| Salvador Barbera, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Carmen Bevia, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona |
| Self-Selection Consistent Choices |
| Session: C-7-10 Sunday 13 August 2000 by Bevia, Carmen |
| This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism. |
| Submitted paper full-text in .pdf |