inward normal vector to the frontier at a smooth point[^2]. Given an arbitrary set \(S\), a point \(s \in Fr(S)\) is a smooth point if locally there is a unique tangent hyperplane to \(Fr(S)\) at \(s\), or more precisely, if there exists an \(\epsilon > 0\) such that, for any \(0 < \delta < \epsilon\), \(B(s, \delta) \cap Fr(S)\) has a unique tangent hyperplane at \(s\). As before, we will denote the set of smooth points on the frontier of \(S\) by \(\tilde{Fr}(S)\). The inward normal vector to the frontier of \(S\) at a smooth point \(s\), is then the normal vector to \(Fr(S)\), \(n_S(s)\), that satisfies the condition that there exists an \(\epsilon > 0\) such that for any \(0 < \delta < \epsilon\), \(s + \delta n_S(s) \in S\). Lastly, we denote by \(co(S)\) the convex hull of set \(S\).

**Proposition 9.** Suppose \(Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2\) is compact and \(Fr(Y)\) has finitely many kinks. Given \(b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^2\) linearly independent, the following statements are generically equivalent:

(i) There exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

(ii) 1. For every \(\theta \in \tilde{Fr}(co(Y))\), \(n^I_{co(Y)}(\theta) \notin C(b_1, b_2)\)  
and  
2. For every \(\theta \in \tilde{Fr}(Y)\), \(n^I_Y(\theta) \notin C(b_1, b_2)\)  

In the proof of the proposition we show that the Global Deterrence Condition (GDC) and the Local Deterrence Condition (LDC) are together necessary and sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE in pure strategies as long as there is not a very special sort of kink point in the frontier of the policy space. At such a special kink point, the frontier is locally non-convex, and on the two sides of the kink, it is locally linear; furthermore the inward normal vectors to these linear pieces coincide with the bias vectors. If such a kink point exists, then the GDC and LDC are not sufficient for the existence of a robust FRE in pure strategies, but a robust FRE in which the receiver uses a mixed strategy does exist. Finally, we argue that if a robust FRE in pure strategies does not exist, then generically, allowing the receiver to use mixed strategies will not help in supporting a robust FRE.

The LDC by itself is necessary and sufficient for small deviations to be deterrable with small punishments, whether the biases have known finite magnitudes or whether they can be arbitrarily large[^3]. As we have mentioned before, when the receiver’s strategy is required to be robust, the senders’ incentives to deviate from truth-telling depend only on the orientations, not the magnitudes, of their biases. When \(Y\) is convex, the LDC is necessary and

[^1]: The extension of the robustness definition to mixed strategies is straightforward. Given the fully revealing strategies \((s_1, s_2)\), the receiver’s strategy \(\sigma^R\) is robust if for any \(\theta \in \Theta\) and any \(\epsilon > 0\), there exist \(\delta > 0\) and \(\delta' > 0\) such that if: (i) \(\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap \Theta\), and (ii) \(y'(\theta'), y''(\theta'') \in B(y'(\theta), \delta') \cap Y\), then for any policy \(y\) in the support of \(\sigma^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta''))\), \(y \in B(y'(\theta), \epsilon) \cap Y\).

[^2]: Recall that for a convex set \(S\) we defined an inward normal vector to a smooth point \(s \in \tilde{Fr}(S)\), as the only vector \(n^I_S(s)\) such that \(n^I_S(s)(s' - s) \geq 0\) for all \(s' \in S\). This definition does not apply to non-convex sets.

[^3]: Note that the set of smooth points \(\tilde{Fr}(S)\) might be empty. This is the case if the set \(S\) is finite for example. If \(\tilde{Fr}(S)\) is empty, robustness does not impose any restriction.
sufficient for existence of a robust FRE, as Proposition 4 shows. When $Y$ is non-convex, however, deterrence of small deviations with small punishments is no longer sufficient for existence of a FRE.

Figure 12 presents an example in which all local deviations can be deterred with local punishments, because the LDC is satisfied. However, at points along the dashed line connecting $A$ to $C$, which is part of the frontier of $\text{co}(Y)$, the GDC is violated. To see the consequence of this violation, observe that if Sender 1 reports $C$ and Sender 2 reports $A$, and the magnitudes of the biases are very large, then there is no feasible response for the receiver that would suffice to deter Sender 1, in state $A$, from deviating to a report of $C$, and that would also deter Sender 2, in state $C$, from deviating to a report of $A$—any response that would deter both of these deviations would have to lie in the punishment region represented by the shaded area. Hence, a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases does not exist.

Figure 12: Conditions for Robustness of FRE for non-convex $Y$.

Figure 12 shows that when the policy space is non-convex, deterrence of local deviations with local punishments no longer implies that all deviations are deterrable. In particular, in Proposition 3 condition (iii) no longer implies condition (i) if the assumption of convexity of $Y$ is dropped. For non-convex $Y$, whether or not large deviations are deterrable depends in general on the magnitudes as well as the orientations of the biases. In particular, in Figure 12a, if the magnitudes of the biases were sufficiently small, a robust FRE would exist. (The receiver could punish incompatible reports with the Min Rule whenever it was feasible and with point $E$ whenever the Min Rule was not feasible.) Hence this example also shows that, for non-convex $Y$, existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases is no longer implied by existence of a robust FRE for biases of known finite magnitudes.

The GDC by itself is necessary and sufficient for all deviations, including large ones, to be deterrable with feasible (though not necessarily robust) punishments, when the biases
can be arbitrarily large. Figure 12b displays an example in which the GDC is satisfied, so there exists a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. For very large magnitudes of the biases, point C is the least-preferred point in \( Y \equiv \Theta \) for both senders, so it can be used by the receiver to punish any discrepancies in the senders’ reports. However, no robust FRE exists. To see why not, note that along segment AB on the frontier of \( Y \), the LDC is violated; as a consequence, it is not possible to deter local deviations along segment AB with local punishments. This example shows that in Proposition 3, condition (i) no longer implies condition (iii) if the assumption of convexity is dropped.

5 Uncertain and State-Dependent Biases

We can generalize the approach and results of the previous Section 3 to accommodate some uncertainty about the directions of the senders’ biases. In particular, we can relax the assumptions that the directions of the senders’ biases are (i) common knowledge and (ii) independent of the realization of the state.

Suppose that the players have a common prior joint distribution \( G \) over \((\theta, b_1, b_2)\). Each sender observes \( \theta \) and his own bias vector, while the receiver does not observe any of these realizations. The definition of a fully revealing equilibrium remains unchanged.

**Proposition 10.** Given \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) convex, suppose that there exists a closed convex cone \( C[b, \tilde{b}] = \{\alpha b + \beta \tilde{b} \mid \alpha, \beta \geq 0\} \), such that for all \( \theta \in \Theta \), the supports of the conditional distributions of the bias directions \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) given \( \theta \) are both contained in \( C[b, \tilde{b}] \). Then conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent and imply (iii):

(i) For all \( \theta \in \tilde{Fr}(Y) \), \( n^o(\theta) \notin C(b, \tilde{b}) \).

(ii) For all \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y \), \( \theta' \wedge_{(b, \tilde{b})} \theta'' \in Y \).

(iii) There exists a (robust) fully revealing equilibrium that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases.

Moreover, if the conditional distribution of the bias directions \( (b_1, b_2) \) given \( \theta \) assigns positive density to \((b, \tilde{b})\) for all \( \theta \in Y \), then (iii) implies (i) and (ii).

The sufficiency part of Proposition 10 says that when the receiver does not know the actual biases but knows only that they are certain to lie in a given closed convex cone \( C[b, \tilde{b}] \), then two equivalent sufficient conditions for the existence of a robust FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases are the Local Deterrence Condition and the feasibility of the Min Rule, just as in Proposition 4, except that here the known biases \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) are replaced by the least aligned possible realizations, \( b \) and \( \tilde{b} \). Each of these

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34 To be more precise, for all \( \theta \in Y \), \( b_i C \leq b_i \theta \) for \( i = 1, 2 \). To see that \( C \) serves as a punishment for all deviations, even for senders with small biases, note that \( b_i C \leq b_i \theta \) implies that \( |\theta + b_i - C|^2 = |b_i|^2 + |\theta - C|^2 + 2b_i(\theta - C) > |b_i|^2 = |\theta + b_i - \theta|^2 \). In other words, for both senders, \( C \) is farther from \( \theta + b_i \) than \( \theta \) is, and hence neither sender has an incentive to deviate from truthfully reporting \( \theta \).

35 Of course, regardless of whether or not \( Y \) is convex, condition (ii) of Proposition 3 implies both (i) and (iii).
conditions ensures that for all true states on the frontier of $Y$, the receiver can find local punishments that would deter local deviations, whether the realized values of $(b_1, b_2)$ were $(\bar{b}, \tilde{b})$ or $(\tilde{b}, b)$. (Recall that the Min Rule is an anonymous rule.) This in turn implies that for any more closely aligned realizations of the biases, local deviations would continue to be deterred by these same local punishments, as illustrated in Figure 13a for the funding allocation game.

The necessity part of Proposition 10 shows that if there exists a minimal closed convex cone containing the biases and this minimal cone is the same for all states $\theta$, then these sufficient conditions are also necessary. The necessity part of the proposition holds, for example, if the distribution of the biases, on the support $C[\bar{b}, \tilde{b}]$, is independent of the realization of the state.

The sufficiency result of Proposition 10 can also be applied to cases in which the biases are deterministic but depend on the realization of the state. Consider, for example, the same funding allocation setting as in Figure 13a and now suppose senders $S_1$ and $S_2$ have fixed ideal points, $y_1$ and $y_2$, independent of the realization of the state. Such state-independent quadratic preferences can expressed as follows:

$$u^{S_i}(y, \theta) = -(y - y_i)^2 = -(y - \theta - \left(y_i - \theta \right)^2_{b_1(\theta)})^2$$

Therefore these preferences correspond to each sender $S_i$ having a deterministic state-dependent bias $b_i(\theta) = (y_i - \theta)$. (See Figure 13b) If these biases lie within a closed convex cone $C[\bar{b}, \tilde{b}]$, and no inward normal vector to a smooth point on the frontier lies within the cone, then it follows from Proposition 10 that there exists a robust FRE. Furthermore, it can be implemented by the receiver using the Min Rule defined with respect to the biases $[\bar{b}, \tilde{b}]$.

