Klonner, Stefan: Rotating Savings and Credit Associations as Insurance
World Conference Econometric Society, 2000, Seattle

Stefan Klonner, Universitaet Heidelberg
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations as Insurance
Session: C-8-4  Monday 14 August 2000  by Klonner, Stefan
Recent theoretical research on rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) suggests that identical individuals prefer a random to a bidding Rosca when participants save for a lumpy durable or an investment good. Here,in contrast, under the assumption that participants are risk averse and that their incomes are stochastic and independent, it is shown that a random Rosca is not advantageous, while participation in a bidding Rosca improves ex ante expected utility if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. When information on individual incomes is private, fixed contributions to a bidding Rosca help to mitigate the problem of information asymmetries. When information on incomes is public, a lack of enforceability of variable contributions may explain the existence of Roscas instead of more efficient insurance arrangements.
Submitted paper full-text in .pdf


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