| Rabah Amir, University of Copenhagen Anna Stepanova, University of Southern Denmark at Odense |
| First and Second Mover Advantage in Asymmetric Price Duopoly |
| Session: C-12-13 Wednesday 16 August 2000 by Stepanova, Anna |
| We consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric linear costs. We provide a generalization of some well-known results in the cases where prices are strategic substitutes or complements, dispensing with extraneous assumptions of single-valued optimal reactions, uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium, ... We also consider a new mixed case. Our approach is based on the theory of supermodular optimization/games. Furthermore, we show that even when prices are strategic complemnts, one firm may have a first mover advantage under a linear demand. |
| Submitted paper full-text in .pdf |