Finally, to conclude our analysis, note that the sufficiency result of Proposition 10 can be easily extended to general convex preferences, using a similar argument to the case of state-dependent biases. Suppose for simplicity that $\Theta \equiv Y$, with $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ and convex. Denote by

![Figure 13: Funding allocation game when the biases are uncertain and/or state-dependent.](image-url)
$u^R(y, \theta)$ the quasi-concave utility function representing the receiver’s preferences, such that $\theta = \arg \max_{y \in Y} u^R(y, \theta)$, that is, the ideal policy of the receiver in state $\theta$ is $y = \theta$. Denote by $u^S_i(y, \theta)$ the quasi-concave utility function of sender $S_i$. For every realization of the state $\theta \in Y$, define the bias vector of $S_i$ as the normal vector to $S_i$’s indifference curve through the policy $y = \theta$, in state $\theta$. Now suppose that there exists a closed convex cone $C[\bar{b}, \bar{b}]$ such that for both senders, $b_i(\theta) \in C[\bar{b}, \bar{b}]$ for all $\theta \in Y$. Then if the Local Deterrence Condition is satisfied for the pair of biases $[\bar{b}, \bar{b}]$, there exists a robust FRE that can be implemented using the Min Rule defined with respect to $[\bar{b}, \bar{b}]$. Figure 14 illustrates the intuition.

**Figure 14:** Quasi-concave utilities and $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$, convex. In state $\theta''$, $S_1$ would prefer a policy in the direction of $b_1(\theta'')$, and hence would be punished for deviating by the receiver choosing a policy to the south-west of $h(b_1(\theta''), b_1(\theta''))$. Analogously, in state $\theta'$, $S_2$ would be punished for deviating by the receiver choosing a policy to the south of $h(b_2(\theta'), b_2(\theta') \theta')$. The grey area represents the punishment region for the deviation $(\theta', \theta'')$. The Min Rule, defined for $[\bar{b}, \bar{b}]$, delivers a policy that lies in the punishment region.

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36 More formally, $S_i$’s bias in state $\theta$, $b_i(\theta)$, is defined as the gradient vector, with respect to $y$, to the indifference curve of $S_i$ at the policy $y = \theta$. 

33
A Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

Consider a robust fully revealing equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) supported by the belief function \(\mu(\cdot)\) and consider the following strategies: \(\hat{s}_1 : \Theta \rightarrow Y\), such that \(\hat{s}_i(\theta) = y^i(\theta); \hat{y}_i : Y \times Y \rightarrow Y\), such that \(\hat{y}(y', y'') = y^R(s_1(y'), s_2(y''))\) and the belief function \(\hat{\mu}(y', y'') = \mu(s_1(y'), s_2(y''))\). We show that the restriction of \((\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2, \hat{y})\) to the environment \((Y, Y)\) is a robust truthful equilibrium. An argument identical to the one in the proof of Proposition 2((ii) \(\Rightarrow\) (i)) shows that in fact \((\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2, \hat{y})\) is also a robust truthful equilibrium in the environment \((\Theta, Y)\). Consider the report \((\theta', \theta'')\) with \(\theta' \neq \theta'', \theta', \theta'' \in Y\). Then:

\[
|\hat{y}(\theta', \theta'') - (\theta' + b_1)| = |y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) - (\theta' + b_1)| \leq |b_1|
\]

\[
|\hat{y}(\theta', \theta'') - (\theta' + b_2)| = |y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) - (\theta' + b_2)| \leq |b_2|
\]

where the inequality follows from the fact that \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) is an equilibrium. Finally, if \(\theta \in Y\) and \(\epsilon > 0\), by the robustness of \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) there exists a \(\delta > 0\) such that if \(\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta), \hat{y}(\theta', \theta'') = y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in B(\theta, \epsilon)\).

hence \((\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2, \hat{y})\) is a robust truthful equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 1:

Statement (i)-sufficiency \((\Rightarrow)\): Suppose there exist \(\theta', \theta'' \in Y\) such that \(Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\). Then \(y(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\). In particular, denoting \(y = y(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta''))\), either \(b_1(y - \theta'') > 0\) or \(b_2(y - \theta') > 0\). Suppose that \(b_1(y - \theta'') > 0\) and consider \(t_1 > \frac{|y - \theta''|^2}{2|b_1|}\). Then \(y(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in B(\theta'' + t_1 b_1, t_1 b_1)\) which implies that sender 1 with bias \(t_1 b_1\) has an incentive to deviate to \(s_1(\theta')\) given \(\theta''\). The symmetric argument could be made if \(b_2(y - \theta') > 0\) with \(t_2 > \frac{|y - \theta'|^2}{2|b_2|}\).

Statement (i), necessity \((\Leftarrow)\): Consider truthful strategies and the following belief function \(\mu(\cdot)\) such that \(\mu(\theta, \theta)\) allocates mass one on \(\theta\) and \(\mu(\theta', \theta'')\) with \(\theta' \neq \theta''\), puts mass one in an element of \(Y \setminus H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\). Denote \(y^R\) the optimal response by the receiver given those beliefs. Given a report \((\theta', \theta'')\), \(y^R(\theta', \theta'') \notin H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\) so in particular \(y^R(\theta', \theta'') \notin B(\theta'' + t_1 b_1, t_1 b_1)\) and \(y^R(\theta', \theta'') \notin B(\theta' + t_2 b_2, t_2 b_2)\). So none of the two senders has an incentive to deviate.

Statement (ii)-sufficiency \((\Rightarrow)\): Suppose there exist some fully revealing strategies \((s_1, s_2)\) and a strategy \(y^R\) that deters local deviation with local punishments, then for any \(\theta \in Y\) and any \(\epsilon > 0\) there exists \(\delta > 0\) such that for every \(\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta), y^R(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \setminus (B(\theta'' + t_1 b_1, b_1) \cup B(\theta' + t_2 b_2, b_2))\) for any \(t_1, t_2 \geq 0\). Hence \(B(\theta, \epsilon) \setminus Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\).

Statement (ii), necessity \((\Leftarrow)\): By the argument used in the proof of Lemma 1 we can focus on truthful strategies. For any \(\theta \in \Theta\) define \(y^R(\theta, \theta) = \theta\). If \(\theta' \neq \theta \in \Theta\) define \(y^R(\theta, \theta')\)
an element of \( \arg \min \{ |s - \theta| : s \in Y \setminus (H(b_1, b_1 \theta')) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \} \) if \( Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \), and any arbitrary feasible policy if \( Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \). To see that this strategy deters local deviation with local punishments consider any \( \theta \in \Theta \) and any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), by hypothesis, for \( \tilde{\varepsilon} = \varepsilon/3 \) there exists \( 0 < \delta < \tilde{\varepsilon} \) such that for all \( \theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \), \( B(\theta, \tilde{\varepsilon}) \cap Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \). Consider any \( \tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \tilde{\varepsilon}) \cap Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \). And \( |y^R(\theta', \theta'') - \theta| \leq |y^R(\theta', \theta'') - \theta'| + |\theta' - \theta| \leq |\tilde{\theta} - \theta' + |\theta' - \theta| \leq |\tilde{\theta} - \theta | + 2|\theta' - \theta| < \tilde{\varepsilon} = \varepsilon \), hence \( y^R(\theta', \theta'') \in B(\theta, \varepsilon) \setminus (H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')) \subset B(\theta, \varepsilon) \setminus (B(\theta'' + t_1 b_1, t_1 |b_1|) \cup B(\theta' + t_2 b_2, t_2 |b_2|)) \).

**Statement (iii):** The necessity is given by parts (i) and (ii). To see the sufficiency, consider truthful strategies and the belief specified in the previous paragraph. Note that given condition (2), \( Y \setminus (H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')) \neq \emptyset \) for any \( \theta \neq \theta' \in Y \).  

**Proof of Proposition 2:**

**Statement (i) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (ii):** Given \( b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^P \) and the environment \((\Theta, Y)\), consider \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) a pure (robust) FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases supported by the belief function \( \mu \). Denote \( \tilde{s}_i : Y \rightarrow M_i \) the restriction of \( S_i \)'s strategy to the policy space \( Y \). Then \((\tilde{s}_1, \tilde{s}_2, y^R)\) together with the belief \( \mu \) constitute a (robust) FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases for the environment \((Y, Y)\). In particular, given Proposition 1 for all \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y, Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \). Note the this last statement is equivalent to \( Y \not\subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \), and hence by Proposition 1 there exists a (robust) FRE for all biases \((t_1 b_1, t_2 b_2)\), \( t_1, t_2 \geq 0 \) for the environment \((Y, Y)\).

**Statement (ii) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (i):** Suppose there exists a (robust) FRE in \((Y, Y)\) for all biases \((t_1 b_1, t_2 b_2)\), \( t_1, t_2 \geq 0 \). By Lemma 1 there exists a truthful (robust) equilibrium outcome-equivalent to it. Denote the truthful equilibrium by \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) where for all \( \theta \in Y \), \( s_i(\theta) = y^s(\theta) = \theta \). For \( \theta \in \Theta \) we define the following strategies: \( \tilde{s}_i(\theta) = y^s(\theta) \). We claim that \((\tilde{s}_1, \tilde{s}_2, y^R)\) is a (robust) FRE in \((\Theta, Y)\).

Consider the out-of-equilibrium messages \((y', y'')\) where \( y' \neq y'' \) and denote by \( x = y^R(y', y'') \) the receiver’s policy after the report \((y', y'')\). By Proposition 1

\[
b_1^Y(y'' - x) \geq 0, \quad b_2^Y(y' - x) \geq 0.
\]

For sender \( S_1 \), we need to show that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) such that \( y^s(\theta) = y'', |\theta + t_1 b_1 - y''| \leq |\theta + t_1 b_1 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \). For any \( \theta \in \Theta \) with \( y^s(\theta) = y'' \), \( y'' \) is the closest point in \( Y \) to \( \theta \) and therefore \( |\theta - y''| \leq |\theta - x| \). In particular, if \( z \) is the midpoint of the segment \([x, y'']\), \( \theta \in H(y'' - x, z(y'' - x)) \) or analogously, \( \theta(y'' - x) \geq z(y'' - x) \). Note that since \( y'', x \in Y, y'' - x \in S^Y \) and hence \( b_1(y'' - x) = b_1^Y(y'' - x) \geq 0 \) where the last inequality follows by (3). Therefore \( (\theta + t_1 b_1)(y'' - x) \geq z(y'' - x) \) for all \( t > 0 \), or in other words \( |\theta + t_1 b_1 - y''| \leq |\theta + t_1 b_1 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \). A similar argument for \( S_2 \) shows that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) such that \( y^s(\theta) = y', |\theta + t_2 b_2 - y'| \leq |\theta + t_2 b_2 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \). Therefore \((\tilde{s}_1, \tilde{s}_2, y^R)\) is a FRE in \((\Theta, Y)\). (See Figure 15).

