| This paper studies the influence of social norms and class on a marriage bargaining process.We use a model where a couple negotiates over a consumption allocation in case of marriage. Social norms determine the sharing rule for the gains from marriage. It depends on the class -- represented by the personal wealth of both players -- which unions may be fficient. Adding hidden information on the player's characteristic or type we find that only in societies giving almost equal rights to both genders the efficient bargaining outcome can be incentive compatible. Otherwise, that is in a patriarchat or in a matriarchat, the person having more argaining power, that is the person demanding the larger share of the gains form marriage, would have an incentive to overstate his/her type in order to get married. Consequently a binding incentive compatibility constraint in the second best bargaining outcome must be to prevent a low type man in a patriarchat, respectively a low type woman in a matriarchat, to pretend to be of high characteristic in order to form a marriage. Moreover, a wealthy person with low bargaining power -- a rich maiden living in a patriarchal society -- may have an incentive to play down her type. |