Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Weak Axiomatic Demand Theory.
Author-Name: Quah, J.K.-H.
Keywords: DEMAND FUCTION ; REPRISENTATIVE AGENT ; TRANSITIVE PREFERENCES ; RATIONALIZABILITY
Length: 38 pages
Abstract: This paper gives a unified and simple treatment of three related questions in the demand theory of the weak axiom: (i) Is there an elementary, i.e., non-fixed point theoretic, proof of equilibrium existence when the excess demand function of an economy satisfies the weak axiom? (ii) What conditions are sufficient for a non-transitive preference to generate a continuous demand function? Note that such a demand must satisfy the weak, though not necessarily the strong, axiom. This motivates the next question. (iii) Given a function that satisfy the weak axiom, can we find a preference that generates it?
Classification-JEL: A10 ; D30
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w12

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?.
Author-Name: Felli, L.
Author-Name: Roberts, K.
Keywords: COMPETITION ; MARKET STRUCTURE
Length: 54 pages
Abstract: In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when marching is assortative and sellers' investment precede market competition the investments are constrained efficient.
Classification-JEL: D40 ; D41
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-W11

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Stratgies for Recruitment and Retention.
Author-Name: Stevens, M.
Keywords: WORKERS' REPRESENTATION ; LABOUR MARKET
Length: 37 pages
Abstract: This paper analyses the contract-posting equilibrium in a general equilibrium matching model of the labour market with on-the-job turnover. Privately optimal contracts have a rising wage-tenure profile, even when productivity is constant. The effect is to reduce equilibrium turnover; when jobs differ in productivity, turnover is below the level required for efficient matching of workers to jobs.
Classification-JEL: J41
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-W10

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Non-Gaussian OU Based Models and Some of their Uses in Financial Economics and Modelling by Levy Processes for Financial Econometrics.
Author-Name: Barndorff-Nielsen, O.E.
Author-Name: Shepard, N.
Keywords: ECONOMETRICS ; FINANCIAL MARKET
Length: 38 pages
Abstract: Non-Gaussian processes of Ornsetin-Uhlenbeck type, or OU processes for short, offer the possibility of capturing important distributional deviations from Gaussianity and for flexible modeling of dependence structure. This paper develops this potential, drawing on and extending powerful results from probability theory for application in statistical analysis.// The other paper reviews some of recent work in which Levy processe are used to model and analyse time series from financial econometrics. A main feature of the paper is the use of positive Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) type processes inside stochastic volatility processes. The basic probability theory associated with such models is discussed in some detail.
Classification-JEL: G10 ; C00 ; C50
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:1999-W9/2000-W3

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Reconciling Theoretical and Empirical Human Capital Earnings Functions.
Author-Name: Stevens, M.
Keywords: WAGES ; HUMAN CAPITAL
Length: 25 pages
Abstract: To interpret estimates of empirical earnings functions, and to resolve sample selection problems such as "tenure bias", the wage determination process must be specified. This paper show that an earnings function can be interpreted as a wage offer in a labour market auction in which the worker accepts the highest offer received.
Classification-JEL: J31
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-W9

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: R&D and Growth at the Industry Level.
Author-Name: Cameron, G.
Keywords: ECONOMIC GROWTH ; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ; MANUFACTURES
Length: 22 pages
Abstract: Although research and development is widely considered to be an important source of growth, relatively little is known about how its effects differ across industries. This is mainly because much reseach on the effect of R&D has used either cross-section or time-series data and the remainder has mostly looked at the effect of R&D on panels of firms. This paper constructs a heterogeneous dynamic panel data model of total factor productivity in the nineteen sectors of UK Manufacturing between 1972 and 1992.
Classification-JEL: C23 ; O3 ; O47 ; L6
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-W4

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: The Right Choice at the Right Time: a Herding Experiment in Endogenous Time.
Author-Name: Sgroi, D.
Keywords: LEARNING ; HERDING ; DELAY ; EXPERIMENTS
Length: 19 pages
Abstract: This paper examines experimental evidence relating to herd behaviour in situations when subjects can learn from each other, and can delay their decision. Subject acted rationally, gaining from observational learning, despite penalties for delay. Cascades were ubiquitous and reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early decision-makers produced herds on the incorrect choice. The major departure from rationality came when subjects realized they had chosen incorrectly despite following the majority view.
Classification-JEL: C91 ; D82 ; D83
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w15

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profit and Welfare.
Author-Name: Sgroi, D.
Keywords: HERDING ; INFORMATIONAL CASCADES ; LEARNING ; SOCIAL WELFARE ; PROMOTIONAL COMPAIGNS
Length: 24 pages
Abstract: Herding arises when an agent's private informationis swamped by public information in what Jackson and Kalai (1997) call a recurring game. The agent will fail to reveal his own information and will follow the actions of his predecessor and, as a result, useful information is lost, which might have highlighted a better choice for later decision-makers. This paper evaluates the strategy of forcing a sub-set of agents to make their decision early from the perspective of a social planner, and a firm with a valuable or valueless procuct. Promotional activity by firms can be explained as an attemps to overcome the herd externality and maximize sales.
Classification-JEL: D82 ; D83 ; L15
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w14

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Pro Arguments, Con Arguments and Status Quo Bias in Multi-Issue Decision Problems.
Author-Name: Spiegler, R.
Keywords: REFORM ; STATUS QUO ; ALTERNATIVES
Length: 28 pages
Abstract: The public faces a choice between two alternatives: the status quo and a "comprehesive reform" proposal that departs from the status quo in several dimensions. Deliberation over the problem takes the form of a public multi-issue debate. The "reformists" argue that the proposed reform satisfies desirable features lacked by the status quo. The status quo supporters counter-argue that some of these features are obtainable by a reform that departs from the status quo in a single dimension only. This "modest reform" is not a feasible alternative in the debate and is used by the status quo camp merely as an argument.
Classification-JEL: A10 ; D79
Creation-Date: 2000
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w13