Finally if we further assume that the initial equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y^R)\) is robust, then by Propo-
sition for any $y \in Y$ and $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $\delta > 0$ such that for all $y', y'' \in B(y, \delta) \cap Y$, $y^R(y', y'') \in B(y, \epsilon)$. In particular, for any $\theta \in \Theta$ and $\theta', \theta'' \in \Theta$ such that $y^R(\theta'), y^R(\theta'') \in B(y^R(\theta), \epsilon)$, we have that $y^R(y^R(\theta'), y^R(\theta'')) \in B(y^R(\theta), \epsilon)$. □

**Proof of Proposition 3**: 

By Proposition 2 we can restrict attention to the case in which $\Theta = Y$.

**Statement (ii) ⇒ Statement (i):** Trivial.

**Statement (i) ⇒ Statement (ii):** We argue in two steps. First, we prove that if a local deviation from $\theta \in Y$ cannot be deterred with a local punishment, then there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that

$$B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$$

where $\overline{S}$ denotes the closure of $S$. Note that this statement is independent of whether $Y$ is convex or not. Second, we use the first result and the convexity of $Y$ to show that if a local deviation cannot be deterred with a local punishment, it cannot be deterred with any punishment and hence a fully revealing equilibrium does not exist.

**Step 1:** If local deviations from $\theta \in Y$ cannot be deterred with local actions then by Proposition 1 there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that for every $\delta > 0$ there exist $\theta'_\delta, \theta''_\delta \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y$ such that $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'_\delta) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta'_\delta)$. We show that for that same $\epsilon$, $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$. Suppose that $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \nsubseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$.

Then there exists $\tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y$, such that $b_1 \tilde{\theta} < b_1 \theta$ and $b_2 \tilde{\theta} < b_2 \theta$. Define $\tilde{\delta} = \min\{\frac{|b_1 - \tilde{b}_1|}{|b_1|}, \frac{|b_2 - \tilde{b}_2|}{|b_2|}\}$ and denote $\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta)$ the corresponding $\theta'_\delta$ and $\theta''_\delta$ such that $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')$. But by the definition of $\tilde{\delta}$, $b_1 \tilde{\theta} < b_1 \theta'$ and $b_2 \tilde{\theta} < b_2 \theta'$ and hence $\theta \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \setminus \{H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')\}$ which is a contradiction. See Figure 16.

**Step 2:** Suppose that local deviations from $\theta \in Y$ cannot be deterred with a local punishment. By Step 1 there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$. Define $\theta' \in \arg\min\{b_2 \tilde{\theta} \mid \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{B}(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y\}$ and $\theta'' \in \arg\min\{b_1 \tilde{\theta} \mid \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{B}(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y\}$. Clearly $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta'')$ and hence either $b_1 \theta > b_1 \theta''$ or $b_2 \theta > b_2 \theta'$. Without
loss of generality assume that \( b_1 \theta > b_1 \theta'' \). We show now that the deviation \( \{\theta', \theta''\} \) cannot be deterred in \( Y \). (See Figure [17])

Suppose there exists \( \hat{\theta} \in Y \) such that \( b_1 \hat{\theta} < b_1 \theta'' < b_1 \theta \) and \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \theta' \leq b_2 \theta \). Below we prove that \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \theta \). As a consequence, by the convexity of \( Y \) there exists a \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) such that \( \lambda \hat{\theta} + (1 - \lambda) \theta \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \) and \( b_1 (\lambda \hat{\theta} + (1 - \lambda) \theta) < b_1 \theta \), \( b_2 (\lambda \hat{\theta} + (1 - \lambda) \theta) < b_2 \theta \) which contradicts that \( B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta) \).

To see that \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \theta \), suppose \( b_2 \hat{\theta} = b_2 \theta = b_2 \theta' = \min \{b_2 \tilde{\theta} \mid \tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y\} \) (See Figure [18]). Since local deviations from \( \theta \) cannot be deterred, by Proposition 1 there exists an \( \tilde{\epsilon} > 0 \) such that for any \( \delta > 0 \) there exists \( \theta'_\delta, \theta''_\delta \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \) such that \( B(\theta, \tilde{\epsilon}) \cap Y \subset H(b_1, b_1 \theta''_\delta) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta'_\delta) \). Consider \( \delta < \min \{\epsilon, \frac{|b_2 n_2|}{|b_1|}\} \), where \( n_2 \) is the unit normal vector to \( b_2 \) such that \( b_1 n_2 < 0 \). In particular, since \( \delta < \tilde{\epsilon} \frac{|b_2 n_2|}{|b_1|} \), \( b_2 \theta'_\delta > b_1 (\theta + \tilde{\epsilon} n_2) \) and hence there exists \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) such that \( \mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \theta \in B(\theta, \tilde{\epsilon}) \cap Y \) and \( b_1 \theta''_\delta > b_1 (\mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \theta) \). Moreover, since \( \delta < \epsilon \) and \( b_2 \hat{\theta} = b_2 \theta = b_2 \theta' = \min \{b_2 \tilde{\theta} \mid \tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y\} \), \( b_2 (\mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \theta) \leq b_2 \theta'_\delta \). But this contradicts that \( B(\theta, \tilde{\epsilon}) \cap Y \subset H(b_1, b_1 \theta''_\delta) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta'_\delta) \).
Statement (ii) ⇒ Statement (iii): Trivial.

Statement (iii) ⇒ Statement (i): Suppose there exists \( \bar{\theta}', \bar{\theta}'' \in Y \) such that \( Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}') \). Then \( h(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}') \cap h(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}') \cap Y = \emptyset \) and for \( H \) compact or \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \), there exist 37

\[
\tilde{\theta}' \in \arg \min_y \{ b_1 y \mid y \in Y, b_2 y = b_2 \bar{\theta}' \}
\]

\[
\tilde{\theta}'' \in \arg \min_y \{ b_2 y \mid y \in Y, b_1 y = b_1 \bar{\theta}' \}.
\]

Note that \( H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}''') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') = H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}') \) and hence \( Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}''') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') \). We show that for any \( \lambda \in (0, 1), Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') \) and therefore given \( \bar{\theta}' \), for every \( \delta > 0 \) there exists a \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) such that \( \lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}'' \in B(\bar{\theta}', \delta) \cap Y \) and

\[
Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 (\lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}'')) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'')
\]

and hence a local deviation from \( \bar{\theta}' \) cannot be deterred 38 See Figure 19

Suppose that there exists \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) and \( \hat{\theta} \in Y \) such that \( \hat{\theta} \notin H(b_1, b_1 (\lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}'')) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') \). Since \( \hat{\theta} \in H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') \),

\[
\hat{\theta} \in H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}'')
\]

\[
\hat{\theta} \notin H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}')
\]

\[
\hat{\theta} \notin H(b_1, b_1 (\lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}''))
\]

Moreover since \( \bar{\theta}', \bar{\theta}'' \in Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'), b_2 \bar{\theta}' < b_2 \bar{\theta}'' \) and \( b_1 \bar{\theta}' < b_1 \bar{\theta}'' \).

37 If \( Y \) is compact then the minimum is reached within the set. This is also the case if \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 \) because \( h(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}'') \cap h(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}') \cap Y = \emptyset \) implies that the sets \( Y \cap h(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}') \) and \( Y \cap h(b_1, b_1 \bar{\theta}'') \) are closed, bounded (from below) half-lines and hence they have a minimum. For general \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p \), even if \( Y \cap h(b, b_\theta) \) is closed and bounded from below, it might be the case that the minimum is never reached.

38 Note that for any \( \epsilon > 0, B(\bar{\theta}', \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 (\lambda \bar{\theta}' + (1 - \lambda) \bar{\theta}'')) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \bar{\theta}'') \), and hence local deviations from \( \bar{\theta}' \) cannot be deterred with local punishments.
Putting all the inequalities together we find that

\[ b_2 \hat{\theta} \leq b_2 \tilde{\theta} < b_2 \tilde{\theta}'' \quad \text{(4)} \]
\[ b_1 \tilde{\theta}'' < b_1 \tilde{\theta} < b_1 \tilde{\theta}' \quad \text{(5)} \]

By (4) there exists \( \mu \in (0, 1] \) such that \( b_2(\mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \tilde{\theta}''') = b_2 \tilde{\theta}' \) and by convexity \( \mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \tilde{\theta}'''' \in Y \). But by (5), \( b_1(\mu \hat{\theta} + (1 - \mu) \tilde{\theta}'''') < b_1 \tilde{\theta} < b_1 \tilde{\theta}' \) which contradicts the definition of \( \tilde{\theta}' \).

\[ \square \]

Figure 19: In \( \mathbb{R}^2 \), if a deviation cannot be deterred, there is a local deviation that cannot be deterred with local actions.

**Proof of Proposition 4:**

By Proposition 3 we can restrict attention to the case \( \Theta \equiv Y \).

**Statement (i) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (ii):** Suppose there exists \( \theta \in \overline{Fr}(\theta) \) such that \( n^n_{\Theta}(\theta) \in C(b_1, b_2) \). Then \( Y \subset \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta) \). Moreover, since \( n^n_{\Theta}(\theta) \neq b_1 \) and \( n^n_{\Theta}(\theta) \neq b_2 \), for any \( \delta > 0 \) there exists \( \theta' \in Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \) and \( \theta'' \in Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \) such that \( b_2 \theta' < b_2 \theta \) and \( b_1 \theta'' < b_1 \theta \).

But then \( Y \subset \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta) \subset H(b_1, b_1 \theta''') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta') \) and local deviations from \( \theta \) cannot be deterred, which contradicts (i).

**Statement (ii) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (iii):** Suppose that there exist \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y \) such that \( x \equiv \theta' \wedge_{[b_1,b_2]} \theta'' \neq \Theta \). In particular \( \theta' \wedge_{[b_1,b_2]} \theta'' \neq \Theta \). Without loss of generality assume that \( b_1 x = b_1 \theta''' \) and \( b_2 x = b_2 \theta' \). Consider any \( \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{Fr}(Y) \) that lies in the interior of the triangle formed by \( \tilde{\theta}', \tilde{\theta}'' \) and \( x \). See Figure 20. In particular, since \( Y \) is convex, \( h(n_Y(\tilde{\theta}), n_Y(\tilde{\theta}')) \) is a hyperplane separating \( Y \) from \( x \), and

\[ n_Y(\tilde{\theta})(\theta' - \tilde{\theta}) \geq 0 \quad \text{(6)} \]
\[ n_Y(\tilde{\theta})(\theta'' - \tilde{\theta}) \geq 0 \quad \text{(7)} \]
\[ n_Y(\tilde{\theta})(x - \tilde{\theta}) < 0 \quad \text{(8)} \]

\[ ^{39}\text{Note that } Fr(Y) \text{ has at most a countable number of kinks. Since } Y \text{ is convex, } Fr(Y) \text{ is locally the graph of a concave (convex) function and hence the derivative of this function is monotonic, and it has at most a countable number of jumps.} \]
Moreover, since \( b_1, b_2 \) span \( \mathbb{R}^2 \) there exists \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R} \) such that \( n_Y(\tilde{\theta}) = \alpha b_1 + \beta b_2 \). Substituting this into equations (9), (10), (11), and then subtracting (11) from (9) and (10), we obtain

\[
0 < ab_1(\theta' - x) - \beta b_2(\theta' - x) = ab_1(\theta' - \theta'') \quad (9)
\]

\[
0 < ab_1(\theta'' - x) - \beta b_2(\theta'' - x) = \beta b_2(\theta'' - \theta'), \quad (10)
\]

where the equalities follow by the definition of \( x \). And given that \( b_1\theta' > b_1\theta'' \) and \( b_2\theta' < b_2\theta'', \) (9) and (10) imply \( \alpha > 0 \) and \( \beta > 0 \), respectively. Hence \( n_Y(\tilde{\theta}) \in C(b_1, b_2) \), which contradicts (ii).

