| Bjorn Frank, University of Hohenheim Guenther G. Schulze, University of Konstanz |
| Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility |
| Session: C-11-2 Tuesday 15 August 2000 by Schulze, Guenther G. |
| This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge. |
| Submitted paper full-text in .pdf |