| Chong-En Bai, University of Hong Kong Zhigang Tao, University of Hong Kong Changqi Wu, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology |
| Expropriation and Incentives for Team Production |
| Session: C-4-2 Saturday 12 August 2000 by Bai, Chong-En |
| Recent research suggests that expropriation by controlling shareholders of other shareholders is an important problem in both publicly held and closely held firms. This paper examines how partners in closely held firms can make control-right arrangements to mitigate expropriation and other incentive problems. We further analyze the interaction between revenue-sharing contracts and control-right arrangements and investigate how the former also helps in dealing with the aforementioned set of problems. Our theoretical results are consistent with the stylized facts that we find from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts. |
| Submitted paper full-text in .pdf |