**Figure 20:** Relationship between the Local Deterrence Condition and the Min Rule

**Statement (iii) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (i):** Suppose that for all \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y, y \equiv \theta' \land_{[b_1, b_2]} \theta'' \in Y \). By the definition of \( \theta' \land_{[b_1, b_2]} \theta'' \), \( b_1 y \leq b_1\theta'' \) and \( b_2 y \leq b_2\theta' \). Therefore \( y \notin H(b_1, b_1\theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2\theta') \) and it is a punishment for the deviation \((\theta', \theta'')\) for arbitrarily large biases. Moreover as \( \theta' \), \( \theta'' \) converge to a point \( \theta, y = \theta' \land_{[b_1, b_2]} \theta'' \) also converges to \( \theta \) and the equilibrium is robust.

**Proof of Proposition 5:**

**Statement (ii) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (i):** Trivial.

**Statement (i) \( \Rightarrow \) Statement (ii):** We show that (i) implies the LDC of Proposition 4, which is equivalent to (ii). Suppose there exists \( \theta \in \tilde{F}(Y) \) such that \( n_Y(\theta) \in C(b_1, b_2) \). Since \( Y \) is convex \( Y \subseteq \tilde{B}(n_Y(\theta), n_Y(\theta)\theta) \). We can find \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that

\[
B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap \tilde{B}(n_Y(\theta), n_Y(\theta)\theta) \subseteq \tilde{B}(\theta + b_1/2, |b_1|/2) \cup \tilde{B}(\theta + b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \quad (11)
\]

More precisely, if we denote by \( t(\theta) \) a unit normal vector to \( n_Y(\theta) \), any \( 0 < \epsilon \leq \min\{|b_1 t(\theta)|, |b_2 t(\theta)|\}, \sqrt{\frac{|b_1|^2|b_2|^2 - (b_1 \cdot |b_2|)^2}{(b_1 - b_2)^2}} \) will satisfy (11)\footnote{The last number in this minimum corresponds to the length of the common chord of the two balls. It is derived using standard trigonometry.} See Figure 21.
In what follows, we show that \( \tilde{\theta} \) could gain by unilaterally deviating from the agreement. In other words, for any possible non-anonymous rule.

Consider \( \tilde{\theta} \) deviated, the receiver’s response \( y \) would satisfy both \( b_1 y \leq b_1 \tilde{\theta} \) and \( b_2 y \leq b_2 \tilde{\theta} \), so it would follow that \( y = y \land (b_1, b_2) \tilde{\theta} \). But then any policy inducible by a deviating sender in the FRE supported by an (arbitrary) anonymous rule would also be inducible in the FRE supported by the Min Rule. The proof that follows allows for the possibility that the receiver uses a non-anonymous rule.

Moreover, for any \( \delta > 0 \),

\[
B(\theta - b_1/2, |b_1|/2) \cap Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \neq \emptyset \\
B(\theta - b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \cap Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \neq \emptyset
\]

Consider \( \tilde{\epsilon} = \min[\epsilon, |b_1|/2, |b_2|/2] \). Then for any \( \delta > 0 \) consider \( \theta' \) an arbitrary element of \( B(\theta - b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \cap Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \) and \( \tilde{\theta}' \) an arbitrary element of \( B(\theta - b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \cap Y \cap B(\theta, \delta) \).

In what follows, we show that \( B(\theta, \tilde{\epsilon}) \cap Y \subset B(\theta'' + b_1, |b_1|) \cup B(\theta' + b_2, |b_2|) \) and hence local deviations from \( \theta \) cannot be deterred locally.

Consider \( \tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \tilde{\epsilon}) \cap Y \), then since \( \tilde{\epsilon} \leq \epsilon \), \( \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{B}(\theta + b_1/2, |b_1|/2) \cup \overline{B}(\theta + b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \).

Suppose \( \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{B}(\theta + b_1/2, |b_1|/2) \), then

\[
|\tilde{\theta} - (\theta'' + b_1)| \leq |\tilde{\theta} - \left(\theta + \frac{b_1}{2}\right)| + |\theta - \frac{b_1}{2} - \theta''| < \frac{|b_1|}{2} + \frac{|b_1|}{2} = |b_1|
\]

which implies that \( \tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta'' + b_1, |b_1|) \). The case \( \tilde{\theta} \in \overline{B}(\theta + b_2/2, |b_2|/2) \) is analogous. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 6**: 

Proposition 6 would be simple to prove if the receiver always used an anonymous rule. In that case, for any deviation from the collusive agreement \( \tilde{\theta} \), no matter which sender deviated, the receiver’s response \( y \) would satisfy both \( b_1 y \leq b_1 \tilde{\theta} \) and \( b_2 y \leq b_2 \tilde{\theta} \), so it would follow that \( y = y \land (b_1, b_2) \tilde{\theta} \). But then any policy inducible by a deviating sender in the FRE supported by an (arbitrary) anonymous rule would also be inducible in the FRE supported by the Min Rule. The proof that follows allows for the possibility that the receiver uses a non-anonymous rule.

If the FRE supported by the Min Rule is not collusion-proof, there exists a state \( \theta \) and a collusive agreement \( \tilde{\theta} \) (weakly preferred by both senders to \( \theta \)), such that neither sender could gain by unilaterally deviating from the agreement. In other words, for any possible deviation \( \tilde{\theta} \neq \tilde{\theta} \), both senders weakly prefer \( \tilde{\theta} \) to \( \tilde{\theta} \land (b_1, b_2) \tilde{\theta} \) in state \( \theta \).

Consider a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases but supported by a strategy for the receiver that is different from the Min Rule. We show that for the same state \( \theta \), the same collusive agreement \( \tilde{\theta} \) is self-enforcing. Figure 22 illustrates the argument. We
proceed by contradiction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that sender $S_1$ can deviate from the agreement and induce a policy $y$ that he prefers to $\hat{\theta}$, that is, a policy $y \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \cap Y$. Since $\hat{\theta}$ is weakly preferred to $\theta$ by $S_1$, $|\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}| \leq |b_1|$, and for any point $z \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$, $b_1 \theta < b_1 z$. In particular, $b_1 \theta < b_1 y$. Moreover, since the FRE is independent of the magnitudes of the biases, any policy $y$ that $S_1$ can induce by deviating from $\hat{\theta}$ must satisfy $b_1 y \leq b_1 \hat{\theta}$. Therefore,

$$b_1 \theta < b_1 y \leq b_1 \hat{\theta}.$$  

(12)

Consider now the policy $y' \equiv y \land \hat{\theta} \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$, then $y' \in B(\theta + b_2, |\theta + b_2 - \hat{\theta}|)$. We consider the following two cases and show that each of them leads to a contradiction.

**CASE 1:** $y' \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$. In this case $S_1$, in the FRE supported by the Min Rule, could have profitably deviated from the collusive agreement $\theta$ by reporting $y$ and thus inducing $y'$. This contradicts the hypothesis.

**CASE 2:** $y' \notin B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$. The rest of the proof shows that in this case, in the FRE supported by the Min Rule, sender $S_2$ could have profitably deviated from the collusive agreement $\theta$ by reporting $y$ and thus inducing $y'$, again contradicting the hypothesis.

The first step is to note that $y' \notin B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$ implies that $b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 y$, since otherwise we would have $y \land \hat{(b_1,b_2)} \hat{\theta} = y \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|)$, and hence, in the FRE supported by the Min Rule, $S_1$ could have profitably deviated from the collusive agreement $\hat{\theta}$ by reporting $y$.

Now $b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 y$ implies that $b_2 y' = b_2 (y \land \hat{(b_1,b_2)} \hat{\theta}) = b_2 \hat{\theta}$, so $y' \in h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta})$. Moreover, given that $\hat{\theta}$ is also weakly preferred to $\theta$ by $S_2$, it must be that $b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \hat{\theta}$.

Now denote by $x$ the projection of $\theta$ onto $h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta})$. Our goal is to prove that $y'$ lies in between $\hat{\theta}$ and $x$ on $h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta})$. From this it will follow, since $x$ is the point that, in state $\theta$, $S_2$ prefers out of all the points in $h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta})$, that $S_2$ prefers $y'$ to $\hat{\theta}$.
Let \( \hat{\theta} \) denote the point in \( \hat{B}(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \) with the lowest inner product with \( b_1 \), i.e. \( \hat{\theta} = \theta + (1 - |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) b_1 \). We now show, by contradiction, that \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \hat{\theta} \). If it were the case that \( b_2 \hat{\theta} \leq b_2 \hat{\theta} \), then the point \( \hat{\theta} = \arg \min \{ b_1 y | y \in \hat{B}(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \} \) would satisfy \( b_2 \hat{\theta} = b_2 \hat{\theta} \). In other words, for the policy space \( \hat{Y} \equiv \hat{B}(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \cap \hat{A}(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta}) \), there would exist a FRE that was independent of the magnitudes of the biases, in which any incompatible reports were punished by \( \hat{\theta} \). But Proposition \( 4 \) would then imply that for the policy space \( \hat{Y} \), the Min Rule would always be feasible. In particular, since \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 y \), \( y \in \hat{Y} \), so it would follow that \( y' = y \land_{b_1, b_2} \hat{\theta} \in \hat{Y} \). Furthermore, since \( b_2 y' = b_2 \hat{\theta} \) and \( b_1 \hat{\theta} < b_1 y = b_1 y' \), we would in fact have that \( y' \in B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \cap h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta}) \subset B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \). But this would contradict the hypothesis in Case 2. Hence \( b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \hat{\theta} \).

