Evans, Robert: Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining and the Deadline Effect
World Conference Econometric Society, 2000, Seattle

Robert Evans, St. John's College
Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining and the Deadline Effect
Session: C-13-2  Wednesday 16 August 2000  by Evans, Robert
A one-shot simultaneous-offers bargaining game is presented in which the unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the infinite-horizon Rubinstein alternating-offers game. For each player there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not arrive. A finitely-repeated version of the game with a small amount of (two-sided) incomplete information about disagreement payoffs is then used to explain the deadline effect. In any pure strategy equilibrium of this game agreement is reached only in the final period.\vspace{0.2in}
Submitted paper full-text in .pdf

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