Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Thomas Norman
Author-Email: thomas.norman@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name:Nuffield College, Oxford
Author-Workplace-Homepage:http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/
Title: The Evolution of Conflict under Inertia
Abstract:
  In Norman (2003), the introduction of individual strategy switching
  costs, and thus inertia, into stochastic evolutionary coordination 
  games was found inter alia to strengthen the mixed-strategy 
  equilibrium as a short- to medium-run equilibrium. This paper 
  considers the impact of such switching costs on the conflict 
  scenario of Hawk-Dove games. The "attractive" mixed-strategy 
  equilibrium of Hawk-Dove games represents a far better candidate 
  for long-run equilibrium than its unstable counterpart in 
  coordination games, and yet robust selection results have proved 
  elusive, with conditions on the selection dynamics generally being 
  required. Such a condition remains a necessity in the switching 
  cost model with state-independent mutations. However, a more 
  realistic model of state-dependent mutations driven by stochastic 
  switching costs overcomes this problem, and identifies a threshold 
  mean switching cost, above which the mixed-strategy equilibrium is 
  selected in the long run for a wide class of switching cost 
  distributions.
Length:42 pages
Creation-Date: 2003-02-17
Number:2003-W07
File-URL:http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2003/W7/Mixed3.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0307