Summing up, we have the following inequalities:

\[
\text{(13)} \quad b_2 \theta < b_2 \hat{\theta} < b_2 \hat{\theta}.
\]

Note that by the definition of \( \hat{\theta} \) and \( \hat{\theta} \) we had

\[
\text{(14)} \quad b_1 \theta < b_1 \hat{\theta} < b_1 \hat{\theta}.
\]

In particular, \( h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta}) \) has to intersect the segment \([\theta, \hat{\theta}]\) at some interior point \( x' \), and \( x \) (the projection of \( \theta \) onto \( h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta}) \)) must satisfy \( b_1 x < b_1 x' < b_1 (\theta \land_{b_1, b_2} \hat{\theta}) \leq b_1 y' \leq b_1 \hat{\theta} \). From this it follows that \( y' \in [x, \hat{\theta}] \) (see Figure \( 22 \)). Finally, since in state \( \theta \), \( x \) is \( S_2 \)'s preferred point on \( h(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta}) \), the quasi-concavity of preferences implies that \( S_2 \) prefers \( y' \) to \( \hat{\theta} \). But then, in the FRE supported by the Min Rule, in state \( \theta \) \( S_2 \) could have profitably deviated from the collusive agreement \( \hat{\theta} \), by reporting \( y \) and thus inducing \( y' \). This contradicts our hypothesis.

Since we have shown that both Case 1 and Case 2 lead to a contradiction, the proof is concluded.

**Proof of Proposition \( 7 \):**

We introduce some notation that will be used in the proof. Given a close convex set \( S \subset \mathbb{R}^2 \) and a point \( \hat{\theta} \in Fr(S) \), we denote by \( t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \), \( t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \) the two unit tangent vectors to \( S \) at \( \hat{\theta} \) such that \( C[t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta}, t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta}] \) is the smallest cone with vertex \( \hat{\theta} \) that contains \( S \), i.e.,

\[
(i) \quad S \subseteq \{ y = \hat{\theta} + v | v \in C[t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta}, t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta}] \}
\]

\[
(ii) \quad \text{for any cone C such that } S \subseteq \{ y = \hat{\theta} + v | v \in C \} \text{ we have that } C[t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta}, t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta}] \subseteq C
\]

Note that if \( \hat{\theta} \) is a smooth point of \( S \) then \( t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta} = -t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta} \), but this is not the case if \( \hat{\theta} \) is a kink point. Given \( t_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta}, t_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta} \) an alternative definition of the polar cone to \( S \) at \( \hat{\theta} \) is:

\[
PC_S(\hat{\theta}) \equiv \{ n \in \mathbb{R}^2 | nt_{\hat{\theta}}^+ \hat{\theta} \leq 0, nt_{\hat{\theta}}^- \hat{\theta} \leq 0 \}.
\]

Before presenting the proof of the Proposition, we prove two claims about \( PC_S(\hat{\theta}) \) that will be used in the proof. Claim 1 states that given a convex set \( S \) and a point in the frontier
\( \hat{\theta} \), the closest point in \( S \) to any point in the set \( X \equiv \{ x = \hat{\theta} + n \mid n \in PC_S(\hat{\theta}) \} \) is \( \hat{\theta} \) itself.

**Claim 1:** Given a convex set \( S \) and a point \( \hat{\theta} \in Fr(S) \), then for all \( x = \hat{\theta} + n \) where \( n \in PC_S(\hat{\theta}), n \neq 0 \), we have that,

\[
\hat{\theta} = \arg \min_{\theta \in S} |\theta - x|
\]

**Proof of Claim 1:** Consider \( x = \hat{\theta} + n \) with \( n \in PC_S(\hat{\theta}) \) and any point \( \theta \in S \). Define by \( y \) the projection of \( \theta - \hat{\theta} \) on to the line with direction \( n \) passing through \( \hat{\theta} \). Since \( n \in PC_S(\hat{\theta}), n(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \leq 0 \) and hence \( y \) and \( x \) lie in the same line on opposite sides of \( \hat{\theta} \). Therefore by Pythagoras theorem:

\[
|\theta - x|^2 = |\theta - y|^2 + |y - x|^2 > |\theta - y|^2 > |\theta - x|^2
\]

**Claim 2:** Given a convex set \( S \subset \mathbb{R}^2 \) and a point \( \hat{\theta} \in Fr(S) \), if \( b \in int(PC_S(\hat{\theta})) \), then there exists \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that for all \( \theta \in B(\hat{\theta}, \epsilon), \theta + n - \hat{\theta} \in int(PC_S(\hat{\theta})) \).

**Proof of Claim 2:** For \( b \in int(PC_S(\hat{\theta})) \), \( bt^*_{S}(\hat{\theta}) < 0 \) and \( bt_{S}(\hat{\theta}) < 0 \) by (15). Define \( \epsilon = \min(-bt^*_{S}(\hat{\theta}), -bt_{S}(\hat{\theta})) > 0 \). Consider \( \theta \in B(\hat{\theta}, \epsilon) \), then \( (\theta + b - \hat{\theta})t^*_{S}(\hat{\theta}) = (\theta - \hat{\theta})t^*_{S}(\hat{\theta}) + bt^*_{S}(\hat{\theta}) < \epsilon - \epsilon = 0 \). Analogously, \( (\theta + b - \hat{\theta})t_{S}(\hat{\theta}) < 0 \) and hence by (15)

\[
\theta + b - \hat{\theta} \in int(PC_S(\hat{\theta})).
\]

We start now with the proof of Proposition 7. We first show that both conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary for collusive-proofness.

**CP \Rightarrow Statements (i):** Suppose there exists a \( \hat{\theta} \in \bar{Fr}(Y) \) and \( t_{Y}^{\hat{\theta}} \in T_{Y}(\hat{\theta}) \) such that \( b_{1}, b_{2} \in C(n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}), t_{Y}(\hat{\theta})) \). Suppose that \( b_{2} \in C(b_{1}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \). The opposite case in which \( b_{1} \in C(b_{2}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \) is symmetric. Since \( Y \) has non-empty interior and \( b_{1} \in C(n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}), t_{Y}(\hat{\theta})) \), there exists \( \epsilon_{1} > 0 \) such that for all \( 0 < \epsilon < \epsilon_{1}, \hat{\theta} - \epsilon b_{1} \in Y \). Moreover, since \( b_{2} \in C(b_{1}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \), \( b_{2} = \alpha b_{1} + \beta n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) \) with \( \alpha > 0, \beta > 0 \). Therefore there exists \( \epsilon_{2} > 0 \) such that for all \( 0 < \epsilon < \epsilon_{2}, b_{2} - \epsilon b_{1} = (\alpha - \epsilon)b_{1} + \beta n_{Y}(\hat{\theta}) \in C(b_{1}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \). Define \( \hat{\epsilon} = \min(\epsilon_{1}, \epsilon_{2}, 1) \) and \( \theta = \hat{\theta} - \hat{\epsilon} b_{1} \). Since \( \hat{\epsilon} \leq \epsilon_{1}, \theta \in Y \). We now show that at \( \theta \) the senders can collude at \( \hat{\theta} \).

Denote by \( S \) the punishment region if both senders report \( \hat{\theta} \), i.e., \( S \) is the set of policies that a sender deviating from the collusive report \( \hat{\theta} \) could induce, given that the receiver uses the Min Rule. Since \( b_{2} \in C(b_{1}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \), for all \( \gamma \in Y \) such that \( b_{1} \gamma \leq b_{1} \hat{\theta} \),

\[
b_{2} \gamma = (\alpha b_{1} + \beta n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})) \gamma = \alpha b_{1} \gamma + \beta n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) \gamma \leq \alpha b_{1} \hat{\theta} + \beta n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) \hat{\theta} = b_{2} \hat{\theta}
\]

where the last inequality uses the facts that \( b_{1} \gamma \leq b_{1} \hat{\theta} \) and that by the definition of \( n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) \), \( n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) (\gamma - \hat{\theta}) \leq 0 \). Therefore the punishment region can be written as \( S = Y \setminus H(b_{1}, b_{1} \hat{\theta}) \) and \( PC_{S}(\hat{\theta}) = C[b_{1}, n_{Y}^{Out}(\hat{\theta})] \). Note that in particular \( \theta \in S \) and hence either sender could
induce \( \theta \) if he preferred it to \( \hat{\theta} \). Now,

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta} &= (1 - \bar{\epsilon})b_1 \in PC_{\mathcal{S}}(\hat{\theta}) \\
\theta + b_2 - \hat{\theta} &= b_2 - \bar{\epsilon}b_1 \in PC_{\mathcal{S}}(\hat{\theta})
\end{align*}
\]

hence, by Claim 1, \( \hat{\theta} \) is the closest point to both \( \theta + b_1 \) and \( \theta + b_2 \) in \( \mathcal{S} \) and neither of the senders would benefit by deviating from \( \hat{\theta} \). See Figure 23.

**Figure 23:** When \( b_1, b_2 \in C(n_{\mathcal{Y}}^\text{out}(\hat{\theta}), t_Y(\hat{\theta})) \) we can find a \( \theta \in \mathcal{Y} \) such that both senders would like to collude at \( \hat{\theta} \) and neither of the senders have an incentive to deviate from the collusive report.

\[
CP \Rightarrow \text{Statements (ii):}
\]

Suppose now that there exists \( \hat{\theta} \in Fr(\mathcal{Y}) \) such that \( b_1, b_2 \in \text{int}(PC_{\mathcal{Y}}(\hat{\theta})) \). By Claim 2, there exists \( \epsilon_i > 0, i \in \{1, 2\} \), such that for all \( \theta \in B(\hat{\theta}, \epsilon_i) \), \( \theta + b_i - \hat{\theta} \in \text{int}(PC_{\mathcal{Y}}(\hat{\theta})) \). Define \( \epsilon = \min\{\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2\} \), since \( \mathcal{Y} \) has non-empty interior, there exists \( \theta \in B(\hat{\theta}, \epsilon) \cap \mathcal{Y} \) with \( \theta \neq \hat{\theta} \). Then \( \theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}, \theta + b_2 - \hat{\theta} \in \text{int}(PC_{\mathcal{Y}}(\hat{\theta})) \) and hence by Claim 1, \( \hat{\theta} \) is the closest point in \( \mathcal{Y} \) to both \( \theta + b_1 \) and \( \theta + b_2 \). Therefore at \( \theta \) both senders want to collude to \( \hat{\theta} \) and neither sender has an incentive to deviate from the collusive report.

**Figure 24:** If \( b_1, b_2 \in PC_{\mathcal{Y}}(\hat{\theta}) \), we can find \( \theta \) such that both senders would like to collude at \( \hat{\theta} \) and neither sender has an incentive to deviate from the collusive report.

