Morelli, Massimo: Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
World Conference Econometric Society, 2000, Seattle

Massimo Morelli, Iowa State University and University of Minnesota
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
Session: C-1-12  Friday 11 August 2000  by Morelli, Massimo
This paper provides a game-theoretic model of parliamentary democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections. With plurality rule the model yields Duverger's Law, whereas with proportional representation a coalitional government is always needed and the number of parties can be large. When ideological policy preferences are strong the expected equilibrium policy outcome is closest to the median voter's preferred outcome with single-member-district plurality rule, while proportional representation does better in that respect when ideology is less intense.


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