Trannoy, Alain: The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian
World Conference Econometric Society, 2000, Seattle

Marc Fleurbaey, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise
Alain Trannoy, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise
The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian
Session: C-7-5  Sunday 13 August 2000  by Trannoy, Alain
We consider the simple model of an exchange economy and we examine whether it is possible to supplement the Paretian quasi-ordering with equity considerations based on multidimensional dominance criteria. The paper begins by a collection of results on multidimensional dominance when we refuse to use prices to compare allocations of bundles. We introduce a distinction between transfer of bundles and transfers of "goods". Whatever the multidi- -mensional dominance criterium considered, it is proved that it is impossible to have a social ranking of allocations satisfying both Pareto and dominance requirements. Once more it illustrates the difficulty to combine non welfarist considerations (dominance criteria) and welfarists one (Pareto condition). In a second best analysis a trade-off between dominance and efficiency is unavoidable. We exploit the connection between the no-domination and a dominance axiom to propose a way to rationalize the set of Pareto-non-dominated allocations.

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