We prove now the other implication, i.e. that conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient for collusion-proofness:

**Statements (i) and (ii) \( \Rightarrow CP \):** Suppose that the FRE supported by the Min Rule is not collusion-proof for some magnitudes of the biases \( t_1 = |b_1|, t_2 = |b_2| \). Then there exists
\( \theta, \hat{\theta} \in Y \) such that:

\[
(a) \quad \hat{\theta} \in B(\theta + b_1, |b_1|) \cap B(\theta + b_2, |b_2|)
\]

(b) For all \( \hat{\theta} \in Y \) with \( b_1 \hat{\theta} \leq b_1 \hat{\theta} \), and \( b_2 \hat{\theta} \leq b_2 \hat{\theta} \), then

\[
\hat{\theta} \notin B(\theta + b_1, |\theta + b_1 - \hat{\theta}|) \cup B(\theta + b_2, |\theta + b_2 - \hat{\theta}|)
\]

Condition (a) states that in state \( \theta \), both senders prefer the policy \( \hat{\theta} \) to \( \theta \). Condition (b) states that in state \( \theta \), neither sender can gain by deviating from the collusive report \( \hat{\theta} \), given that the receiver will respond to a deviation using the Min Rule; the receiver’s use of the Min Rule restricts a deviating sender to inducing only policies \( \hat{\theta} \) such that \( b_1 \hat{\theta} \leq b_1 \hat{\theta} \), and \( b_2 \hat{\theta} \leq b_2 \hat{\theta} \).

Condition (a) can be rewritten as

\[
\theta \in Y \cap B(\theta - b_1, |b_1|) \cap B(\hat{\theta} - b_2, |b_2|)
\]

Note that \( Y \cap B(\hat{\theta} - b_1, |b_1|) \cap B(\hat{\theta} - b_2, |b_2|) \subseteq Y \setminus (H(b_1, b_1 \hat{\theta}) \cup H(b_2, b_2 \hat{\theta})) \). Hence, denoting by \( n_1 \) and \( n_2 \) the unit normal vector to \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) respectively such that \( n_1 b_2 < 0 \), \( n_2 b_1 < 0 \), condition (a) implies that \( \theta - \hat{\theta} \in C[n_1, n_2] \). In particular

\[
\text{either} \quad n_1(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \quad \text{or} \quad n_2(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0. \tag{16}
\]

Consider \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) such that \( n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \). Then condition (b) implies that for any \( 0 < \epsilon \leq n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \), \( \hat{\theta} + \epsilon n_i \) is not feasible; if there were an \( \epsilon \) with \( 0 < \epsilon \leq n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \) such that \( \hat{\theta} = \hat{\theta} + \epsilon n_i \in Y \), we would have that \( b_i \hat{\theta} = b_i \hat{\theta} \), \( b_j \hat{\theta} < b_j \hat{\theta} \) (since \( n_i b_j < 0 \)) and \( |\theta + b_i - \hat{\theta}| < |\theta + b_j - \hat{\theta}| \). To see this last inequality, note that \( \theta + b_i \) lies on the orthogonal line to \( \hat{\theta} - \hat{\theta} \) passing through \( \theta \). Denote by \( y \) the intersection between the line passing by \( \hat{\theta} \) and \( \hat{\theta} \) and the orthogonal line passing by \( \theta \) and \( \theta + b_i \). The distance between \( \hat{\theta} \) and \( y \) is \( n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) - \epsilon \), whereas the distance between \( \hat{\theta} \) and \( y \) is \( n_i(\hat{\theta} - \hat{\theta}) = \epsilon \). By Pythagoras,

\[
|\theta + b_i - \hat{\theta}|^2 = |\theta + b_i - y|^2 + (n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) - \epsilon)^2 < |\theta + b_i - y|^2 + n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta})^2 = |\theta + b_i - \hat{\theta}|^2.
\]

Therefore sender \( S_i \) would be able to induce \( \hat{\theta} \) given the receiver use of the Min Rule, and he would gain by deviating from \( \hat{\theta} \) to \( \hat{\theta} \). See Figure (25).

**Figure 25:** If the collusive report \( \hat{\theta} \) is in the interior of \( Y \), at least one sender (in this case \( S_1 \)) has an incentive to deviate from it.

Hence a necessary condition for \( \hat{\theta} \) to be a collusive report given \( \theta \) is that for any \( i \in \)
\[ \text{if } n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \text{ then } \hat{\theta} + \epsilon n_i \notin Y, \text{ for any } 0 < \epsilon \leq n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \] (17)

In other words, the ray departing from \( \hat{\theta} \) in the direction of \( n_i \) cannot be feasible. In particular, \( \hat{\theta} \) has to be in the frontier of \( Y \).

Consider \( n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \), (recall that by (16) we know that there exists such \( i \)), then (17) implies that one and only one of the tangent vectors \( t_i^1(\hat{\theta}) \) and \( t_i^2(\hat{\theta}) \) belongs to \( C(\theta - \hat{\theta}, n_i) \). Denote such tangent vector by \( t_i^1(\hat{\theta}) \), and the outward\(^{41} \) normal vector to \( t_i^1(\hat{\theta}) \) by \( n_i^1(\hat{\theta}) \) (See Figure 26). Then,

\[ n_i \in C(t_i^1(\hat{\theta}), n_i^1(\hat{\theta})). \] (18)

\[ \begin{array}{ll}
(a) & \text{If } n_1(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \text{ and } n_2(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0, \text{ then } \hat{\theta} \text{ is a kink point and } b_1, b_2 \in \text{int}(PC_Y(\hat{\theta})). \\
(b) & \text{If } n_1(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \text{ and } n_2(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \leq 0, \text{ then } b_1, b_2 \in C(t_i^1(\hat{\theta}), n_i^1(\hat{\theta})). 
\end{array} \]

**Figure 26**

Suppose that \( n_j(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \) for \( j \neq i \). Then, following the same argument as above, the ray departing from \( \hat{\theta} \) in the direction of \( n_j \) cannot be feasible and \( \hat{\theta} \) has to be a kink point (See Figure 26a). Denoting by \( t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \in \{ t_i^1(\hat{\theta}), t_i^2(\hat{\theta}) \} \setminus t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \), the remaining tangent vector, it has to be that \( t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \in C(\theta - \hat{\theta}, n_j) \), and denoting by \( n_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \) its normal outward vector, we have that \( n_j \in C(t_i^j(\hat{\theta}), n_i^j(\hat{\theta})) \). This together with (18) implies that \( b_1, b_2 \in C(n_i^j(\hat{\theta}), n_i^j(\hat{\theta})) \). But \( C(n_i^j(\hat{\theta}), n_i^j(\hat{\theta})) \equiv \text{int}(PC_Y(\hat{\theta})) \), hence \( b_1, b_2 \in \text{int}(PC_Y(\hat{\theta})) \) which contradicts condition (ii) of the proposition.

Lastly, suppose that \( n_j(\theta - \hat{\theta}) \leq 0 \) while \( n_i(\theta - \hat{\theta}) > 0 \). This together with (18) implies that

\[ b_1, b_2 \in C(n_i^j(\hat{\theta}), -t_i^j(\hat{\theta})). \] (19)

If \( \hat{\theta} \) is a smooth point then \( n_i^j(\hat{\theta}) = n_i^{Out}(\hat{\theta}) \) and \( -t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) = t_Y(\hat{\theta}) \). Hence, condition (i) of the proposition is violated (See Figure 26b). If \( \hat{\theta} \) is a kink point, suppose first that \( b_2 \) and \( -t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \) are linearly independent, then by moving along the frontier in the direction of \( t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \), there exists a smooth point \( \tilde{\theta} \) sufficiently close to \( \hat{\theta} \) such that \( t_Y(\tilde{\theta}) \in C(b_2, -t_i^j(\hat{\theta})) \) and hence \( b_1, b_2 \in C(n_Y^{Out}(\tilde{\theta}), t_Y(\tilde{\theta})) \) and condition (i) of the proposition is violated. If \( b_2 \) has the same direction as \( -t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \), then it has to be that \( n_j(\theta - \hat{\theta}) = 0 \). Consider \( \tilde{\theta} = \hat{\theta} + \epsilon n_j \) for

---

\(^{41}\)By **outward** we refer to the normal vector to \( t_i^j(\hat{\theta}) \) that exits from \( Y \).
0 < \epsilon < \hat{\theta} - \theta, \ \hat{\theta} \text{ is a smooth point in the frontier and } n^\text{Out}_Y(\hat{\theta}) = n^*_Y(\hat{\theta}), \ t_Y(\hat{\theta}) = -t^*_Y(\hat{\theta}). \ 
Hence b_1, b_2 \in C(n^\text{Out}_Y(\hat{\theta}), t_Y(\hat{\theta})] \text{ which contradicts condition (i) of the proposition.} \ \square

**Proof of Proposition 8:**
Throughout the paper, \( Y \) is assumed to be closed, but since the projection of a closed set onto a plane is not necessarily closed, \( Y_b \) is not necessarily closed. Nevertheless, Proposition 1(i) holds independently of whether or not the policy space contains its frontier. Moreover, the condition for robustness (Condition (2) in Proposition 1) is trivially satisfied for interior points. Consequently, the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) in Proposition 8 also holds independently of whether or not the policy space contains its frontier. (In Proposition 3, the assumption that the policy space is closed is relevant only for statement (iii)).

Given these observations, to prove Proposition 8 it suffices to show that for \( Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^p \), a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases exists if and only if, for the two-dimensional policy space \( Y_b \), a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases exists, where now the biases are regarded as two-dimensional vectors in \( \Pi_b \).

