| Alexander Kovalenkov, University of North Carolina Myrna Holtz Wooders, University of Toronto and University of Warwick |
| Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs |
| Session: C-12-5 Wednesday 16 August 2000 by Wooders, Myrna Holtz |
| This presentation focuses on new approachs to large games introduced in five papers by the authors (one with the same title as this abstract). In a new framework of parameterised collections of games with and without side payments, we provide nonemptiness of approximate core, a law of scarcity, and convergence results. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our nonemptiness theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. Our convergence results provide a new sort of application of standard theorems from linear programming. The results are applied to a model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows widespread externalities -- that is, the payoffs to members of a club may depend on the economy in which the club is situated. |
| Submitted paper full-text in .pdf |