| We construct the optimal regulation contract between a risk-averse principal, such as a small municipality, and a risk-neutral private ''public service'' operator, such as a large multinational firm. With adverse selection, moral hazard and socially costly transfers, we show that the more risk-averse the principal, the more result oriented the contract. We also show that, for a given degree of the regulator's risk aversion, the larger the number of operators supervised by one regulator, the more high powered the incentive scheme. In a two period dynamic setting, we focus on the commitment issue. We define a measure of the social value of a regulator's ability to sign binding long term contracts, and we obtain that this increases with the degree of the principal's risk aversion. We discuss some political implications of these results in terms of regulatory institutions' design. Such issues like the efficiency of the contract, credibility or independence of the regulator are tackled with this concept of regulator's risk aversion. |