Given an arbitrary \( \theta \in \mathbb{R}^p \), denote by \( \theta_b \) the projection of \( \theta \) onto the plane \( \Pi_b \) and by \( x_b \) an arbitrary element of \( \Pi_b \). Define \( H_b(b, b\theta_b) = \{ x_b \in \Pi_b \mid b x_b > b\theta_b \} \). Then

\[ \hat{\theta} \in H(b, b\theta) \iff b\hat{\theta} > b\theta \iff b\hat{\theta}_b > b\theta_b \iff \hat{\theta}_b \in H_b(b, b\theta_b). \] (20)

Given Proposition 1(i), there exists a FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases in \((Y, Y)\) if and only if for any \( \theta', \theta'' \in Y \not\subseteq H_b(b_1, b_1\theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2\theta') \). By (20) this is equivalent to the statement that for any \( \theta'_b, \theta''_b \in Y_b \), \( Y_b \not\subseteq H_b(b_1, b_1\theta'_b) \cup H_b(b_2, b_2\theta''_b) \) which, given Proposition 1(i), is equivalent to the existence of a FRE independent of the magnitudes of the biases in \((Y_b, Y_b)\). \ \square

**Proof of Proposition 9:**
In order to guide the reader through the proof we have subdivided the argument into several subsections. To save on notation we denote by FREIMB a FRE that is independent of the magnitudes of the biases. We define the following two concepts:

**Definition 7.** The frontier is **locally non-convex at** \( \theta \) if for all \( \epsilon > 0 \), there exist \( \theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Fr(Y) \) such that there exists \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \), \( \lambda \theta' + (1 - \lambda) \theta'' \not\in Y. \)

**Definition 8.** Given biases \( b_1, b_2 \), a point \( \theta \in Fr(Y) \) is **bad kink** if there exists \( \tau > 0 \) such that

\[ Y \cap B(\theta, \tau) = (\overline{H}(b_1, b_1\theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2\theta)) \cap B(\theta, \tau) \]

In other words, a bad kink point is a kink point at which the frontier is locally non-convex and such that the frontier is linear on both sides of the kink point with the inward normal vectors coinciding with the biases. See Figure 27 for an illustration.
1: GDC$\Rightarrow$∃ Robust FREIMB. For this implication we proceed in three steps. In Step 1.1 we show that GDC implies condition (1) of Proposition\(^1\) which is equivalent to the existence of a FREIMB in pure strategies. In Step 1.2 we show that if there are not bad kinks, LDC implies condition (2) Proposition\(^1\) and therefore together with Step 1.1 they guarantee the existence of a robust FREIMB in pure strategies (Proposition\(^1\)-(iii)). Lastly in Step 1.3 we show that when both GDC and LDC hold but there are bad kinks we can construct a robust FREIMB in mixed strategies.

Step 1.1: GDC$\Rightarrow$ Prop\(^1\)(1). We show that GDC implies Proposition\(^1\)(i). Suppose there exist $\theta', \theta'' \in Y$ such that $Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1\theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2\theta')$. Since $Y$ is compact, consider $\tilde{\theta} \in \arg \min \{b_2y \mid y \in Y\}$ and $\tilde{\theta}' \in \arg \min \{b_1y \mid y \in Y\}$.

By Proposition 1-(iii), GDC implies condition (1) of Proposition\(^1\) which is equivalent to the existence of a FREIMB in pure strategies. In Step 1.2 we show that if there are not bad kinks, LDC implies condition (2) Proposition\(^1\) and therefore together with Step 1.1 they guarantee the existence of a robust FREIMB in pure strategies (Proposition\(^1\)-(iii)). Lastly in Step 1.3 we show that when both GDC and LDC hold but there are bad kinks we can construct a robust FREIMB in mixed strategies.
local deviations can be deterred locally if the receiver mixes between two actions.

Figure 27: The point $\theta$ is a non-convex kink such that the frontier is linear on the two sides of $\theta$, and the inward normal vectors to the frontier coincide with $b_1, b_2$. A local deviation from $\theta$ cannot be deterred by a pure strategy from the receiver. However, the receiver can deter deviations by locally mixing between $y'$ and $y''$ with equal probability. This can be rationalised by the receiver’s belief allocating equal mass to $x'$ and $x''$, so that the expected belief is $\hat{\bar{\theta}}$.

We need to define the receiver’s belief given any report $(\theta', \theta'')$ and a best response (that will involve mixing) given those beliefs that would deter deviations from the senders.

In order to define the receiver’s belief, denote by $\beta$ half of the outside angle of $Fr(Y)$ at $\theta'$. Define $\bar{\delta} = \tau \cos^3(\beta) \sin(\beta)$. For any $\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \bar{\delta})$ define $\hat{\bar{\theta}}(\theta', \theta'') = \theta + \frac{B}{\cos^2(\beta) \sin(\beta)} \max(|\theta' - \theta|, |\theta'' - \theta|)$ where $B$ is the unit bisector vector to $\{-b_1, -b_2\}$. Lastly, define $x'(\theta', \theta'')$, $x''(\theta', \theta'')$ the points in the frontier that are at a distance $\frac{|\hat{\bar{\theta}}(\theta', \theta'') - \theta|}{\cos(\beta)}$ to $\theta'$.

Figure 27 illustrates $\bar{\delta}$ and $\hat{\bar{\theta}}$, $x'$, $x''$ for given $(\theta', \theta'')$. The idea is that given $\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \bar{\delta})$, the receiver’s belief allocates equal probability to $x'(\theta', \theta'')$, $x''(\theta', \theta'')$, and hence the expected belief is $\hat{\bar{\theta}}(\theta', \theta'')$, that lies on the bisector line that is equidistant to the two sides of the frontier. Given such a belief, the receiver is indifferent between the policies $y'(\theta', \theta'')$ and $y''(\theta', \theta'')$, the projections of $\hat{\bar{\theta}}(\theta', \theta'')$ onto the two sides of the frontier, and can mix between them.

Formally, we define the receiver’s beliefs as follows. If $\theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta'' \in Y$ the receiver allocates mass one to $\theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta''$. If $\theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta'' \notin Y$ but $\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \bar{\delta})$, the receiver allocates equal probability to $x'(\theta', \theta'')$, $x''(\theta', \theta'')$. Finally, in the remaining cases, the receiver allocates mass one to $y \in \arg\min_{y \in Y} b_1y \land \arg\min_{y \in Y} b_2y$ (which is non empty since GDC holds).

Given those beliefs the receiver optimally responds with the mixed strategy:

$$\sigma^R(\theta', \theta'') = \begin{cases} 
\theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta'' & \text{with prob } 1 \text{ if } \theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta'' \in Y \\
y' \text{ with prob } \frac{1}{2}, y'' \text{ with prob } \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } \theta' \land_{b_1, b_2} \theta'' \notin Y, \theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \bar{\delta}) \\
\text{otherwise} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

\footnote{The formula for such an angle is given by $\beta = 90^\circ - \frac{1}{2} \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{b_2}{\|b_1, b_2\|}\right)$. Note that $0 < \beta < 90^\circ$ and hence $\cos(\beta) > 0$.}

\footnote{The definition of $\bar{\delta}$ ensures that the points $x'(\theta', \theta''), x''(\theta', \theta'')$ belong to $Fr(Y) \cap B(\theta, r)$.}
In order to prove that this response supports a FRE, note that $y$ is the worst policy for both senders and hence large deviations are always deterred. Moreover, local deviations can be deterred locally since for any $\epsilon > 0$ with $\epsilon < \tau$, there exists $\delta = \cos^3(\beta) \sin(\beta) < \tilde{\delta}$, such that for any $\theta', \theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta)$, either $\theta' \wedge h_{b_1} \theta'' \in Y$ (and $\theta' \wedge h_{b_1} \theta'' \in B(\theta, \epsilon)$) or, $\theta' \wedge h_{b_1} \theta'' \notin Y$ and the receiver responds by mixing with equal probability between $y'(\theta', \theta'')$ and $y''(\theta', \theta'')$. We show now, that such response from the receiver deters deviations from both senders. For simplicity we drop the arguments of $y'$ and $y''$ below. Sender $S_1$ has no incentive to deviate if:

$$\frac{1}{2}(y' - (\theta'' + b_1))^2 + \frac{1}{2}(y'' - (\theta'' + b_1))^2 \geq b_1^2$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{2}(y' - \theta'')^2 + \frac{1}{2}(y'' - \theta'')^2 \geq \frac{1}{2}b_1(\frac{\theta' + \theta''}{2} - \theta'')$$

But $b_1(\frac{\theta' + \theta''}{2} - \theta'') \leq 0$ by construction, and hence this inequality is always satisfied. The argument for Sender $S_2$ is symmetric. Moreover it is straightforward to see that such punishments are robust. We have therefore constructed a Robust FREIMB in mixed strategies.

This concludes part 1 of the proof that shows that $GDC$ and $LDC$ are sufficient for the existence of a robust FREIMB.

2: $\exists$ Robust FREIMB $\Rightarrow$ GDC+LDC. For this implication we proceed again in three steps. In Step 2.1 we show that if the GDC is not satisfied, then it is not possible to construct a FREIMB (in mixed or pure strategies). In Step 2.2 we show that if there exists a robust FREIMB in pure strategies then LDC is satisfied. Lastly, in Step 2.3 we show that if the GDC is satisfied but the LDC fails, then it is not possible to support a robust FREIMB unless the section of the non-convex part of the frontier where the LDC is violated forms part of a circumference.

Step 2.1: $\exists$ FREIMB $\Rightarrow$ GDC. Suppose that the GDC is violated. Since $co(Y)$ is convex, by Proposition[4] there is not a FREIMB in the environment $(\Theta, co(Y))$. Given that $co(Y)$ is compact, define $Y_1 = \arg \min_{\theta \in co(Y)} b_1 \theta$ and $Y_2 \in \arg \min_{\theta \in co(Y)} b_2 \theta$. Since there is not a FREIMB in $co(Y)$, it has to be the case that $Y_1 \cap Y_2 = \emptyset$. Moreover, by the definition of $co(Y)$ it has to be the case that $Y_1 \cap Y \neq \emptyset$. Consider $\theta' \in Y_1 \cap Y$ and $\theta'' \in Y_2 \cap Y$. Clearly $\theta' \neq \theta''$ and any mixing in $Y$ by the receiver is strictly preferred by at least one of the senders to either $\theta'$ or $\theta''$ and hence the receiver cannot deter the deviation $\{\theta', \theta''\}$ even if he mixes.

Step 2.2: $\exists$ Robust FREIMB in pure strategies $\Rightarrow$ LDC. By Proposition[3] if there exists a robust FREIMB in pure strategies in $(\Theta, Y)$, there exists a robust FREIMB in pure strategies for the environment $(Y, Y)$ and hence Proposition[4](ii) holds. We show that Proposition[4](ii) implies LDC. Suppose there exists $\theta \in Fr(Y)$ such that $n_Y(\theta) \in C(b_1, b_2)$. Then for any $\delta > 0$, both $B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \cap H(b_1, b_2 \theta) \neq \emptyset$ and $B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \cap \{y \in \mathbb{R}^2 | b_i y < b_i \theta \} \neq \emptyset$ for $i = 1, 2$. Moreover, there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that

$$B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta). \quad (21)$$
For any $\delta > 0$ consider $\theta' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \cap \{x \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid b_2 x < b_2 \theta\}$ and $\theta'' \in B(\theta, \delta) \cap Y \cap \{x \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid b_1 x < b_1 \theta\}$. Then $B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y \subseteq H(b_1, b_1 \theta') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta')$. To see this, consider $\tilde{\theta} \in B(\theta, \epsilon) \cap Y$. By (21), $\tilde{\theta} \in \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta) \cup \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$. Suppose $\tilde{\theta} \in \overline{H}(b_1, b_1 \theta)$, then $b_1 \tilde{\theta} \geq b_1 \theta > b_1 \theta''$ so $\tilde{\theta} \in H(b_1, b_1 \theta'')$. Similarly, if $\tilde{\theta} \in \overline{H}(b_2, b_2 \theta)$, then $\tilde{\theta} \in H(b_2, b_2 \theta'')$. Hence $\tilde{\theta} \in H(b_1, b_1 \theta'') \cup H(b_2, b_2 \theta'')$.

**Step 2.3:** $\exists$ Robust FREIMB $\Rightarrow$ LDC. Suppose that the GDC is satisfied but condition the LDC is not (and hence by 2.2 there is not a robust FREIMB in pure strategies). Consider the point $\theta \in \overline{Fr}(Y)$ such that $n^H_n(\theta) \in C(b_1, b_2)$. If $Fr(Y)$ is locally convex at $\theta$, and the receiver is constrained to punish locally, it will never be optimal for her to mix and there is no robust FREIMB.

Suppose that $Fr(Y)$ is locally non-convex at $\theta$. In order to robustly deter deviations from such a point with mixed strategies there need to exist three sequences $\{y'_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}, \{y''_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset Fr(Y)$ and $\{\tilde{x}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset \text{co}(Y)$ such that:

1. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $y'_n \neq y''_n$ and $y'_n, y''_n \in \arg \min_{y \in Y}(|\tilde{x}_n - y|)$.
2. Both $\{y'_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\{y''_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converge to $\theta$.

The sequence $\{\tilde{x}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ represents the sequence of expected beliefs for the receiver, and for each $\tilde{x}_n$, there must be at least two distinct policies, $y'_n$ and $y''_n$, in the receiver’s best response set.

These requirements are very strong since they require $Fr(Y)$ to be tangent to a circle (centred at $\tilde{x}_n$) at both $y'_n$ and $y''_n$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, i.e., as they converge to $\theta$. Moreover, these requirements have to be satisfied for all $\theta \in \overline{Fr}(Y)$ for which the LDC is violated, in particular for a continuum of points. These requirements can be satisfied only if the non-convex part of the frontier at which the LDC is violated is itself an arc of a circumference. A policy space with such a frontier is non-generic. □

**Proof of Proposition 10:**

**Statement (i) $\Leftrightarrow$ Statement (ii):** This follows from Proposition 4.

**Statement (ii) $\Rightarrow$ Statement (iii):** Consider first the case $\Theta = Y$. We show that if for any pair of reports $(\theta', \theta'')$ in $Y$ such that $\theta' \neq \theta''$, the receiver responds by choosing $y^R(\theta', \theta'') = \theta' \wedge_{[b, \overline{b}]} \theta''$, this response deters both senders from deviating, whatever the realizations of $b_1, b_2 \in C[b, \overline{b}]$, and therefore the truthful strategies $(s_1, s_2)$ together with $y^R$ constitute a robust FRE.

Since $b_1, b_2 \in C[b, \overline{b}]$, there exist $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1, \beta_2 \geq 0$ such that, $b_i = \alpha_i \overline{b} + \beta_i \overline{b}$, for $i = 1, 2$. Then we have

$$b_1(\theta' \wedge_{[b, \overline{b}]} \theta'') = (\alpha_1 \overline{b} + \beta_1 \overline{b})(\theta' \wedge_{[b, \overline{b}]} \theta'') = \alpha_1 \overline{b}(\theta' \wedge_{[b, \overline{b}]} \theta'') + \beta_1 \overline{b}(\theta' \wedge_{[b, \overline{b}]} \theta'')$$

$$= \alpha_1 \min(b_1 \theta', b_2 \theta'') + \beta_1 \min(\overline{b} \theta', \overline{b} \theta'')$$

$$= \min(b_1 \theta', b_1 \theta'', \alpha_1 b_1 \theta' + \beta_1 \overline{b} \theta'', \alpha_1 b_1 \theta'' + \beta_1 \overline{b} \theta')$$

$$\leq \min(b_1 \theta', b_1 \theta'')$$

(22)
Analogously, \( b_2(\theta' \wedge b, \theta'') \leq \min(b_2\theta', b_2\theta'') \). Therefore, when the realized biases are \((b_1, b_2)\), the strategy \( y,i'/(\theta', \theta'') = \theta' \wedge b, \theta'' \) deters \( S_1 \) in state \( \theta'' \) from reporting \( \theta' \) and \( S_2 \) in state \( \theta' \) from reporting \( \theta'' \). (Since the rule \( y,i'/(\theta', \theta'') = \theta' \wedge b, \theta'' \) is anonymous with respect to the senders, it also deters them, when the biases are \((b_1, b_2)\), from generating the incompatible pair \((\theta', \theta'')\).) Note that whenever \( \theta', \theta'' \) converge to \( \theta, \theta' \wedge b, \theta'' \) also converges to \( \theta \), and hence \( \theta' \wedge b, \theta'' \) deters local deviations with local actions. Furthermore, observe that the inequality (22) and the analogous inequality for \( b_2 \) hold for any \( b_1, b_2 \in C[b, B] \) independently of whether those values of the biases belong to the support of the conditional distribution of the biases given the realization of the state.

Consider now \( Y \subseteq \Theta \), and for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) define \( \tilde{s}_i(\theta) = y^i(\theta) \). We show that for any realization of the biases \((b_1, b_2)\), \((\tilde{s}_1, \tilde{s}_2, y^\theta)\) is a robust FRE in \((\Theta, Y)\) for arbitrarily large biases.

Given \( y', y'' \in Y \) denote by \( x = y,i'(y', y'') = y' \wedge b, y'' \). For sender \( S_1 \) we need to show that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) such that \( y,i'(\theta) = y'', \theta + tb_1 - y'' \leq |\theta + tb_1 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \) and for all \( b_1 \in C[b, B] \). Consider any such \( \theta \in \Theta \) with \( y,i'(\theta) = y'' \), that is, \( y'' \) is the closest point in \( Y \) to \( \theta \). In particular \( |\theta - y''| \leq |\theta - x| \). Define \( z \) as the midpoint of the segment \([x, y'']\). Then \( (y'' - x) \geq z(y'' - x) \), and by (22), \( (\theta + tb_1)(y'' - x) \geq z(y'' - x) \) for all \( t > 0 \) and all \( b_1 \in C[b, B] \), or in other words \( |\theta + tb_1 - y''| \leq |\theta + tb_1 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \) and all \( b_1 \in C[b, B] \). A similar argument for \( S_2 \) shows that for any \( \theta \in \Theta \) such that \( y,i'(\theta) = y', |\theta + tb_2 - y'| \leq |\theta + tb_2 - x| \) for all \( t > 0 \) and all \( b_2 \in C[b, B] \). Therefore \((\tilde{s}_1, \tilde{s}_2, y^\theta)\) is a FRE in \((\Theta, Y)\).

**Statement (iii) \Rightarrow Statement (i):** Given \( Y \), if for \( \Theta \supseteq Y \) there exists a robust FRE then for \( \Theta = Y \) there exists a robust FRE. Given that for all \( \theta \in Y \), the realization of biases \((b, B)\) has positive probability, then Proposition 4 implies that condition (i) must hold.

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**Equivalence of Robustness and Continuity on the Diagonal**

As mentioned in the introduction, Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) define the following notion of continuity for the receiver’s strategy, for the case in which \( Y = \Theta \):

**Definition 9** (Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)). An equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y)\) is continuous on the diagonal if

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) = y(s_1(\theta), s_2(\theta))
\]

for any sequence \( (\theta_1^n, \theta_2^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) of pairs of states such that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_1^n = \lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_2^n = \theta \).

In this paper, we allow for the possibility that the policy space might be a strict subset of the state space. Below we extend the definition of continuity on the diagonal to the case \( Y \subseteq \Theta \). For simplicity, we state the definition for fully revealing equilibria.

**Definition 10.** A fully revealing equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y)\) is continuous on the diagonal if

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) = y^\theta(\theta)
\]

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for any sequence \( \{(\theta_1^n, \theta_2^n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) of pairs of states such that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_1^n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_2^n) = y^*(\theta) \).

We now show that this notion of continuity is equivalent to our definition of robustness.

**Lemma 2.** A fully revealing equilibrium \((s_1, s_2, y)\) is robust if and only if it is continuous on the diagonal.

**Proof.** \(\Rightarrow\) Consider any pair of sequences \( \{(\theta_1^n, \theta_2^n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset \Theta \) such that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_1^n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_2^n) = y^*(\theta) \). Since \( \mu \) deters local deviations with local actions, for every \( \epsilon > 0 \) there exists a \( \delta > 0 \) such that for all \( y^*(\theta'), y^*(\theta'') \in B(y^*(\theta), \delta) \cap Y \), \( y(s_1(\theta'), s_2(\theta'')) \in B(y^*(\theta), \epsilon) \). Now, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_1^n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} y^*(\theta_2^n) = y^*(\theta) \) implies that for that \( \delta > 0 \), there exists \( n_0 \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for all \( n \geq n_0 \), \( y^*(\theta_1^n), y^*(\theta_2^n) \in B(y^*(\theta), \delta) \cap Y \), which implies that \( y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) \in B(y^*(\theta), \epsilon) \) and hence the equilibrium is continuous on the diagonal.

\(\Leftarrow\) We argue by contradiction. Suppose that \( \mu \) does not deter local deviations with local actions. Then there exists \( \theta \in \Theta \) and \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) there exists \( \theta_1^n, \theta_2^n \) such that \( y^*(\theta_1^n), y^*(\theta_2^n) \in B(y^*(\theta), \frac{\epsilon}{n}) \cap Y \) with

\[
y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) \notin B(y^*(\theta), \epsilon) \setminus \left( B(\theta_1^n + b_2, |b_2|) \cup B(\theta_2^n + b_1, |b_1|) \right).
\]

Note that for any \( n \) such that \( \frac{1}{n} < \epsilon \), \( \theta_1^n \neq \theta_2^n \), because if \( \theta_1^n = \theta_2^n \), \( y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) = y^*(\theta_1^n) \in B(y^*(\theta), \epsilon) \setminus \left( B(\theta_1^n + b_2, |b_2|) \cup B(\theta_2^n + b_1, |b_1|) \right) \). Since \((s_1, s_2, y)\) is an equilibrium, \( y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) \notin B(\theta_1^n + b_2, |b_2|) \cup B(\theta_2^n + b_1, |b_1|) \), otherwise either sender 1 would have an incentive to deviate to \( s_1(\theta_1^n) \) when \( \theta_2^n \) is realized, or sender 2 would have an incentive to deviate to \( s_2(\theta_2^n) \) when \( \theta_1^n \) is realized. Hence \( y(s_1(\theta_1^n), s_2(\theta_2^n)) \notin B(\theta, \epsilon) \), which contradicts the diagonal continuity of the equilibrium. \(\Box\)
References


